FORUM

What makes our projects anthropological?
The concept of civilization has not prospered in socio-cultural anthropology. Its origins lie in Enlightenment France, where it was used in both singular and plural forms, the universalist singular eventually prevailing in the decades leading up to the Revolution. Our discipline came to prefer pluralizing counter-currents of this universalism such as that associated with Johann Gottfried Herder. The key term in German was \textit{Kultur}, though it was not widely used in the plural until the twentieth century, while \textit{Zivilisation} referred to technological progress.

For Edward Burnett Tylor in England, culture and civilization were synonymous. But even before the demise of the European colonial empires, most socio-cultural anthropologists were uncomfortable with the normative connotations of the latter. They preferred to carry out ethnographic studies within paradigms that represented the world as composed of more or less bounded societies with their more or less incommensurable cultures. With the abandonment of evolutionist paradigms, analyses of the emergence of civilization from primitive cultures were rendered redundant and repugnant.

Both society and culture proved susceptible to the disease now known as “methodological nationalism.” They are no longer uncontested master concepts. Terms such as ethnic group and identity have become popular alternatives in denoting the central objects or units of anthropological investigation. Few modern anthropologists have been tempted to re-integrate “civilization” to the lexicon and we have poured scorn on both singular and plural usages in other disciplines. For example, Jack Goody (2006) has critiqued Norbert Elias’s use of “civilizing process” for its Eurocentrism. Political scientist Samuel Huntington’s account of the “clash of civilizations” has attracted far more opprobrium due to this scholar’s impassioned commitment to the values of his own “Western civilization.” Huntington’s civilizations are “cultures writ large,” neatly bounded and closed entities. He is adamant that “the West was the West long before it was modern” (cited in Arnason 2003: 12).

For all the justified critique it has attracted, Huntington’s book in the wake of the Cold War has provoked scholars to revisit the concept of civilization with the aim of developing new and more productive usages. For example, engaging explicitly with Huntington, archeologist David Wengrow has emphasized “camouflaged borrowings” rather than clashes between the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt. According to Wengrow (2010: xviii): “Civilization, if we are to retain that term, should then refer to the historical outcomes of exchanges and borrowings \textit{between} societies, rather than to processes or attributes that set one society apart from another.” This cautious formulation emphasizes connectivity and retains society as the basic unit. But Wengrow does not challenge received knowledge that civilization, understood as the growth of more complex societies based on agricultural intensification and new
technologies of communication, developed with a high degree of independence in different parts of the world. He and others have drawn theoretical inspiration for a plural concept of civilization from Marcel Mauss, who drew in turn on the late work of his uncle Émile Durkheim (Schlanger 2006). This strand has been neglected by anthropologists, who associate the Durkheimian tradition with the analysis of closed societies and are unaware that the masters clearly saw the need for a meso-level of analysis between the societal and the universal. However, Durkheim and Mauss did not develop new concepts to implement this agenda, and the gauntlet laid down by Huntington has not been picked up by socio-cultural anthropologists. We have a gut resistance to his rhetoric of “clash”—but might there be circumstances in which this diagnosis is warranted?

If anthropologists today have to re-acquaint themselves with the concept of civilization as it were from scratch, a good place to start is the magisterial survey of historical sociologist Johann P. Arnason (2003). Arnason too rejects Huntington’s culturalism. He is equally critical of all forms of economic and geographical determinism. He finds much of value in Elias, but also in the historical sociology of Max Weber (though Weber preferred to use the term \textit{Kulturwelt}) and its contemporary offshoot, the “multiple modernities” paradigm of Shmuel Eisenstadt. Like Wengrow, Arnason eschews a neat definition of civilization. He concentrates on preindustrial Eurasia, where he favors comparative approaches “grounded in intercivilizational encounters” (2003: 62). For example, he notes the development of successive Russian states as a result of encounters between Slavs, pagan Scandinavians, Byzantine Christians, and Mongolian nomads as “an eminently instructive case of unfolding multi-civilizational dynamics” (ibid.: 33f).

