On the Prospect for Market-based Approaches to Incentivise Deliberative Global Governance

Responding to a Response by Agafonow

in Theoria
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In the preceding article Alejandro Agafonow explores the idea of incorporating market-based approaches into the structure of The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in order to address particular deliberative and democratic shortcomings (Agafonow 2011). This exploration was in response to an article I wrote on safeguarding deliberative global governance within the Global Fund and with particular deliberative deficits that were highlighted within that article (Brown 2010). In my article, it was argued that the decision- making capacity of the Global Fund suffered from a deliberative deficit in that donor members enjoyed an unfair advantage in boardroom deliberations due to two structural inequalities. First, donors enjoyed an unfair deliberative advantage because of their ability to utilise an effective veto, which manifested itself in the form of possible threats in the reduction of future donations if specific initiatives passed. Second, donors often enjoyed an unfair negotiating position due to their ability to meet prior to Board meetings and thus possessed an ability to create donor caucuses where collective voting strategies could be formulated. It was concluded that these two conditions created real perceptions of unequal deliberation between donor and non-donor Board members and therefore threatened to render the Global Fund’s multisectoral mandate for creating deliberative decision-making via agreed consensus as mere window-dressing for an obfuscated form of multilateral power politics as usual. In responding to this deliberative deficit, I argued that certain regulative devices should be incorporated into the Global Fund Framework Document as a means to safeguard deliberative procedures constitutionally within the multisectoral Global Fund Board.

Theoria

A Journal of Social and Political Theory

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