

FORUM

On “tribes” and bribes: “Iraq tribal study,” al-Anbar’s awakening, and social science

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Abstract: The concept of the “tribe” has captured the imagination of military planners, who have been inspired partly by social scientists. Interest in tribes stems from events in Iraq’s al-Anbar province, where the US military has co-opted Sunni “tribal” leaders. Some social scientists have capitalized on these developments by doing contract work for the Pentagon. For example, the “Iraq tribal study”—prepared by a private company consisting of anthropologists and political scientists among others—suggests employing colonial-era techniques (such as divide and conquer) for social control. It also advocates bribing local leaders, a method that has become part of the US military’s pacification strategy. Such imperial policing techniques are likely to aggravate armed conflict between and among ethnic groups and religious sects. Observers report that the US strategy is creating a dangerous situation resembling the Lebanese civil war, raising ethical questions about social scientists’ involvement in these processes.

Keywords: anthropology and the military, colonialism, ethics, Iraq, tribes

Few concepts have provoked as much debate among anthropologists as the idea of a “tribe.”¹ Like culture, nature, and community, it has sparked heated controversy for decades. Anthropologists generally avoid the term, because it often confuses rather than clarifies social analysis. In common usage, however, it has tended to acquire two interrelated meanings. Historians, political scientists, and the public have used tribe to describe archaic, “savage,” or non-literate peoples; for example, ancient Germanic tribes. At the same time, government officials have frequently adopted it as an administrative category for classifying colonized groups across Africa, Asia, and North America.²

In the United States, the concept of tribe was employed during the nineteenth century to refer to Native American groups in both senses—as uncivilized savages and as subjects to be relocated and administered by the War Department’s Office of Indian Affairs (later the Bureau of Indian Affairs). President Andrew Jackson’s message to the US Congress in December 1830—an appeal for passage of the Indian Removal Act—illustrates the congruence:

“[The Act] will place a dense and civilized [white] population in large tracts of country now occupied by a few savage hunters. By opening the whole territory between Tennessee on the

north and Louisiana on the south to the settlement of the whites it will incalculably strengthen the southwestern frontier. ... It will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; free them from the power of the States; enable them to pursue happiness in their own way and under their own rude institutions; will retard the progress of decay, which is lessening their numbers, and perhaps cause them gradually, under the protection of the Government and through the influence of good counsels, to cast off their savage habits and become an interesting, civilized, and Christian community. ... Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes have with great unanimity determined to avail themselves of the liberal offers presented by the act of Congress, and have agreed to remove beyond the Mississippi River. ... What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms. ... filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion?" (quoted in Sturgis 2006: 101f.).

The conceptual idea of the tribe resonated strongly with a specific political problem: how to remove native peoples from the lands they inhabited. For Jackson and many others, the savage tribe was not so much a model *of* reality as it was a model *for* reality—for an imagined future that was eventually realized by military means.

More than a century has passed since the US army completed the task of brutally subduing Native Americans in the Indian Wars following the Indian Removal Act, but the idea of the tribe has once again taken center stage among military personnel. The sudden interest stems from events in the western Iraqi province of al-Anbar, where the US military has enlisted Sunni sheiks (presumably tribal leaders) as political allies. The impetus for "tribal engagement" comes primarily from officers with social science backgrounds, who occasionally cite anthropology as a crucial source. For example, US Army Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt (2007) has written an article on this topic for the *Military Review*,

which includes a section titled "Anthropology 101: What is a tribe?"

Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen (2007a), former counterinsurgency adviser to General David Petraeus in Iraq, gives a sense of why military officials are interested: "Since the new threats are not state-based, the basis for our approach should not be international relations (the study of how nation-states interact in elite state-based frameworks) but anthropology (the study of social roles, groups, status, institutions and relations within human population groups in nonelite, nonstate-based frameworks)." Kilcullen, who holds a PhD in politics from the University of New South Wales, describes how al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) violated Iraq's tribal norms:

"The tribes run smuggling, import/export and construction businesses which AQI shut down, took over, or disrupted through violent disturbances that were 'bad for business' ... AQI already 'had it coming'. (Out in the wild western desert, things often tend to play out like *The Sopranos* ... AQI changed the rules of the game by adding roadside bombs, beheadings, murder of children and death by torture. Eventually, enough was enough for the locals)" (Kilcullen 2007b).

