Editorial

The focus of this special issue of *Theoria* is the Politics of Migration. Our aim in designing and attracting contributions to this issue was to contribute to the current debates on various aspects of global migration practices that are challenging the ways in which many nation-states, sending and receiving migrants, conceive of their place in this ever-changing globalised and globalising world in which we all live. International Relations theorists have, for several years, been writing about the contesting phenomena of integration and disintegration in global politics. As the world becomes more globalised, more linked and interdependent, the reality of a kind of global citizenship for the privileged elite with access to the markets and their spoils become more apparent. Those on the other end of the spectrum, often immigrant, minority and working class groupings who do not have access to resources beyond those promised to them by the state they rely on, react against these globalising forces. The result is a contest between a global integration and pulling together of individuals all over the world with similar political and economic situations, and a disintegration within and between nation-states, where those without these networks retreat into ethnic and cultural enclaves that offer them protection and defence against globalising impulses. Migration patterns throw many of the issues related to this contest into sharp relief, as migrants fall into both ‘categories’—those who work and move within powerful global networks, and those who do not, and often refuse to move outside of their limited and site-specific enclaves. Three of the four papers in this issue focus on Europe—in particular, the European Union—and explore issues related to rights justification and implementation for immigrants at a national and supranational level; the integration of immigrants into particular host networks, and the gaps between the rhetoric and practice of immigration policy; and the challenges that migrant crime pose to host nation-states within the EU. The fourth article moves between the EU and Africa to point to emerging debates and shifts in thinking about the link between migration and development, chiefly characterised in the link between the Global North and the South, and the need for new direction and conceptualisation in migration research more broadly.

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In ‘Development and Migration—Migration and Development: What Comes First? Global Perspective and African Experience’, Stephen Castles moves from Europe to Africa to focus on shifts in the debate about development and migration. He believes that it is essential to engage with the question posed in his title for three clear reasons. Firstly because it has become clear to him the politicians, officials and the general public believe that if development policies are improved, and developing nations in the South uplifted, international migration will be drastically reduced. Castles points out that this assumption is false because higher levels of development create more rather than less mobility, at least for a lengthy period of time. He also points out that this view implies that international migration from South to North is an evil that needs to be halted. His second reason for engaging with this question is the gap that exists between migration research and the policies that are being made. He believes that there is both something wrong with the research that is being done—largely that it is fragmented and narrow and does not lead to a collective understanding and body of knowledge—and that migration scholars have failed to get their research seen and understood by decision-makers. The third reason is that there has been a recent shift in thinking and theorising about migration and development that shows that migration can have a positive effect on countries of origin. Thus, there seems to be a space or an opportunity in which to seriously confront the question of migration and development, and advance these debates and this important body of knowledge and theory.

Castles begins with a brief overview of the history of migration and development, the gist of which is that throughout the 1950s, 60s, 70s and later in the 20th century, labour migration has been a key focus of migration policy and decision-making, and there was an idea, often disproven, that labour migrants would contribute to the development of their countries of origin through inflows of capital and experience gained. South-North migrants have also been viewed as a security threat and a threat to national cohesion and identity, as they come from such different religious, cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. In the 21st century thus far there has been a shift from viewing migrants in a largely negative light to seeing the potential of international migration to bring about ‘economic and social development in countries of origin’. Castles points to two debates—one social and the other academic – that have contributed to this shift. Replacing older neo-classical and historical-institutional theoretical approaches that dominated the debates from the 1950s to the 1980s are transi-
tional theories, like the new economics of labour migration (NELM) and dual or segmented labour market theory, that make it possible to move towards ‘more holistic understandings of the migratory process’. These approaches seek to re-theorise the links between individual and group human action and wider processes of change in social structures.

