Israel’s wall and the logic of encystation: Sovereign exception or wild sovereignty?

Glenn Bowman

Abstract: It seems vital, in the face of escalating Israeli expansionism in the Palestinian Territories and obstructionism in the “Peace Process,” to theorize the cultural foundations of a process of containment and dispossession of Palestinians that can no longer convincingly be seen as mere strategy. Symptomatic of the Israeli state program is the “wall” (a.k.a., “the Security Fence” or the “Apartheid Wall”) and its radical encroachment into territory designated as the grounds of a future Palestinian state. The following essay attempts an anthropological analysis of the concept of “border” in contemporary Israeli thought and practice, and, in so doing, assesses the impact of a limitless sovereignty on both an encompassed minority population and on international relations more generally.

Keywords: border, encystation, ethno-nationalism, Israel/Palestine, sovereignty

Prologue

I wrote the descriptive elements of the following article in the autumn of 2003 after witnessing first hand the depredations imposed by the Israeli state on a community I had worked with closely for nearly fifteen years. I have not attempted to update substantially my sketch of what is being done to Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, and the West Bank (although I have, where appropriate, provided new information). As anyone attending to the news will know, the process described here has continued apace (and has in fact accelerated in the wake of the soi disant “withdrawal” from the Gaza Strip); the wall has engulfed more land, the settlements have grown larger, and the Palestinians have experienced higher levels of unemployment, emigration, and malnutrition. This slow process of ethnic cleansing (all the more effective for its unhurried inexorability) has been operating openly in Gaza and the West Bank since the Oslo Accords, and will continue to work with brutal efficiency either until the last Palestinian leaves (or blows himself or herself up in an emotive but fruitless suicide bombing) or until a sustained international outcry calls a halt to it.

The architecture of entombment

In the summer of 2003 I spent several weeks in Beit Sahour, the West Bank town in which...
I have carried out fieldwork since the late 1980s, observing—among other things—the rapacious hunger with which Israel’s “Anti-Terrorist Fence” (more commonly known as “the Wall”) consumed Palestinian lands and infrastructure, biting off roads, wells, housing projects, community centers, and other supports of Palestinian life. On the northern border of Beit Sahour the Wall was for the most part a bulldozed strip of between twenty and forty meters in width containing two three-meter barbed-wire-topped fences, a ditch, another fence with electronic movement sensors, two raked sand “trace strips,” and a paved patrol road. It meandered through the countryside in what appeared to me to be an aimless and extravagant manner (extravagant insofar as it costs on average $2.27 million per kilometer) until I recognized that it ran right along the edge of the inhabited sectors of Beit Sahour and neighboring Bethlehem and Beit Jala, gathering behind it nearly all of the vineyards, the olive groves, the orchards, and other agricultural lands of the local people.3

The Wall, however, was not the only bit of caging being erected. Since September 2000, when the Second Intifada erupted after Ariel Sharon’s armed “visit” to Jerusalem’s Haram ash-Sharif, Bethlehem District had been ghettoized through the programmatic erection of fifty-nine barriers across its roads, fifty kilometers of “Anti-Terrorist Fence,” and a tight bracket of “bypass roads,” which, to the 170,000 Palestinians trapped inside, were functionally indistinguishable from the rest of the Wall. To the east of Beit Sahour the Wall linked up with the “Za’tara Bypass Road” (a militarily guarded “settler road” between Jerusalem and Tequ’a, which neither passes through nor allows access to or from Palestinian towns or villages). To the West it sliced through residential and commercial areas of Bethlehem and Beit Jala (devastating them through its imposition of an emptied security zone stretching variously from the Wall between 50 and 100 meters into Palestinian territory) before butting up against Route 60, a settlement “motorway” running from Jerusalem south to Efrat and settlements beyond which, again, it is impossible to access by vehicle from the Bethlehem townships. All roads out of Bethlehem district to the south had been cut, often by simply bulldozing up the roadbed and turning it into a three-meter-high wall of rubble. Armored fencing separating the extensive settlement complexes of Tequ’a, Efrat, and Migdal Oz from nearby Palestinian villages was expanding into Palestinian lands at a rate exponentially related to the growth of the settlements themselves. There was only one road in and out of Bethlehem district and that, fiercely guarded at checkpoints by the Israeli Defense Force, could only be traversed by yellow-plated (i.e., Israeli-licensed) vehicles bearing soldiers, settlers, journalists, and the occasional tourist. Palestinians who wanted, or needed, to get in or out of Bethlehem District went by foot, either—if they had “permissions”—trudging through the long slow queues at the checkpoints or—if not—clambering illegally over the remains of their broken roadways so as to gain access to the busy traffic of everyday Israeli life.4