Such perspectives give some indication as to why military planners are so focused on the concept of tribe: it provides an analytical basis for concrete political objectives. As in the case of US government tribal policies during the nineteenth century, the concept of tribe has surfaced at a particular historical moment—a moment in which an expansionist state with occupation forces implements "pacification" programs to quell insurrectionists. This was clearly the case with the Indian Removal Act and the Indian Wars, and it appears to be the case in Iraq, as counterinsurgency specialists portray tribal-based strategies as necessary and effective tools for military application. It is telling that today many soldiers and military planners refer to al-Anbar as "the Wild West" and Iraq as "Indian Country" (Silliman 2008).

How to rent a tribe

A particularly ambitious analysis of western Iraq's *'asha'ir* and *qaba'il* ("tribal" groups and confederations, respectively) is the 390-page "Iraq tribal study: al-Anbar Governorate," prepared for the Pentagon by a for-profit company based in the United States (Todd et al. 2006). Its list of contributors includes Lin Todd and W. Patrick Lang, who are former military intelligence officers (Todd holds an MA in military arts and sciences and Lang holds an MA in Middle East studies and anthropology); R. Alan King, who is a retired US Army civil affairs and psychological operations officer; Andrea Jackson, who is a former research director for the Lincoln Group (a Washington-based public relations firm); Montgomery McFate, who is a doctor of cultural anthropology with experience in intelligence gathering;³ and Ahmed Hashim, a US Army officer with a PhD in international relations. The title page attributes the study to Global Resources, a "private intelligence and

business risk assessment firm" founded by lead authors Lin Todd and W. Patrick Lang (Global Resources 2008). "Iraq tribal study" has received negligible media coverage. However, the *Washington Post* reported that it "was circulated in the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, at the time led by then-Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus" (Pincus 2007).

The document focuses on three relatively small groups: Albu Fahd, Albu Mahal, and Albu Issa. The authors apparently selected them because of the prominent role their leaders played in challenging al-Qaeda operatives in Ramadi, Qaim, and Fallujah respectively (Todd et al. 2006: ch. 4, p. 5.). The objectives of "Iraq tribal study" are clearly stated in several chapter titles, particularly "Emerging insights on influencing the tribes of al-Anbar" (chapter 7A) and "Influencing the three target tribes" (chapter 7B). Sub-headings read like a how-to manual: there are instructions for how to "Leverage traditional authority," "Use a compelling ideology," "Use



FIGURE 1. US Army Lieutenant General Ray Odierno speaks with a group of local leaders in Owasat, Iraq, December 2007. (Source: US Army—Photo by Staff Sergeant Curt Cashour.)

appropriate coercive force,” and “Use economic incentives and disincentives.” In addition, the authors provide views on “How to persuade the tribes to stop supporting insurgency,” “How to persuade the tribes to support the Coalition,” and “How to work and live with tribesmen.”

Such sections spell out techniques for pressing local power brokers into the service of US occupation forces. When the authors of “Iraq tribal study” suggest leveraging “traditional authority,” they mean co-opting local leaders; when they recommend creating a “compelling ideology,” they mean conducting psychological warfare; when they call for “appropriate coercive force,” they mean controlling and focusing attacks upon suspected insurgents; and when they mention “economic incentives and disincentives,” they mean rewarding Iraqis who cooperate with US demands and punishing those who do not. These are the basic techniques of imperial policing—a blend of persuasive and coercive strategies as old as the idea of empire.

“Iraq tribal study” frankly discusses the benefits of renting tribes. The authors are not bashful about their admiration for imperial tactics of social control and repression. For example, they review the periods of Ottoman rule (1534–1918) and the British Mandate (1920–1932) in Iraq for clues on adapting imperial techniques to the twenty-first century. A section titled “Engaging the sheiks: British successes, failures and lessons” states:

“Convincing the sheiks that the British were the dominant force ... had a powerful effect ... Subsidies and land grants bought loyalty ... Controlling water (irrigation canals), the economic lifelines of the sheiks’ constituencies was a powerful lever as well. It may be useful to examine the tribal landscape for modern parallels ... Development funds immediately come to mind ... The key lies in putting into the sheik’s hands the ability to improve their people’s livelihoods, and thereby the sheik’s own status” (Todd et al. 2006: ch. 5, p. 23).