Castles moves on to argue that political considerations, and policy-making, are at the heart of the questions and topics of investigation in migration theory, and that this can serve to separate migration studies from broader social enquiry practices. He looks at policies and understandings of the link between migration and development in the EU, and emerging debates in Africa as case studies in point. In Europe, many countries actively recruited labour migrants until the oil shock of 1973, when labour migration was officially halted, only to be turned into family reunion and settlement. After the end of the Cold War, this was added to by labour migration and asylum seekers from the former Soviet bloc, and the South. Until this point in the 1970s European governments had seen migration in economic terms, and were thus unprepared for the backlash against immigration as it created new forms of cultural and religious diversity that challenged many European nation-states’ self-conceptions and understandings of national identity and citizenship. The new focus in Europe, highly politicised, became integration, community relations and social cohesion. The link between these shifts in Europe and development is marked by certain trends in policy-making and thinking: in the early 2000s conflict resolution strategies and developmental approaches became fashionable, as were trade in place of migration and asylum control in the 1970s and 80s, thus leading to ideas of linking development aid to African countries to encourage return migration and development of countries of origin.

In Africa, debates on migration and development centre on creating sufficient local rural development to avoid or reduce out-migration, and African migration scholars have devoted much time and research to internal and international mobility within Africa and its political, social, cultural and economic dimensions. Africa is, and historically has been, a continent of high internal and international mobility, and recent migration has been motivated by the desire for better livelihoods, as people move to seek opportunities in urban areas with higher growth and better income. Migration within and between African countries has been and is closely linked to economic development, but this has not been part of any official strategy; rather as a
result of individual and family decisions and movements. Castles claims that discourses on migration in the North, particularly Europe, have focused on African nationals as a threat to European security and national sovereignty, which has led to attempts to highly formalise immigration to prevent long-term settlement and illegal and informal migration. African scholars, though, see migration as a more common phenomenon that can create both costs and great benefits.

Castles’ chief argument, in examining the new transitional theories and the shifts in migration thinking and research, and also policy, is that we need a new way of conceptualising and undertaking migration research. He believes very strongly that the isolation of both migration and development theorists from one another and also from mainstream sociological theory is harmful to the field of migration research, as it results in the narrow and fragmented nature of migration research pointed to in the first part of his paper. It is necessary to engage with processes of social transformation influenced as they are by globalisation as a way of conceptualising and engaging with the relationships between human mobility and social transformation and development. He argues that it is very important that migration theorists find new ways of understanding the relationships between the various socio-spatial levels of the global, regional, national and local, and also to look at developing transnational research processes based on both international and interdisciplinary teams of researchers. Migration and development have to be seen and theorised within the wider context of global power, wealth and inequality, and ‘conceptualising migration as a key aspect of the social transformations that affect all parts of the world today can enrich both migration studies and the social sciences as a whole’.

In his article, ‘Immigrant Rights and Regional Inclusion: Democratic Experimentalism in the European Union’, Jonathan Bowman is concerned with the justification and implementation of rights claims in the European Union (EU), which are further complicated by their contested nature when they are immigrant rights claims within member states and the supranational EU. He argues that justification can become part of deliberative practices that entrench these rights, and that the heterogeneity of deliberative practices in different Member State administrative contexts can be turned into an ‘epistemic virtue’ when including additional perspectives that increase the likelihood of avoiding error and alleviating bias. He confronts three different theoretical perspectives on the justification and implementation of rights claims, from the liberal nationalists, the post-national theorists to the
cosmopolitans, and counters their approaches with that of ‘democratic experimentalism’ and a ‘rolling rights regime’.

Bowman seeks to give an overview of a ‘rolling rights regime’ and how it has developed in contemporary human rights debates, particularly those in the context of European Union and other European institutions concerned with human rights, such as NATO, the Council of Europe, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He is particularly concerned with the link between rights justification and rights protection, and the kinds of institutional support structures required to entrench support for and justification of minority rights, like those of immigrant groups in the EU. The democratic experimentalist approach turns both justification and protection of rights into questions of democratisation by ‘viewing the new communicative networks created by institutional differentiation as potentially complementary forums for problem-solving inquiry’. In order to support his claim that experimentalism offers the EU, and immigrant minorities within it, what the other three approaches cannot—a way to link the best practices of different states within a ‘shared social imaginary’ in order to confront and solve problems related to rights claims of immigrant groups and non-citizens in a constantly evolving and ‘rolling’ manner—Bowman turns to the EU and Turkish immigrants. Briefly, this is the largest group of immigrants in the EU at present, and is also a group that finds political naturalisation and social integration challenging, partly as a result of personal and religious attitudes and beliefs and partly as a result of the complex nature of legal-juridical relations between Member States and the EU structures, and between the EU and Turkey, which is not an EU Member as yet.

