Epistemic Reasonableness and Respect for Persons
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Abstract
Recent discussions by Martha Nussbaum and Steven Wall shed new light on the concept of reasonableness in political liberalism and whether the inclusion of epistemic elements in the concept necessarily makes political liberalism lose its antiperfectionist appeal. This article argues that Nussbaum's radical solution to eliminate the epistemic component of reasonableness is neither helpful nor necessary. Instead, adopting a revised understanding of epistemic reasonableness in terms of a weak view of rationality that is procedural, external and second-order rather than a strong view that is substantial, internal and first-order can help political liberalism maintain an epistemic dimension in the idea of reasonableness without becoming perfectionist. In addition, political liberalism can defend a stronger account of respect for persons against liberal perfectionism on the basis of the revised understanding of epistemic reasonableness. Both arguments serve to demonstrate the strength of the political liberal project.
Contributor Notes
Zhuoyao Li is an assistant professor of philosophy at St. John's University and the managing editor of Philosophy and Social Criticism. His areas of specialization include social and political philosophy, ethics and comparative political theory. His current research focuses on the political nature of the state and the relationship between state actions and the values of citizens in both Western and Eastern contexts. His articles appear in several peer-reviewed journals, including the Review of Politics, Philosophy East and West, and Ethics and Global Politics. E-mail: liz@stjohns.edu