In the next paragraph, the authors describe how the British handled recalcitrant sheiks:

“Punitive assaults, both by infantry column and with air strikes, on the villages of sheiks judged uncooperative brought about short-term cooperation and long-term enmity. Enabled largely by airpower, the British were able to stay in Iraq—with minimal resources—through its independence in 1932 and beyond” (Todd et al. 2006: ch. 5, p. 23)

At another point, the authors note how Saddam Hussein’s techniques might be emulated for social control:

“The Baath regime fostered competition between tribes in a ‘divide and rule’ campaign. This method was, and remains, effective because it exploits tribal honor and competition over limited resources. Competition between tribes can be a compelling way to secure the cooperation of one tribe at the expense of another. A tribe is likely to cooperate to keep another tribe from getting the benefits” (Todd et al. 2006: ch. ES, p. 4).

Petraeus’s close advisers euphemistically refer to a strategy of “balancing competing armed interest groups,” implying that they seek to combine a divide and conquer strategy with a form of indirect rule over different regions across the country (Kilcullen 2007b).

By the end of the study, the authors are more direct about manipulating Iraqis, and outline strategies for “influencing three target tribes” through bribes: “Iraq’s tribal values are ripe for exploitation. According to an old Iraqi saying, ‘You cannot buy a tribe, but you can certainly rent one’ ... Sheiks have responded well to financial incentives” (Todd et al. 2006: ch. 7A, p. 12). The authors offer specific suggestions for using development funds to win support, and recommend “allowing the sheiks to advise on and be involved in the distribution of resources,” including health care services, dietary supplements, water and sewage treatment plants, telephone and electrical service, farm equipment, and high-quality seeds.

No how-to manual would be complete without warnings, and “Iraq tribal study” is no exception. The authors warn that “sheiks should not

be allowed to directly distribute resources ... there have been many documented cases where the tribal elements believed the sheiks were "holding back" and hording [*sic*] resources for themselves" (Todd et al. 2006: ch. 7A, p. 18). They also caution against "direct and visible monetary disbursement [which] has created rivalries and assassinations in the past" (ibid.: 19). On a broader level, the authors acknowledge that "tribal authority" has limitations, and that "tribal power" could lead to "oppression" and "abuses of authority" (ibid.: 21). Furthermore, Coalition forces might be sucked into a "tribal trap" between competing groups (ibid.).

"Iraq tribal study" is at times schizophrenic. Occasionally the authors include passages espousing cultural relativism. On the one hand, they note that "RESPECT (*Ihtiram* in Arabic) is the key to working with tribesmen anywhere in the world," and suggest that readers "Do not assume that they want to be like you" and "Do not reject their ways as primitive or backward" (Todd et al. 2006: ch. A1, p. 1). On the other hand, they often portray Arabs and Islam in unflattering (and sometimes stereotypical) terms: they solemnly comment on "the fatalistic outlook that pervades Iraqi and Arab society" (ibid.: ch. 2, p. 31), state that "Iraqi Arabs are generally submissive and obedient to their superiors," and suggest that Islam is characterized by a "medieval mind set ... in which change is neither beneficial nor virtuous" (ibid.: chap. A2, p. 2).

Such notions follow a long line of Orientalist scholarship by European and later American observers who portrayed the "East" in disparaging terms. It was closely connected to imperialism: negative stereotypes reflected the racist attitudes of the day, while Orientalism served to justify the project of empire.

Ethnographic fictions

From an anthropological perspective, "Iraq tribal study" suffers from conceptual problems that have long accompanied the notion of tribe. The authors take an extremely positivist view of tribes in the Middle East, portraying them as

mappable and bounded groups with minimal change in membership. In fact, the document's cover page features a color-coded Iraqi map arrayed with names of dozens of groups (see Figure 2). Even more bizarre is the inclusion of a map titled "Distribution of tribes in Iraq," which was originally used to illustrate Henry Field's 1940 *The anthropology of Iraq* (Todd et al. 2006: ch. A3, p. 13).⁴ Another example of the hyper-positivist nature of the report is the use of US Marine Corps Intelligence "tribal structure charts" to illustrate segmentary relationships (ibid.: ch. 4, pp. 15, 45).

