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Abstract
In this article, I intervene in the debate about the nature of Afrocommunitarianism between Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye. I contend that Menkiti’s talk of ‘personhood’ entails a perfectionist moral theory to the effect that one ought to lead a morally excellent life in a context of ‘being-with-others’. Secondly, I deny that Menkiti’s political theory rejects rights per se; rather, I submit, a more charitable reading would recognise that he takes an agnostic stance towards them and that he conceives of an African political theory as one that is duty-based (and if it considers rights at all, these are secondary to duties). I also highlight that Menkiti’s contribution poses a challenge to African philosophers to justify their ontological commitment to rights. I conclude by drawing our attention to the fact that Gyekye’s in his latter political philosophy writings endorses Menkiti’s duty-based political theory, that rights take secondary consideration to duties.
Contributor Notes
Motsamai Molefe is a lecturer in Ethics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His research and teaching interests encompass African philosophy, African ethics, applied ethics, and moral philosophy. He is author of ‘A Rejection of Humanism in the African Moral Tradition’ (2015); ‘An African Religious Moral Theory and Abortion’ (In Man, Medicine and Values. Edited by E. Starzyńska-Kościuszko & A. Kucner, 2014); and ‘Critical Reflections on Gyekye’s Humanism – Defending Supernaturalism’ (In Ontologized Ethics: A Critical Reader in African Meta-ethics, 2013).