What I saw that summer in Beit Sahour was far less dramatic than what I knew was happening in other regions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Qalqilyah and Tulkarm, in the north of the West Bank, were being encircled by single-gated, eight-meter-high stretches of concrete wall crowned with smoked-glass windowed watchtowers and protected by ditches, patrol roads, and supplementary fences. The ghettoization of these cities was not only preventing their inhabitants from working in either Israel or the West Bank5 but was as well depriving those living in satellite villages of access to markets for buying necessities, selling their produce and labor, and obtaining basic services such as medical care and education. There, where the “sealing” was much more efficient, entry to and egress from the cities was only available to those willing, or able, to wait in long and faltering queues for bored Israeli soldiers to interrogate them—often publicly strip-searching and humiliating them—before deciding whether or not to let them, one by one, in or out.
Encystation

It seems obvious that the horrific grandiosity of the Wall’s “sealing off” of Qalqilyah and Tulkarm serves to reassure a nervous Israeli electorate in the coastal cities so near to these West Bank conurbations that “Arabs” will not be able to get to them. The “quieter” rhetoric with which the section of “fence” surrounding Bethlehem District “speaks” seems more appropriate to addressing the foreign diplomats, journalists, and tourists likely to be traveling in the vicinity of Jerusalem. Such differences in appearance and address are, however, deceptive. Beneath this diverse visual rhetoric operates a unitary logic of what I call “encystation.” Encystation is the process of enclosing within a cyst, and the encirclement of Palestinian communities within the territories over which Israel claims sovereignty—in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions—is indisputably a matter of quarantining “matter” held to put the surrounding social body at risk.7

It is unclear whether or not there is a “goal” at the end of this process. Arguments can convincingly be made that the walling is meant to bring about either or both the voluntary emigration and involuntary expulsion of Palestinians. Rates of emigration in Bethlehem and elsewhere in the Occupied Territories are currently at an all-time high and the increasing popularity of the phrase—“Jordan is Palestine”—that Sharon promoted since the fifties (see Shlaim 2000: 477 and passim) does little to quiet fears that what the Israeli historian Benny Morris called the “mistake” of the “non-completion of the transfer [in 1948]” (Shavit 2004: 8) might be forcibly rectified in the not-distant future. Regardless of whether the ultimate motive for walling is making people leave or simply making them invisible to the Israeli population, it is indisputable that life within Palestinian “gated communities” is being etiolated by an intentional crippling of the economy, the strangling of access to food, water, medicine, and education, and the imposition of a sense of isolation and political impotence. Palestinians, or at least those within these enclaves surrounded by Israeli settlements and highways, are certainly not treated as part of what is popularly known as “the only democratic state in the Middle East.”

Nor, for the most part, do Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza want to be; they want their own state in the 17 percent of Mandate Palestine left under “Arab” control (albeit by fiat of Egypt and Jordan rather than of the local Palestinians) in the wake of the Arab–Israeli war of 1948. Although the liberal European press and the European Parliament has tended, since the summer of 2003, to condemn Israel’s building of the Wall, it has done so on the assumption that the Wall is intended to constitute the border between a nascent Palestinian state and a state of Israel in retreat from its current maximalist position. They assume the Wall should run along the “Green Line”—the internationally recognized armistice line established at the close of the 1967 war, which is 190 miles in length—and are outraged that government plans announced in April of 2006 project a total length for the Wall of 437 miles. None of the circuitous wanderings of the existing wall take place on the Israeli side of the Green Line, whereas at a number of points it bulges dramatically into the West Bank to incorporate Israeli settlements. The Wall’s “land grab” threatens to expropriate more than 10 percent of the West Bank, and commentators feel this puts the viability of a future Palestinian state at risk—especially in light of the fact that the most fertile lands, and the largest aquifers, are within the territory being consumed by the security fence.