It is worth recalling Edmund Leach's warning regarding the concept of tribe:

"It is largely an academic fiction to suppose that in a 'normal' ethnographic situation one ordinarily finds distinct 'tribes' distributed about the map in orderly fashion with clear-cut boundaries between them ... My own view is that the ethnographer has often only managed to discern the existence of 'a tribe' because he took it as axiomatic that this kind of cultural entity must exist. Many such tribes are, in a sense, ethnographic fictions" (1954: 290f.).

Richard Tapper has provided a fuller critique of the uses of tribe:

"The nature of indigenous concepts of tribe ... has too often been obscured by the apparent desire of investigators (anthropologists, historians, and administrators) to establish a consistent and stable terminology for political groups ... Unfortunately, Middle Eastern indigenous categories ... are no more specific than are English terms such as 'family' or 'group' ... The ambiguity of the terms and the flexibility of the system are of the essence in everyday negotiations of meaning and significance ... Most of the terms that have been translated as 'tribe' contain such ambiguities, and attempts to give them—or tribe—precision as to either level, function, or essence are misdirected" (1990: 56).⁵

The authors of "Iraq tribal study" are almost certainly aware of these critiques. After all, they




FIGURE 2. The cover page of “Iraq tribal study” features a version of this map of Iraqi tribes, ethnic groups, and sects. (Source: University of Texas Libraries.)

cite the work of several anthropologists, and most of the contributing researchers hold graduate degrees in the social sciences. Why then, would they and other military planners use an outdated, ambiguous concept rejected by most contemporary anthropologists?

US Army commanders—like other military commanders—seek tools or instruments to help accomplish immediate objectives. Short-term mission success trumps all other considerations. In the current context, military forces have been asked to carry out a quintessentially imperial mission—“pacification” (though the new euphemism “stability operations” is the official term currently used by the US military). Given this mission, military strategists were commissioned to create “Iraq tribal study” as a handbook for managing Iraq by “influencing the tribes” with bribes and pitting them against one another. The report was intended to serve as a “set of analytic and operational tools” (Todd et al. 2006: ch. 1, p. 1) for commanders at a time when Petraeus and others were reintroducing counterinsurgency methods into the US military’s repertoire. “Iraq tribal study” was not designed to improve the well-being of Iraqis; it was designed to accomplish the dubious objective of helping US forces more effectively manipulate and control a select group of Iraqi power brokers. Its lack of scruples about producing banal social analysis is without doubt increased by the fact that Global Resources is a private company seeking to sell its knowledge to the Pentagon for profit. The fact that this was done in support of a politically disastrous and legally questionable invasion and military occupation makes anthropological participation in such an enterprise even more troubling.

The study appears to have had concrete effects: it reportedly played a role in the decision of US military commanders to pay off Sunnis who stood up against al-Qaeda operatives (Pincus 2007)—a phenomenon that has come to be known as the al-Anbar “awakening.”⁶

The first time as tragedy ...

On 10 September 2007, Petraeus—who holds a PhD in international relations from Princeton

University—appeared before the US Congress to provide testimony regarding the situation in Iraq. During the climax of his discussion, he presented graphs of declining numbers of insurgent attacks and US and Iraqi casualties in al-Anbar, and pointed to the awakening as a prime example of progress:

“The most significant development in the past six months likely has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting Al Qaeda and other extremists. This has, of course, been most visible in Anbar Province. A year ago the province was assessed as ‘lost’ politically. Today, it is a model of what happens when local leaders and citizens decide to oppose Al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like ideology ... We have, in coordination with the Iraqi government’s National Reconciliation Committee, been engaging these tribes and groups of local citizens who want to oppose extremists” (Petraeus 2007).

By the spring of 2008, Petraeus’s tribal engagement strategy—which has paid out US\$767 million to mostly Sunni groups, with another US\$450 million on the way—was in full swing (Dehghanpisheh and Thomas 2008). Although US commercial media generally portray this as a success, it is becoming increasingly apparent that it is a reckless and potentially disastrous policy over the long run. Documentary filmmaker Rick Rowley was embedded with US troops in 2007, and described how the process works:

“Through a combination of threats and enticements like releasing their kids from prison, the US military has gotten [Sunni] groups to join a coalition. They’re paid money for small construction projects, and they’re eventually incorporated into the Iraqi police force, where they’re armed and paid, given a gun, a badge and the power to arrest ... I didn’t see anyone give an M16 to anyone. But I did see a US captain hand wads of cash to militiamen who were guarding checkpoints” (quoted in Halper 2007).

