Relational Ethics and Partiality
A Critique of Thad Metz’s ‘Towards an African Moral Theory’
in Theoria
Abstract
In this article, I question the plausibility of Metz’s African moral theory from an oft neglected moral topic of partiality. Metz defends an Afro-communitarian moral theory that posits that the rightness of actions is entirely definable by relationships of identity and solidarity (or, friendship). I offer two objections to this relational moral theory. First, I argue that justifying partiality strictly by invoking relationships (of friendship) ultimately fails to properly value the individual for her own sake – this is called the ‘focus problem’ in the literature. Second, I argue that a relationship-based theory cannot accommodate the agent-related partiality since it posits some relationship to be morally fundamental. My critique ultimately reveals the inadequacy of a relationship-based moral theory insofar as it overlooks some crucial moral considerations grounded on the individual herself in her own right.
Contributor Notes
Motsamai Molefe is a lecturer in Ethics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His research and teaching interests encompass African philosophy, African ethics, Applied ethics, Moral philosophy and Social and Political Philosophy. His latest publications are ‘A Rejection of Humanism in the African Moral Tradition’ (2015); ‘A Critique of Thad Metz’s African Theory of Moral Status’ (2017); ‘An African Religious Ethics and The Euthyphro Problem’ (2017); ‘Personhood and Partialism in African Philosophy’ (Forthcoming). Recently, he has been requested to contribute a chapter into the International Encyclopedia of Ethics on ‘Ubuntu ethics’; and, he is also contributing a chapter on a book dedicated to African Environmental Ethics.