But is the Wall meant to be a border? It is important to note in my descriptions of Bethlehem, Qalqilyah, and Tulkarm that the encircled towns are cut off as much from the West Bank as from Israel; Palestinians must cross through checkpoints to access other sectors of Palestine. Numerous other towns and villages are being “enclaved” by supplementary fences built around them, while the effects of road cuttings
and roadblocks (as detailed earlier in Bethlehem district) on countless other Palestinian conurbations do not even show up on the detailed map of the Wall the Palestine Land Development Information Systems drew up in 2003 on the basis of the Israeli Defense Force plans. Also not shown on that map is that the city of Jenin, a considerable distance from the projected path of the fence, is currently being walled.

Meanwhile, despite the outrage expressed by “outside” critics of the Israeli state for its pushing of the Wall up to three and a half miles into the West Bank so as to incorporate Israeli settlements such as Alfe Menashe, the projected path of the “western” Wall (that taking its bearings from the Green Line) leaves 98 percent of West Bank settlers on the east side of the Wall. This population (which holds Israeli citizenship despite being “extra-territorial”) can move without hindrance along its own roads and through roadblocks designed only to stop Palestinians. Long-term plans (announced by Ariel Sharon in March of 2003) envisage another wall running down the entire length of the Jordan Valley’s western rim, effectively caging the entirety of the West Bank. Even now, while this more draconian project remains on the drawing boards, towns and villages left on the outside of existing walls are stranded in the midst of hostile territory, severed from other Palestinian communities. Palestinian communities “inside” are similarly quarantined insofar as walling divides the territories into three discontinuous “cantons” containing 45 to 50 percent of the West Bank’s current territory, three “depth barriers” (fully encircled domains with single entry and exit points), and six fenced enclaves (see Cook 2003).

It is hard to imagine the borders of a Palestinian state that is comprised of a series of noncontiguous bantustans around, between, and through which swarm armed settlers and the tanks, bulldozers, and personnel carriers of an antagonistic foreign military. Furthermore, as Eyal Weizman has saliently pointed out, while under the Oslo Accords “the Palestinian Authority was given control over isolated territo-rial ‘islands’, . . . Israel retained control over the airspace above them and the sub-terrain beneath” (Weizman 2002: n.p.). As a consequence the aquifers beneath the Palestinian communities are drained by underground pipes into Israel from whence, during frequent water shortages in the Territories, commercial tank trucks venture out to sell water to the Palestinians at exorbitant prices. The air above those communities is filled, day and night, with the sonic booms of Israeli jets and the thrumming of Apache helicopters, any of which might suddenly rain bombs or missiles down on Palestinians deemed “terrorists,” or on those standing or living nearby. This is not a national territory, but a bubble—or series of scattered bubbles—pressured and threatened with extinction by an antagonistic outside.

The concept of a “border”

The concept of a “border” has been both central to and multivalent in Israeli practice and discourse since the early days of the state, as Adriana Kemp has shown in her study of the role of the border and of military border violations in the shaping of Israeli identity (Kemp 1998). She contends that the territorialist idiom of settlement, which presented the boundary as the ultimate symbol of state sovereignty, did not take root in the Israeli mind. The army gradually initiated practices which transferred activity to the other side of the border11 . . . [so that] the breaching of the border became a symbolic practice, a genuine territorial ritual, which had the effect of both trivialising the border and instilling a sense of lordship over the territories across the lines. (Kemp 1998: 89f., 92)

Kemp is talking of cross-border violations in the period when the West Bank was in Jordanian hands (although a favorite Israeli destination for the incursions of that period was Petra, well to the east of the Jordan River). The “frontierist” conception of borders that she claims
characterizes Israeli attitudes toward state and sovereignty is still in play in Israeli state policies not only toward Lebanon and Syria but also with regard to what international law declares are the illegally occupied territories of the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and (until recently) the Gaza Strip where the state establishes settlements, builds roadways and other infrastructural "facts on the ground," and maintains the citizenship of "extraterritorial" settlers. In the period she discusses (1949–1957) border crossings by the Israeli military were designed to punish Palestinian communities for allowing attempts to access Israel by refugees (who, for the most part, were attempting to return to houses and properties from which they had been forced in the course of the 1948 war and subsequent "mopping up" operations):

Since 1967, crossing of the lines by the Palestinians was portrayed as "gross violation of the armistice agreements" and was called "infiltration" However, when border-crossing became a habit of the Israeli army, even if unacknowledged, it was known as "routine" security measures and depicted as part of the attempt to achieve border discipline. (Kemp 1998: 87)

Today, as evident both in Israeli incursions into Gaza and the West Bank to assassinate activists or arrest government ministers and in the recent invasion of Lebanon, a similar logic operates; "Arabs" must remain passive and in place, whereas the Israeli military can go anywhere it wants to ensure that quiescent immobility.

