From Friendly Disinterest to Strategic Partnership?
German–Ukrainian Relations Since the Full-Scale Russian Invasion
in German Politics and SocietySearch for other papers by Mattia Nelles in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
All currencies in US Dollar
Abstract
Since 2014 and especially after 2022, the German–Ukrainian relations have developed impressive depth. With over seven billion euros in military aid spent since 2022, another seven earmarked for 2024, and a long-term security agreement signed, Germany has become an indispensable and reliable partner for Ukraine. Given the dire situation on the battlefield and the prospect of a long and difficult war ahead, several factors impede the potential strategic relationship. If not addressed, those could prove a problem for the otherwise strong German support for and partnership with Ukraine. They include improper communication on the German side, especially from the chancellor who is not properly making the case to his electorate more broadly as to why Ukraine aid is in Germany's interest. While Germany has changed course and only after Russia openly invaded Ukraine, it has failed to critically examine its failed Russia policy and underinvested in addressing what scholars refer to as the country's “Ukraine-ignorance”. Additionally, the cautious and fear-driven logic of German decision-making and a lingering distrust of the Ukrainian side impede the provision of much-needed weaponry and influence the bilateral relationship.
Contributor Notes
Mattia Nelles is the CEO and co-founder of the German-Ukrainian Bureau, a boutique consultancy focused on research and strategic advisory to enhance German–Ukrainian relations at civil society, business, and the state levels. Since 2014, Mattia has focused on Eastern Europe, but especially Ukraine, its foreign and domestic policy, and politics. He lived and worked in Ukraine for several years and holds a master's degree in political science from the Free University of Berlin. Email: mattia.nelles@gmail.com