Support for the tribes has evidently entailed support for some of Iraq’s “worst war criminals”:

“In the town of Fallahat, where there used to be a lot of Shia, there are now no Shia ... [We] found them living on the outskirts of Baghdad in a refugee camp ... There are no services, no doctors, no hospitals, no schools, no running water, no work, no sanitation ... The refugees we talked to knew the names of the people who have kicked them out and bombed their houses. And they are exactly the same tribes the Americans are working with ... Maliki’s head of negotiations with Sunni groups told us the groups the Americans are working with include some of the country’s worst war criminals” (quoted in Halper 2007).

Why would US forces pursue this strategy? According to Rowley: “The US is funding sectarian militias fighting in a civil war in order to momentarily decrease attacks on Americans ... It’s an easy way to produce immediate statistical successes on the ground, a decrease in attacks on American soldiers” (quoted in Halper 2007).

A showdown appears to be imminent. Observers reported that Iraq’s government (dominated by Shiites) has arrested hundreds of members of the awakening, including five senior members and others deemed to be dangerous. In a front-page *New York Times* article on growing tensions between the US-supported awakening troops and the Iraqi government, Iraq Army Brigadier General Nasser al-Hiti commented on the movement’s leaders: “These people are like cancer, and we must remove them” (quoted in Oppel 2008). According to the report, the Iraqi policy “is causing a rift with the American military, which contends that any significant diminution of the Awakening could result in renewed violence ... ‘If this is not handled properly, we could have a security issue,’ said Brigadier General David Perkins, the senior military spokesman in Iraq. ‘You don’t want to give anybody a reason to turn back to al-Qaeda.’”

This unfolding scenario was predicted months in advance by Nir Rosen (2008), who in



FIGURE 3. A displaced Iraqi family seeks refuge north of Baghdad, March 2008. (Source: US Air Force/Department of Defense—Photo by Tech. Sergeant William Greer.)

an expose noted that the US strategy "seems simple: to buy off every Iraqi in sight ... the US is now backing more than 600,000 Iraqi men in the security sector—more than half the number Saddam had at the height of his power." Rosen warned that "unless the new Iraqi state continues to operate as a vast bribing machine, the insurgent Sunnis who have joined the new militias will likely revert to fighting the ruling Shiites, who still refuse to share power."

Others have warned that US support for the awakening is likely to aggravate armed conflict between and among Sunni and Shia groups, creating a situation comparable to the Lebanese civil war of the 1970s and 1980s (Cole 2008, Simon 2008). Like the Syrians, who invaded and kept tens of thousands of troops in Lebanon through years of sectarian conflict (while pitting Lebanese factions against each other), the United States seems unable or unwilling to end the Iraqi civil war. From this perspective, the US military's support of awakening forces appears to be a high-stakes divide and conquer initiative enabled (or at least given an aura of legitimacy) by social science. The similarities to colonial-era tactics employed in Northern Ireland, India, Rwanda, Vietnam, and Lebanon should give pause to those concerned about Iraq's future.

In the meantime, *Newsweek* magazine reported without a trace of irony that "Petraeus says he instructs his young officers, 'Go watch *The Sopranos* in order to understand the power dynamics at work in Iraq'" (Dehghanpisheh and Thomas 2008). History repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.

"Weaponized" anthropology and the retreat from responsibility

When anthropologists and other social scientists are employed as military consultants—or actively create private for-profit military firms—what are the implications? What are the effects when they advocate bribing tribes, applying "appropriate coercive force," and using "divide and rule" as a tactic? All of these recommendations—articulated clearly in "Iraq tribal study"—have

become part of the US military's strategy for supporting al-Anbar's awakening militias. But what are the consequences?

Such work is fundamentally compromised in both ethical and political terms. Unsupported claims that militarized social scientists save lives do not change the fact that they have cast their lot with occupying forces functioning as imperial armies and willfully ignore the substantial criticism of such ventures in the history of anthropology, notably during the brutal US counterinsurgency efforts in southeast Asia in the 1960s (see Gill 2008; Ribeiro 2008). If "counterinsurgency is the work of empire" (Bass 2008), then we must face the fact that strong currents threaten to propel us back to a neo-colonial anthropology.