As this example shows, a world of multiple civilizations, contiguous and overlapping temporally and spatially, is radically different from that of the early post-Neolithic societies explored by archeologists. Arnason’s synthetic, meta-theoretical panorama of civilizational analysis is liable to leave anthropologists gasping for breath and wondering how they might possibly operationalize the concept. In the first part of this contribution I outline the efforts of a few anthropologists to promote analysis at this level, whether or not they made use of the term civilization. I then present two brief case studies to show how micro investigations making use of ethnographic methods can be reconciled with the analysis of inter- and intra-civilizational dynamics, and how we can distinguish between the latter.

**Anthropological contributions**

The anthropologists discussed most carefully by Arnason are Claude Lévi-Strauss and Pierre Clastres. Their appreciation of the post-Neolithic but pre-state condition constitutes for Arnason a kind of baseline for all civilizational analysis. Arnason also acknowledges the efforts of Louis Dumont (another student of Mauss) to grasp Indian civilization in terms of a basic structuring relationship between the political and the religious. But while his teacher’s vision of civilization had emphasized encounters, the endless give and take between civilizations, Dumont opted to contrast \textit{homo hierarchicus} in India with an equally reified ideal type of \textit{homo aequalis} in distant Western Europe.

By the 1950s the US was the hegemonic power and modernization and decolonialization were keywords in the social sciences. Following Franz Boas, his first doctoral student Alfred Kroeber had helped to transmit impulses from German humanities traditions into the paradigms of North American anthropology, including the notion of “culture area.” In the 1950s culture solidified as the master concept. Kroeber also used civilization, distinguishing it from culture primarily in terms of scale (as did Huntington later). Both culture and civilization were open systems, which, however, could conceal to form “patterns” that varied in intensity at different locations and had nothing to do with utilitarian adaptations. They were based ultimately on a common style or “value culture.”
Kroeber negotiated a division of labor with sociologist Talcott Parsons, confirming fieldwork as the dominant method of the anthropologists and granting them the leading role in the study of culture in this idealist sense, particularly the “value culture” of people very different from ourselves. This reached its apotheosis in the Geertzian paradigm of “the interpretation of cultures.”

This work also reflected the impact of modernization theory, in an era in which studies of exotic “tribesmen” were gradually being displaced by close-up investigations of “peasants.” Whether studied in East or South Asia, the Mediterranean or Latin America, peasant communities were evidently embedded in wider systems that could be extensively documented historically. Robert Redfield, building on Kroeber’s ideas, argued that peasant communities were “part societies,” whose “little tradition” had to be analyzed in dynamic interaction with the “great tradition” to which it belonged. He was the main inspiration behind a project on “comparative civilizations” at the University of Chicago (Arjomand 2010). Redfield and his colleagues recognized the emerging domination of the West over what was about to be termed the Third World, but alongside this new inter-civilizational encounter, they also drew attention to intra-civilizational dynamics. These were obviously influenced by new global inter-dependencies, yet they remained partially autonomous. India provided the richest illustrations: Sanskritization proceeded in accordance with the logic of a distinctive South Asian, primarily Hindu civilization, even as new inter-civilizational encounters had resulted in the rise of the English language in an independent developmental state, influenced also by Soviet models.

Eric Wolf (1967) appreciated Redfield’s conceptualization of the “social organization of tradition” as a corrective to the culturalist positivism of Kroeber, while criticizing the work of anthropologists and archeologists who in his view exaggerated the importance of socio-economic relationships and underplayed ideas and ideologies. Every “coagulation” or “crystallization” (Kroeber’s terms) that we might wish to call a civilization had to be accounted for sociologically, distinguishing internal and external factors, but Wolf insisted on paying equal attention to what he termed cognitive and ideological dimensions. Unfortunately he seems at this point to have lost interest in civilization: neither in Europe and the People without History (1982), with its focus on the rise of the North Atlantic countries from the sixteenth century on, nor in his later investigations of the internal dynamics of “culture and power” in cases such as the Aztecs and Nazi Germany did he make significant use of this concept. This is unfortunate, because it might have helped him find that elusive world-historical balance between what we simplistically distinguish as the social and the cultural.

In Britain the only figure with comparable range and stature is Jack Goody, who has pursued comparative analysis in even longer time frames than Wolf. Goody’s (2010) narrative of Eurasian breakthrough begins, following Gordon Childe, with the urban revolution of the late Bronze Age. He has been more concerned to redress a long history of Eurocentrism in the writing of global history than to address any particular civilizations within Eurasia. Goody’s principal actors are the “merchant cultures,” which transmitted ideas as well as commodities by land and by sea along the trade routes of the Old World. This is consistent with the Maussian approach to civilizational encounters, but Goody does not make this connection and has not contributed to the reinvigoration of this concept.