The fact that borders continue to be delineated as devices for encysting Palestinians is manifest in the contemporary operations of the "Border Police," a "police" unit under the command of the military that is supposed to patrol borders as well as ports and airports. In practice, the Border Police go into operation wherever Palestinians confront Israelis in what the authorities perceive as a political manner. Thus, when Sharon’s "visit" to the Haram esh-Sharif sparked demonstrations in "Arab" towns and cities within Israel’s 1949 borders, it was the Border Police that was sent into the Galilee to suppress these, at the cost of thirteen “Israeli Arabs” shot dead. Borders, whether those drawn by the Wall or those of "Closed Military Areas," which any officer can declare at whim, pertain to Palestinians, and are erected wherever and whenever a Palestinian is seen to impinge on or question Israeli sovereignty over "the land."

Giorgio Agamben’s concept of the "sovereign exception" may illuminate the logic that has led Israel simultaneously to enclose the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza and render them "extra-territorial"—a term used here not to describe persons or communities belonging to a national collectivity but located outside national territory (such as Israeli settlers or Jews outside of Israel) but to signify persons excluded from the conceptual and legal domain of the nation state within which they nonetheless live. Agamben, in his Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life ([1995] 1998: 18), writes:

The exception that defines the structure of sovereignty is . . . complex. Here what is outside is included not simply by means of an interdiction or an internment, but rather by means of the suspension of the juridical order’s validity—by letting the juridical order, that is, withdraw from the exception and abandon it. The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule. The particular “force” of law consists in this capacity of law to maintain itself in relation to an exteriority. We shall give the name relation of exception to the extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion.

As was the case for those imprisoned in the concentration camps at the core of Agamben’s argument, the withdrawal of the juridical order from the Palestinians “behind the wall” is not a matter of disregard but one of dehumanization (the production of what Agamben terms “bare life”). The “enclosed” populations are carefully regarded—profiled, branded with identity
cards, confined to specified areas, tracked—
while simultaneously being denied the rights or
legal status accruing to citizens of the incorpo-
rating state. The encysted are brought far more
under the control of the state than its citizens
but, rather than enjoying protection by the state
correlative to that control, stand in constant
risk of extermination by it. For Agamben this
construction of an “inside” (the sovereign jur-
ridical order of the state) by the inclusion of
an excluded population (the threatening “other”) is a central rhetorical (and practical)
move by modern sovereign powers. This interi-
orization of a national exteriority not only pro-
vides its citizenry with evidence of the protec-
tive power of the state but simultaneously
grounds—on the threat presented by that in-
corporated other—that state’s demands to in-
crease its power over, and reduce the rights of,
that citizenry (see Agamben [2003] 2005; King-
Irani 2006).

Certainly the perspective provided by Agam-
ben’s concept of the sovereign exception pro-
vides an alternative understanding of the Oslo
Agreements that served to entice the diasporic
“Palestinian Government in Exile” into a terri-

tory claimed and controlled by the Israeli state
where it eventually found itself confined to and
impotent within the walled camps of Gaza and
the West Bank. From here too the recent (24
October 2006) incorporation into the Israeli
government of Avigdor Lieberman’s extreme
right-wing Israeli Beitenu (“Israel Our Home”) party seems less bewildering; Israeli Beitenu pro-
poses the handing over of Arab majority regions
within Israel to the Palestinian Authority in
exchange for territory occupied by Israeli settle-
ments. Both strategies further encyst the Pales-
tinian populations—in the former case
bringing the activist cadres “outside” within the
Israeli controlled areas; in the latter realigning
the wall so as to ensure that all Palestinian
populations within areas controlled by the Is-
raeli state areas are concentrated behind the
wall—while presenting, to Israelis as to the
world, the image of a strong state committed
to a peaceful and just resolution of the Arab–
 Israeli conflict.

