Epistemic Reasonableness and Respect for Persons

in Theoria
Author:
Zhuoyao LiSt. John's University liz@stjohns.edu

Search for other papers by Zhuoyao Li in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Close
View More View Less
Restricted access

Recent discussions by Martha Nussbaum and Steven Wall shed new light on the concept of reasonableness in political liberalism and whether the inclusion of epistemic elements in the concept necessarily makes political liberalism lose its antiperfectionist appeal. This article argues that Nussbaum’s radical solution to eliminate the epistemic component of reasonableness is neither helpful nor necessary. Instead, adopting a revised understanding of epistemic reasonableness in terms of a weak view of rationality that is procedural, external and second-order rather than a strong view that is substantial, internal and first-order can help political liberalism maintain an epistemic dimension in the idea of reasonableness without becoming perfectionist. In addition, political liberalism can defend a stronger account of respect for persons against liberal perfectionism on the basis of the revised understanding of epistemic reasonableness. Both arguments serve to demonstrate the strength of the political liberal project.

  • Collapse
  • Expand

Theoria

A Journal of Social and Political Theory

Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 315 77 4
Full Text Views 25 1 0
PDF Downloads 40 1 0