Case study I: East-Central Europe

The reasons why even those anthropologists who explicitly engage in long-term historical analysis are reluctant to adopt the concept of civiliza-
that smacks of a “higher” form of human community. But setting aside our disciplinary specialization in the “cold” societies, how exactly is one to recognize civilizational crystallizations in the hot flux of Eurasian history? Does every ephemeral empire constitute a civilization? Are the Eastern and Western strands of Christianity separate civilizations? Or do they form a single great tradition alongside those of Judaism and Islam? Or should we recognize the Abrahamic religions as together constituting a single monotheistic civilization? Did European civilization re-emerge with the fall of the Roman Empire to re-emerge in new forms after the Renaissance, or should we pluralize Renaissance and consider medieval Europe as a civilization in its own right? Such problems of periodization and classification are endemic to historiography. Anthropologists, having opted for micro-level ethnography as their hallmark, have preferred to ignore them.

Civilizational analysis was certainly not on my agenda when I began fieldwork in Poland in 1978. My aim was to conduct a socio-economic study of non-collectivized villagers, following an earlier study of collectivized villagers in Hungary. Thus the units of comparison were “national” variants of socialism. Chance led me to the Carpathian village of Wisłok in the southeast corner of the country, near the borders with Slovakia and what was then Soviet Ukraine. During fieldwork I learned a little about the ethnic and religious histories of the various Slavic groups of the region, but I only began to study this complexity in greater depth when, following the collapse of socialism, the past suddenly became salient in contemporary life in the form of highly visible ethno-religious conflicts (e.g. concerning the ownership of sacred property).

Eastern and Western Christians and Jews had mingled in this region since the Middle Ages. The city of Przemysł was the center of both a Roman Catholic and an Orthodox diocese. With the Union of Brest (1596), some eastern Bishops acquiesced to political pressure and recognized the authority of the Pope. They were not required to change their Byzantine liturgy. Nonetheless in the following centuries these “Greek Catholics,” as they were later called by Empress Maria Theresa, borrowed extensively from Western ritual practices, architecture, and sacred art. The movement of cultural traits was shaped by unequal power relations, as stressed by Eric Wolf. But there was also traffic in the other direction. The national icon of the Black Madonna, Queen of Poland, the largest Western Slav nation, visited by millions of pilgrims every year at her shrine in Częstochowa, has undeniably Eastern, Byzantine features. This may be another case of camouflaged borrowing, but of course all of these styles had a common origin in the eastern Mediterranean.

This East-West encounter within Christianity took on a new form in the nineteenth century when clergy of both variants of Catholicism helped to disseminate a national identity to their peasant congregations in what was then the multiethnic Habsburg province of Galicia. The disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918 was marked by violent conflicts between Polish Roman Catholics and Ukrainian Greek Catholics. The Poles won and controlled the region for the next two decades. Although their elites now proclaimed them to be radically different kinds of people, in the diocese of Przemysł the rates of intermarriage between ordinary Eastern and Western Christians actually increased; the languages were so close that mutual comprehension had never been an issue; the two kinds of Christian had different calendars but they continued to respect each other’s rituals and joined forces in boycotting Jewish shops in the 1930s. After the Holocaust and mutual ethnic cleansing sprees by both Poles and Ukrainians, Stalin imposed a new state border. By mid-century the old cosmopolitan civilization had vanished: to the west, the People’s Republic of Poland was overwhelmingly Polish and Roman Catholic, while to the east the Soviet Ukraine was overwhelmingly Ukrainian and Orthodox. Communist power holders in Ukraine formally merged the Greek Catholics into the Orthodox Church in 1946, though in practice its priests were able to maintain considerable regional autonomy, while others went
underground. There were minor convulsions on both sides of the border when Ukraine achieved independence and the Greek Catholics re-emerged in the 1990s. I documented these in several articles based on ethnographic observation. I found that the basic pattern set in the 1940s had not changed further. Nowadays this Polish-Ukrainian border is a “Schengen” external boundary of the EU; despite the continued presence of small minorities on both sides, in national imaginations it represents a sharp ethnic and religious boundary.