Citizens of the world

If borders for Israelis exist in large part for what
Kemp (1998: 92) calls the “symbolic practice”
of breaching them, how does one discern the
limits of “the land of Israel”? This question
concerns not only the legal rights of settlers to
benefits accruing from Israeli citizenship, which
are refused their “Arab neighbors” in the Occu-
pied Territories. It also has “extraterritorial”
applications. Israel’s Law of Return 5710–1950
promises that “every Jew has the right to come
to this country as an olim [an immigrant],” which
in practice has come to mean that any
person claiming to be a Jew is granted auto-
matic citizenship as well as guaranteed housing,
full tuition for language and university educa-
tion, and significant discounts on cars, appli-
cances, and other aids to settlement. Beyond,
having eased aliya [immigration], the Law of
Return implies that, by virtue of being Jewish,
Jews outside of Israel are in effect always already
Israeli citizens (a parallel instance from Former
Yugoslavia is analyzed in Dimitrijevic 1993: 50–
56). In line with the effective extension of Israeli
state sovereignty this guarantee of automatic

citizenship entails, Israel has, in the past few
years, intervened, either directly or by providing
asylum, in cases in which Jews were on trial for
crimes committed outside of Israel as though
these were cases in which its own citizens were
being tried by a foreign state. It has also, in
Iran, Iraq, and Ethiopia, organized massive
“rescue missions” taking Jewish citizens of these
countries out and “resettling” them in Israel. If
Israeli sovereignty is extensible to anywhere
Jews exist, then there are in effect no borders
at all.

Certainly, in terms of its violation of interna-
tional borders in defense of its self-ascertained
interests, Israel acts as though they do not exist.
In several instances, dating from the earliest
days of the state until the present, Israel has
ignored extradition processes and kidnapped
persons it deemed criminals from foreign states.
Strikes against and invasions of Lebanese terri-

tory are virtually routine, and it is worth noting
that Israel has in the last twenty five years alone carried out the following violations of other states’ sovereignty as expressions of its right of self-defense: the 7 June 1981 bombing of the Osiraq nuclear power plant in Iraq, the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the April 1988 assassination of Abu Jihad in Tunis by a military squad, the bombing on 5 October 2003 of Ein Saheb refugee camp northwest of Damascus, the July 2006 invasion of Lebanon, and the 6 September 2007 bombing of an alleged nuclear installation in north-eastern Syria. If within Israel and the Occupied Territories every Palestinian has a border inscribed around him or her, in the global context Israeli sovereignty is extensible to everywhere Israeli-defined “Jewish” interests can be discerned.

Imperial sovereignty

I return, in closing, to the concept of “encystation.” Like the term “border” in Israeli discourse and that of “extra-territorial” in this article,” “cyst” has a double meaning: it is both a closed sac in which morbid matter is quarantined so as to protect the surrounding body, and a “cell containing an embryo” which provides a defensive membrane within which that fetal entity can develop until it has grown sufficiently strong to emerge into the world outside. It is in the latter sense that Israel, as a homeland for the Jewish people, was conceptualized by Herzl and the late-nineteenth-century Zionist pioneers who saw the land as a place distant from Europe and its anti-Semitism, where Jews, weakened by centuries of discrimination, could shelter while developing into what Herzl termed “real men” (Complete Diaries I, 19 cited in Kornberg 1993: 166; see also Bowman 2002: 456–463). Unsurprisingly, as a protected space within which a people could shelter and grow strong without encountering debilitating competition and challenges, Israel’s founders envisaged not only the need for strong defenses against an “outside” but also means for ensuring that any internal challenge to the development of sovereignty would be contained, expelled, or destroyed.17

Modern-day Israel, which—with its massive army, its nuclear capabilities, and its high-technology economy—certainly has entered forcefully into the global community of mature states, nonetheless still wants to pose itself as a protective womb for a fetal people. As a result it encysts non-Jewish populations within the territory over which it imposes de facto sovereignty, refusing them even the semblance of self-determination (see Kimmerling 2003), while simultaneously extending its protective wall outward so as to encompass and protect all the members of a globally distributed ethnoreligious population it sees as its “concern.” Like the United States, which, with the demise of the Soviet Union, is able to celebrate its power to defend its citizens and its interests everywhere, Israel has, with its victories over the antagonisms against which it established itself, become unrestrained in its will to sovereign power both within and beyond its borders.