Challenging the liberal nationalist and post-nationalist approaches, Bowman argues that Turkish immigrants cannot have full recourse to rights claims and political participation because of the difficulties confronting them as they naturalise themselves politically and socially, and because locating human rights claims in personhood, as post-nationalists like Yasemin Soysal does, divorces human rights from democracy, and from the institutions necessary to realise these rights claims. Cosmopolitans, in agreement with democratic experimentalists, argue that basic rights must be embedded politically at national, institutional and supranational levels in order to be realised in a ‘sufficiently democratic manner’. Bowman argues that experimentalism can overcome failures of the other approaches to fully account for how immigrant and other minority rights claims can be
fully realised, and can also provide a ‘model of political socialisation for meeting the democratic ideals of accountability and freedom as non-domination’. Bowman uses extensive examples from the current EU situation to show that experimentalism can offer a real alternative for realising human rights through freedom-promoting, normative practices like sharing best practices and constantly reviewing approaches and policies in a ‘rolling’ manner. The rolling rights regime provides a strong alternative response to the many immigrants who continue to fall outside of the constitutional jurisdiction of many member states—immigrants who contribute a great deal to the EU’s economy and civil society yet are unable to participate effectively in decision-making practices.

In her article entitled ‘From rhetoric to practice: a critique of immigration policy in Germany through the lens of Turkish-Muslim women’s experiences of migration’, Sherran Clarence also looks at the situation of Turkish immigrants in the EU, specifically at German immigration policy and the experiences of Turkish-Muslim immigrant women. She argues that there is a gap between the rhetoric surrounding immigration practices and policies and their actual implementation in Germany. In spite of encouraging and long-overdue policy changes and upgrades in the last decade, Germany is still a reluctant country of immigration, and this can be clearly seen in the experiences of Turkish-Muslims migrating to, and settling in, Germany. The paper takes the position that immigration is a necessary reality for European Union member states, in response to declining birth rates and a declining labour market. Immigrants are a vital part of creating long-term economic and civil society stability in Germany, and many other EU Member States. In spite of this reality, though, Germany is still reluctant to make wide-reaching and significant policy changes that will effectively integrate immigrants more completely into German political and social life.

The Immigration Act, currently in place and which came into being in 2005, is a scaled-down version of the policy Gerhard Schröder’s government originally wanted in place. Many of the reforms they proposed, like a points-based green card system, and more inclusive citizenship rights, were blocked by the Christian Democrats, the party currently in power. Nonetheless, the new Act is a marked improvement on the previous legislation, and makes integration of immigrants, both new and long-term residents, a clear priority. The policy makes provision for language and civic education, and relaxes some of the residence requirements needed for family
reunification. It also creates space for women, particularly Turkish-Muslim women—the Turks are the largest group of immigrants in Germany—to gain their own work and residence permits separate from their husbands. This is an important issue, among others, as many Turkish women come to Germany with their husbands, and oftentimes have been forced into those arranged marriages by their families. When they seek to escape they are in danger of being murdered – honour killings are not uncommon in all parts of Germany, particularly in Berlin – or physically and emotionally abused. There are many shelters set up around Germany, many of them state-funded, to enable young Turkish women to escape their abusive domestic situations. The paper uses this example, among others, to indicate that although this is the lived reality for many Turkish immigrant women, the policy does not really account for this. Even though it is possible, it is a very lengthy and difficult bureaucratic process for Turkish women to get their own separate work and residence permits if they have migrated with their fathers or husbands, and even when they succeed, they struggle to move outside of the ethnic enclaves to find work and accommodation, and are often cut off from family and other support networks, at least initially. This makes the reality of immigration very different from the policy.