How can civilizational analysis help us make sense of this transformation of cosmopolitan Eastern Galicia into a zone of sharply bounded nation states? Samuel Huntington’s take might at first sight surprise. Four centuries of affiliation to the Vatican suffice for him to classify East Slav Greek Catholics with the civilization of the West. This is indeed how many Greek Catholics see themselves, in opposition to Orthodox, less nationally conscious Ukrainians in the eastern half of their country. But in the eyes of most Polish Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics are an Eastern anomaly, whose true home is on the other side of a sharp, civilizational boundary. Recent Vatican policy has reaffirmed this difference by proclaiming the value of the pure Eastern rite; but Greek Catholic congregations are often reluctant to give up the camouflaged borrowings of recent centuries.

Whereas Huntington views the Greek Catholics as the fulcrum of an inter-civilizational clash between East and West, my interpretation differs from both his and the various emic accounts. I prefer to read this history in terms of intra-civilizational dynamics and the rise of the nation-state. The historical division of Christianity into Eastern and Western streams, each subsuming enormous diversity, preceded state formation in this region of Central Europe. The East-West boundary has never disappeared; even Greek Catholicism falls far short of a real hybrid. But Eastern and Western Slavs could always understand each other’s dialects, intermarry and share each other’s food. Jews were more distinct, but they spoke the languages of their neighbors and formed an integral part of the polyglot civilization destroyed by the “un-mixing” of the 1940s. Some Jewish survivors later formed associations in Israel and are proud today to recall their origins in Galicia. Back in the homeland, the replacement of capitalism by socialism seems almost insignificant in comparison to the imposition of the new state boundary and the violence of ethnic cleansing in the 1940s. After the collapse of socialism, Habsburg Galicia became the object of intellectual and entrepreneurial nostalgia on both sides of the border. But the old cosmopolitanism has gone forever. The eventual accession of Ukraine to the EU will have little bearing on the nationalization that has taken place within European, Christian civilization, in East and West alike.

Case study II: East-Central Asia

My later project in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), in northwest China, was similarly innocent of a civilizational agenda in its inception. But, twenty-five years after my first visit, increased conflict between Uyghurs and Chinese leads me in this case to diagnose a problematic inter-civilizational encounter. The Chinese are well known, one of the earliest and most significant of Eurasian civilizations and widely perceived as the new global hegemon of the twenty-first century. But who are the Uyghurs? If they do not belong under the Chinese civilizational canopy, where do they belong?

The history of the vast territory between the eastern European steppe and the Great Wall of China is commonly told as a history of separate civilizations that replaced each other successively, the superseded literally disappearing into the sand. Closer inspection of the lands traversed by the multiple routes of the Silk Road reveals continuous contacts, borrowings, and overlapping civilizational influences. The lines of demarcation are often indistinct. Nevertheless, from a modern perspective the administrative entity officially designated (since 1955) as the XUAR can be reasonably classified as the easternmost segment of the belt of Turkic
speakers that extends through the Caucasus into Anatolia, and which reached deep into the Balkan peninsular until the post-imperial unmixing of the twentieth century. Today’s Uyghurs speak an eastern Turkic that is unintelligible on the streets of Istanbul; but language and literature are nonetheless a prime unifying civilizational characteristic, and many prefer Eastern Turkestan to the Chinese term Xinjiang as the name of their homeland.

These Turkic speakers, including Kazakh and Kyrgyz pastoralists as well as the sedentary oasis-dwelling agriculturalists who gave rise to today’s Uyghur, were gradually Islamized in a process that began in Kashgar in the tenth century and was completed in Qumul (Hami) in the sixteenth. Buddhist and Nestorian Christian practices yielded to Sunni Islam, within which powerful Sufi orders, notably the Nakshbandi, played a key role. The second unifying civilizational factor is therefore religion. Even if Eastern Turkestan lacked centers of learning comparable to Samarkand and Bukhara, from the sixteenth century on we can speak of an intensifying Turkic-Islamic congruence in this zone of Inner Asia.