Glenn Bowman is a senior lecturer in Anthropology at the University of Kent at Canterbury. He has carried out extensive fieldwork in Jerusalem and the West Bank as well as in Former Yugoslavia, particularly Serbia and Macedonia (a.k.a. FYROM).
E-mail: jrai@kent.ac.uk.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this text was published in Social Analysis 48 (1) in the Spring of 2004.
2. Readers looking for a succinct description of what has happened since the “Gaza withdrawal,” the collapse of Sharon, and the Palestinian elections can do no better than to look at Tanya Reinhart (2006). Joel Beinin and Rebecca Stein (2006) and Jeff Halper (2005) offer incisive contemporary assessments of the situation.
3. According to the Applied Research Institute—Jerusalem walling in the Bethlehem district has resulted in the alienation of 70 square kilometers
of the total 608 square kilometers which make up the district—http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=347.

4. A striking exemplification of the disjunction between these two worlds is displayed when the two potential suicide bombers of Hany Abu-Assad’s film Paradise now (2005) move, cutting through the “Security Fence,” from desolated Nablus into the affluence of Tel Aviv.

5. See Bornstein (2002) for an analysis of the fostered economic dependency of Tulkarm residents on Israel in the days before the Wall’s erection.

6. A cyst is a “sac containing morbid matter, parasitic larvae etc.; cell containing embryo, etc” (Concise Oxford English Dictionary). “Encystation” differs from the term “encapsulation” as used by Boal (1994) and “enclavement” in Douglas’ work (2001) in emphasizing a bodily metaphors of disease and generation that resonates with a biopolitics deeply embedded in Israeli conceptions of nation and statehood. The particular nature of Israeli border conceptions must be understood with the extensive body of anthropological work on borders usefully assessed and critiqued in Donnan and Wilson (1999, 2005) and Wilson and Donnan (2005).

7. Or, in the neutralized speech of government Web sites, “it cannot be clearly stated that the Palestinians’ right to freedom of movement must take precedence over the right of Israelis to live” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Israeli Government’s Official Website: http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il).

8. Ilan Pappe, commenting on the situation in the “hermetically sealed” territory of Gaza in September 2006, wrote “the conventional Israeli policies of ethnic cleansing employed successfully . . . in the West Bank are not useful here. You can slowly transfer Palestinians out of the West Bank [via Jordan] . . . but you cannot do it in the Gaza Strip once you sealed it as a maximum security prison camp” (Pappe in The Electronic Intifada, 2 September 2006: http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article5656.shtml).


10. Ibrahim (2005) documents the growing popularity in Israel proper (behind the “Green Line”) of municipalities and developers constructing (without the consent of the Palestinian communities) four-meter-high concrete walls between Jewish and Arab communities. Case studies are presented from Qisariya, Lid, and Ramle.

11. Michel Warschawski, in his excellent On the border ([2002] 2006: 12), writes that “in May 1966, while out hiking with some friends, I wound up in Jordan without knowing it, and it was an Israeli patrol that brought us back to the railway zone, an extraterritorial zone, and made us get on the next train. None of us even questioned then what an Israeli patrol was doing inside Jordanian territory.”

12. In an interview with Ulrich Raulff, Agamben asserted that the situation “of the prisoners in Guantánamo . . . is legally-speaking actually comparable with those in the Nazi camps. The detainees of Guantánamo do not have the status of Prisoners of War, they have absolutely no legal status. They are subject now only to raw power; they have no legal existence. In the Nazi camps the Jews had first to be fully ‘denationalised’ and stripped of all the citizenship rights remaining after Nuremberg, after which they were also erased as legal subjects” (Raulff 2004: 610).

13. The year 5710 in the Jewish calendar is 1950 in the Gregorian calendar.


17. This position is elaborated by Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Zionist leader and founder of the clandestine anti-British militant organization Irgun, in his 1923 manifesto for a Jewish state, The Iron Wall (We and the Arabs); see Shlaim 2000: 11–16.

References