One area in which the German government has only made fairly small steps forward is citizenship legislation. The basis for gaining German citizenship has shifted from *ius sanguinis* (birth or ethnic descent) to *ius soli* (residence), but gaining such citizenship, especially for long-term residents, is a lengthy process, and the German government does not allow dual citizenship. Citizenship theorists like Yasemin Soysal and Thomas Faist argue that post-national or social citizenship, located in the person, has been attained for particularly long-term migrants, and thus looking toward legal, nationally based citizenship rights is unnecessary. Long-term immigrants, and also new immigrants, have recourse to rights claims as they are recognised as part of the nation-state in which they are located. However, other theorists like Christian Joppke and Dietrich Thränhardt argue, more correctly Clarence believes, that formal national citizenship is a must for immigrant groups in Germany and the EU, as without it they will be subject to exclusion and xenophobia, and without formal structures, whether at national or supranational level, to which they can appeal for rights protection, they will continue to be marginalised, and for immigrant women in particular, this invisibility to the government and citizens of the host state will continue to
result in wide-scale abuse which will eventually bring to bear costs for that state.

In ‘Macro-Lessons from Micro-Crime: Understanding Migrant Crime through the Comparative Examination of Local Markets’, Harlan Koff argues that although many issues related to the complex subject of immigration have been explored, one issue that remains largely under-investigated is the relationship between immigration and crime. He claims that there is little agreement between scholars as to whether immigrant crime is a sign of social exclusion or a rational choice by immigrants who seek economic security they cannot obtain through legal markets. This article argues that immigrant crime must be studied at a local level, and any analysis of immigrant behaviour at this level should be informed by the assumption that economic integration is the ability to exert power over socio-economic systems. As such, this article explores immigrant crime in four European cities in France and Italy, and claims that the level of migrant autonomy in these markets indicates whether migrant crime is entrepreneurial or indicative of social deviance.

It is a fact that in Europe, particularly in recent years as numbers of migrants have increased significantly, that migrant crime has been sensationalised by the media and seized upon by right-wing politicians and their supporters as a sign of the threat immigrants pose to European security. It would perhaps be tempting, then, to dismiss the issue of migrant crime as the xenophobic invention of right-wingers and the mass media. However, Koff provides detailed statistics that show that migrants are overrepresented in prison populations relative to their proportion of the general population of several EU Member States, indicating that indeed migrants are involved in crime. This is not Koff’s concern, however. He is more concerned with what this involvement indicates, and what it means for the EU and its members.

Koff states that migrant ‘integration’ into criminal markets is complex: on the one hand it can lead to anti-immigrants backlash because of the fear it creates in law-abiding citizens, and on the other, because of the threat migrants pose to established native crime networks which can lead to xenophobia. This is why Koff insists on an examination of migrant crime from a political economy approach that ‘studies the interaction of migrant resources and market structures’. Integration into criminal networks is determined by autonomy, which, Koff states, is a function of market constraints and social networks that can offer both social and economic resources to migrants. He examines three types of immigrant crime in his four case cities, argu-
ing that it is the type that is important, not the amount of crime recorded. These three types are autonomous entrepreneurship, where migrants exert power in crime markets; restricted entrepreneurship where immigrants are involved in crime under the auspices of native criminal organisations; and deviance resulting from social exclusion. Interestingly, his account of the nature and amount of crime in his case cities shows that the types of crime dominant in the two Italian cities fall into the first two categories, and that, even though restricted trans-national entrepreneurship is growing in France, in the two French cities the most prevalent type of crime is deviance linked to social exclusion.

Koff explains this correlation by looking at migrant integration into legal markets. The statistics he provides show that indeed, in the two Italian cities, migrant unemployment is only slightly higher than overall unemployment, whereas in the two French cities, migrant unemployment is double that of native unemployment, indicating ‘overrepresentation in social marginalisation’. Here the question of power becomes important, as it is arguable that migrants in France feel a sense of powerlessness that their counterparts on the Italian case cities do not experience, and that this lack of power leads to a higher incidence of deviant, reactive crime as opposed to more entrepreneurial, powerful crime. This article clearly indicates that migrant crime is not simply the product of choices made to counteract a lack of legal economic opportunities, and nor is it a survival strategy for the relatively powerless migrants; rather migrants make career choices based on their opportunities and resources, as do native citizens, and the challenge for European host states is to find ways to integrate and empower migrants in order to create attractive legal alternatives to those currently being chosen.

This collection of articles offers a rich range of debates and discussions of various practical and theoretical issues related to the politics and practice of migration, particularly from the South to the North – in these cases the European Union Member States. They are a valuable contribution to the wider field of migration research, and contribute to existing and emerging debates in Europe and further afield.

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