The political history of this territory was increasingly shaped by the expansive continental empires of the Romanov and Qing dynasties. The boundaries specified in the wake of military campaigns in the middle of the eighteenth century do not diverge greatly from the western frontier of the PRC today. Under the Manchu Qing and the republic that succeeded their empire in 1911, Eastern Turkestan was at first attached and then gradually incorporated into Chinese civilization (despite periods of warlord rule and brief spasms of autonomy). There were plenty of borrowings, as there always had been along the Silk Road, for example noodles are nowadays central to Uyghur cuisine, and no one suspects a Chinese origin; but language differences were deep, dietary rules held firm, and there was very little intermarriage between Han colonists and the Muslim-Turkic population. Chinese Muslims (the contemporary Hui) complicated the picture; they usually had separate mosques and little contact with their co-

religionists (with whom few were capable of communicating).

The third civilizational force shaping the modern history of Eastern Turkestan was thus that of Manchu Chinese imperialism. In 1949 this Chinese world was proclaimed to be a socialist world. During the following decades the demographic composition of the region was transformed. Han Chinese probably now outnumber Uyghurs in their designated “autonomous region.” Yet in addition to radical political and economic transformation, socialist rule also brought a new consciousness of being Uyghur to a disparate population whose identities were previously linked largely to their particular oasis and to their religion. Chinese socialist policies of nationality (minzu) recognition, like the Soviet policies on which they were based, were instrumental in forging strong ethno-national identities. They included the standardization of the language and its use in educational institutions at all levels. In the Soviet case, the principle of federalism led to the emergence of independent Turkic republics following the collapse of the USSR. In China, by contrast, Mao opted to preserve the historic political ideology of a unitary state. The XUAR has thus from its inception formed an integral component of a single centralized state. In the neo-Confucian rhetoric of recent decades it is proclaimed that this state embraces multiple civilizations, notably those of Islam, Buddhist Tibet, and the Mongolian grasslands.

The vast territory of the XUAR is thus contested, pulled in different directions by competing civilizational influences. Despite some efforts from Ankara, the Turkic component has not been easy to mobilize. Islam has experienced a significant revival since Maoist repression and scripture-based currents have become popular. The socialist authorities have alleged that a “fundamentalist” impulse emerging from the Islamic civilizational sphere is working in tandem with a secularist “splittist” movement rooted in the principles of minority recognition (which they themselves introduced). But there is no significant evidence that religion can be mobilized to support separatist politics.
Arguably, the “reformed socialism” of the past three decades, which in the eyes of some observers amounts to “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics,” deserves to be classified as a further distinct civilizational influence in the present conjuncture. Certainly many Uyghurs are attracted by the goods available in the new shopping malls and mediatized glimpses of a globalized consumerism. However, socialist political and administrative controls remain firmly in place, such that neither rural nor urban Uyghurs are able to participate as equals in the new market society. The best jobs are effectively reserved for Chinese, who continue to pour into the region. The state proposes to consolidate this mixing by means of educational reforms designed to weaken provision in Uyghur and make all Uyghurs fluent in Mandarin. Unfortunately the evidence indicates that discrimination against Uyghurs is largely independent of their linguistic competence. At present the minkaohan—Uyghurs educated in Chinese-language schools—are the object of suspicion on both sides. They are no more able to forge a genuine hybrid than the Chinese Muslims. Language, religion, and dietary rules continue to mitigate against intermarriage between Uyghur and Han. Far from Uyghur integration/assimilation being fostered by the new market economy, the loss of almost 200 lives in the ethnic rioting that took place on 5 July 2009 in Urumchi, capital of the XUAR, suggests an explosive clash between two civilizations. Two kinds of population transfer played a direct role in this conflagration: in addition to the increased immigration of Chinese into the XUAR, significant numbers of unemployed Uyghur have been relocated to the east to alleviate labor shortages in China’s booming coastal provinces (see Hann 2011).

