The 2023 Judicial Reform That Wasn't

From Non-decision Constitution-Making to Decision and Back

in Israel Studies Review
Author:
Joshua Segev Senior Lecturer, Netanya Academic College, Israel segejosh@netanya.ac.il

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Abstract

This article offers two interpretations of the constitutional confrontation that ensued over the proposed 2023 judicial overhaul legislation. It places the debate in the context of a broader culture war over Israel's conditions of legitimacy and as a continuum. At one end of the spectrum, the judicial overhaul legislation can be seen as pursuing a ‘decision to decide’ tactic, countered by the opposition using the same constitutional tactic in the opposite direction. On the other end of the spectrum, the judicial overhaul program could be viewed as an opening position in constitutional negotiations, with reform advocates seeking only the nomination of a few committed conservative justices and the maintenance of the constitutional status quo of deciding not decide. To this end, the nationalists’ move was again countered by the opposition using the same constitutional tactic but in the opposite direction to prevent this outcome.

Contributor Notes

JOSHUA SEGEV is a Senior Lecturer at Netanya Academic College, School of Law. He joined the Netanya Academic College faculty after completing his Doctor of Juridical Science degree at University of Virginia School of Law. He was Editor in Chief of the Netanya Academic College Law Review, Associate Editor of the Tel-Aviv University Law Review, and Associate Editor of the Israel Yearbook on Labor Law. His main research interests are constitutional law, judicial review, and philosophy of law. E-mail: segejosh@netanya.ac.il

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