Morton Fried (1975: 52) wrote that "tribe is essentially a concept that arises and thrives in the interactions between state-organized societies and those societies that are not state-organized." The US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq has nurtured these interactions; consequently, it is not surprising that the concept of tribe has been deployed for counterinsurgency warfare. In the past, when military planners sought the counsel of anthropologists, they looked for a social science stripped of ambiguity, meaning, and context. They wanted simple analytical tools that might help them accomplish short-term objectives. Recent reports by anthropologists commissioned by the Pentagon reveal an unambiguous tendency to use culture, kinship groups, tribes, and so on as instruments for manipulating and controlling non-state social forms—not as a means of humanizing other people: *Operational culture for the warfighter* (Salmoni and Holmes-Eber 2008) and "The military utility of understanding adversary culture" (McFate 2005) are but two troubling examples.

Efforts to militarize anthropology depart dramatically from the idea that scholars are obligated "to humanity as a whole and that, in a conflict of duties, our obligations to humanity are of higher value than those toward the nation ... patriotism must be subordinated to humanism" (Franz Boas quoted in Price 2008). Many of those jumping on the Pentagon bandwagon

have retreated from the notion of social responsibility, perhaps out of a sense of patriotism or perhaps for crass pecuniary purposes. They have apparently abandoned the idea that intellectuals have an obligation to the public—not just to powerful decision makers.

Others—perhaps traumatized by the Cold War, or a lingering memory of it—have become “epistemological radicals” obsessed with trivia, mere “flights from facts of power which expressed denial of domestic repression and US imperialism abroad” (Nader 1997: 140). Journalist Robert Fisk (2005), in a searing critique of “poisonous academics and their claptrap of exclusion,” observed that phrases such as “dialogic apologetics,” “persecutorial othering,” “remythification,” and “hermeneutic possibility” serve as distancing mechanisms. “It is part of the secret language of academe—especially of anthropology,” he noted. “University teachers—especially in the States—are great at networking ... but hopeless at communicating with most of the rest of the world.” These trends have indeed served to “reinvent armchair anthropology, and intentionally or not, legitimated a retreat from responsibility” (Nader 1997: 134).

Many anthropologists are resisting the retreat from social responsibility by enlightening public debate, including the debate on Iraq. Robert Fernea (2005), who first conducted research in Iraq more than a half century ago, warned that a prolonged US occupation there would likely lead to civil war. Barbara Nimri Aziz (2007) and Nadjie Al-Ali (2007) have done much to humanize Iraqis often dehumanized by the corporate media. Their activist work (Aziz produces a popular radio program in New York; Al-Ali is a founding member of Act Together—Women’s Action for Iraq) has greatly stimulated public discussion.

Anthropology holds great promise for those seeking a more just world, but its practitioners are most likely to be effective when they maintain an independent role (outside of the military and its contract firms) and when they communicate widely and publicly. It is by enlightening the public that we might spark progressive change in democratic societies.

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Notes

1. This article is an expanded version of a piece previously published in *Z Magazine* (González 2008).
2. Morton Fried (1975: 1) noted that the tribe is commonly a “secondary phenomenon” that emerges as the consequence of interactions between state and non-state societies. The legal process of tribal formation occurred in the United States when the federal government recognized (and in some cases created) tribes (*ibid.*: 100f.).
3. McFate reportedly worked in her mother-in-law’s private intelligence-gathering business during the 1990s, under the pseudonym Montgomery Sapone. Her 1999 resume reportedly included the following description of her responsibilities: “Collect and analyze intelligence on European activities of major international environmental organization for a company specializing in domestic and international opposition research, special investigations, issues management, and threat assessment. Write weekly intelligence update on European animal rights and eco-terrorist activity” (Ridgeway, Schulman, and Corn 2008).
4. Field was deeply involved in the “M Project” initiated by President Roosevelt in 1942. The

goal was to search for regions for resettling millions of wartime refugees. Declassified documents reveal that "library bound bureaucrats [were] designing contingency plans to move tens of millions of people ... Field and his staff appear[ed] comfortable planning to move inventoried people about the globe like fungible commodities" (Price 2008: 126f.).

5. For fuller discussion of the "tribe" concept see Sahlins (1968), Fried (1975), and Khoury and Kostiner (1990).
6. By the time "Iraq tribal study" was released, there were already signs that influential power brokers were turning against al-Qaeda operatives, a point noted by the authors (Todd et al. 2006: ES-13; see also Kilcullen 2007a).

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