Discussion and analysis of the cases

I presented the case studies as examples of intra- and inter-civilizational dynamics respectively, but of course this very distinction is problematic. Looking back in time from the territorial vantage point of today’s XUAR is also questionable. Perhaps I have yet to escape from two pitfalls: the fetishism of the local and the tyranny of the present. In a different frame, the case of East Central Asia might be analysed in terms of intra-civilizational dynamics. For example, in terms of a Muslim religious canopy a text-based orientation seems to be on the rise in contemporary Eastern Turkestan, a trend very similar to that documented in other parts of the Muslim world. That would be to privilege religion, but one might equally well privilege the political or some other aspect of social organization. From the political angle, the Chinese state has subsumed multiple civilizations for thousands of years in the vast expanse of its western territories, and today’s policies of mixing represent the culmination of that continuity. But the term civilization, as Wolf saw but failed to follow up, forces us to historicize actual combinations of the cultural and the socio-political, rather than artificially unmix them. When, despite enforced intensified interaction in all areas of social life, population groups refuse to intermarry and instead assert radical differences, sometimes phrased as differences in ultimate values, then there is a strong prima facie case, at this moment in time and space, for assigning these distinct socio-cultural groups to separate, clashing civilizations. Following gradual incorporation over two centuries, socialist ideology in the second half of the twentieth century aimed to bring Xinjiang and the Uyghurs as its dominant socio-cultural group under a single Chinese canopy; but ironically these very policies, implemented with the standardization of the modern Uyghur language and disseminated through Uyghur schools and mass media, led to the emergence of a strong secular Uyghur identity that now poses a serious threat to the integrity of the PRC.

It is still possible that the “civilization” of global capitalism will succeed where that of Maoist socialism failed. Like other intra- and inter-civilizational phenomena, this encounter can be illuminated by the micro-level work of the ethnographer. Rather than see the clash between Chinese and Uyghurs in terms of sepa-
ratism or fundamentalism based on a unique society or culture, the current crisis in the XUAR must be studied in all its multiple longue durée civilizational dimensions. The category minkaohan will lose its significance if Uyghur educational institutions are effectively abolished; as even more Chinese enter the labor markets of the XUAR, eventually the nomenclature of the territory may have to be changed. At that point we would have to conclude that the mixing of peoples in Central Asia has led not to civilizational pluralism within the Chinese nation-state, as proclaimed by its ideologists, but to the definitive absorption by one civilization, the Chinese, of a large segment of another, the Turkic-Islamic. This Chinese superstate would be a sharp contrast to the fragmented nation-states of East-Central Europe, which were produced in large measure through the elimination and unmixing of peoples. A fuller historical analysis of this outcome would trace this dénouement back at least as far as the decline of Rome, after which Europe’s religious canopy was able to expand without the political core that survived all dynastic vicissitudes in the continuous history of Chinese civilization.

Conclusion: Whither anthropology?

The editors of this journal (and also those of other leading journals such as American Anthropologist and Current Anthropology) evidently think it timely to re-open the perennial issue of anthropology’s future. I have used my opportunity to argue for a renewed engagement with global history and historical sociology. Looking back at my own work in two regions of Eurasia, I find that much of it exemplifies two pitfalls of twentieth-century anthropology: parochialism and presentism. I have suggested that to revisit the concept of civilization might offer a way beyond these limitations and allow anthropologists to join historical sociologists and archeologists in exciting interdisciplinary debates.

Civilization poses a considerable theoretical challenge to anthropologists, but the potential rewards are great. For me the main attraction of the term is that it welds together the social and the cultural, an unhelpful bifurcation in the Anglophone traditions of the discipline. The study of civilizations in Eurasia draws our attention to functional adaptations of many kinds, but also to the persistence of values that cannot be reduced to any materialist calculus. Under the canopy of a civilization we can expect to find a diversity of what we might term socio-cultural groups. The terms society and culture are best used adjectivally; each component and the composite may be broken up for specialized analysis, but a satisfying account of a human group or community at any level will require attention to both.

But is the noun form of civilization any more defensible? I have suggested tentatively that it is, at least in Eurasia, but I do not deny the difficulties. Like other contested terms, this one too has problematic normative associations. My case studies highlighted a few of the problems that arise. When the political entity lacks congruence with the religious, and the latter is deeply segmented or layered, how do we avoid arbitrariness in identifying civilizations? How are we to maintain a general concept while simultaneously delving into the particular semantics and taking seriously people’s own declared views about the boundaries that separate them from other civilizations? Must we modify the principle of openness with equal attention to closure, in order to account for the complex realities of resistance, unexpected adaptations, long-term resilience of both tangible institutions and intangible styles, and even, in some cases, civilizational clash? These are not new problems, but they are as pertinent for anthropologists today as they ever were, perhaps even more so, if one takes the view that contemporary globalization is a serious threat to civilizational pluralism.

Chris Hann is a director of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale. His recent publications include (ed) Market and Society; The Great Transformation today (2009) and Economic Anthropology: History, Ethnography, Critique (2011), both with Keith Hart.
References