FORUM
Conjunctures, crises, and cultures
Valuing Stuart Hall

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Abstract: This article explores the significance of the work of Stuart Hall for social and political anthropology. It identifies the concern with concrete conjunctural analysis, the continuing attention to the problem of hegemony, and the centrality of a politics of articulation in theory and practice as core features of Hall’s work. The article also touches on his complex relationship with theory and theorizing while grounding his work in a series of political and ethical commitments within and beyond the university.

Keywords: articulation, common sense, conjuncture, cultural studies, hegemony, Stuart Hall

The death of Stuart Hall in February 2014 attracted considerable attention, and this contribution to Focaal reflects on the significance of his work for anthropology, and for social and political anthropology in particular. This feels like a rather strange undertaking, given my own sense of the evident affinities between Hall’s project in cultural studies and the work of critical anthropologists. However, I think Hall seems relatively, albeit unevenly, neglected despite these affinities, with perhaps two reasons for this. First, cultural studies emerged at an odd moment in anthropology—when much critical anthropological work identified itself by refusing the “culture” concept. The move away from culture emphasized its depoliticizing and softening effects, through the dominant organicist, stable, and consensual conceptions of culture (see the illuminating discussion of culture, Gramsci, and anthropology in Crehan 2002).

Cultural studies, by contrast, took culture—and popular culture in particular—as a site of political struggle: the domain through which forms of domination and subordination, inclusion and marginalization, and hierarchical relations could be organized and ordered.

Perhaps the other reason Hall’s work is less visible than it might be reflects the absence of the Great Book. This seems to condemn him to exclusion from the pantheon of “great thinkers” in the social sciences whose work provides a touchstone for many working in anthropology (Harvey, Giddens, Bauman, etc). On Hall’s death, Tariq Ali (2014) posed the question: “Unlike almost everyone else of his 1956 and later cohort, he did not write a book. Why, many asked, did he concentrate on the essay?”

Leaving aside the odd fetishization of the sole-authored book, there are many reasons that might explain Hall’s way of working. Let me of-
fer two that certainly contributed to his absence from the list of wizards of Grand Theory (or the providers of epochal definitions of the present era). Despite being theoretically sophisticated and able to mobilize diverse conceptual resources from across many disciplines (including anthropology), Hall had little interest in delivering grand theoretical statements. Famously, he once argued that “theory is always a detour” on the road to “somewhere more important” (1991: 42). This somewhere more important—the sort of knowledge that mattered—was always about how to understand concrete political situations (elsewhere [1992: 286] he emphasizes that this detour through theory is a “necessary detour”). As a result, Hall—and cultural studies in his wake—has tended to be theoretically open, borrowing and bending analytic resources from a variety of places in order to illuminating these concrete political situations. This has led to charges of inconsistency, fashion following, trendiness, and so forth, for cultural studies. These may well be true—but they miss Hall’s persistent commitment to “theorizing” as an analytic practice rather than doing Theory (in which purity, consistency, and grandeur are often more highly valued). Later, I will return to the questions—the orientation—that disciplined this theoretical openness, and meant that theorizing through “borrowing and bending” was conditioned by a consistent set of purposes.

The second reason for the absence of the Book of Hall relates to his commitment to working and thinking collectively. As many histories of the University of Birmingham’s Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies have shown, Hall fostered an approach to collaborative working that remains rare in the world of fetishized individualism in academic work. As a result, Hall left us many collaborative projects, many reflective and exploratory essays, many urgent interventions into political and academic moments, and possibly the most neglected Big Book of all—Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order (written with Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts, published in 1978; a second edition appeared in 2013). This collaborative work offered a careful conjunctural analysis of Britain in the 1970s; its argument that Britain was experiencing a shift toward an authoritarian populism foreshadowed the emergence of “Thatcherism”; it was the first cultural studies book to engage with the ways in which the British social formation and its crises were thoroughly racialized, and its method (of analysis and writing) offered an exemplary model of how critical intellectual work in cultural studies might be conducted. What surprises me is that the book fails to fit into many histories of cultural studies (it is not a direct product of one of the Birmingham Centre’s subgroups, nor does it embody one of the characteristic fields of investigation: media, literature, education, subcultures, etc.).

Despite the regularity with which studies pick it up as a reference point for work on authoritarianism, neoliberalism, and the punitive turn (e.g., Makovicky 2013), Policing the Crisis not only goes missing from some accounts of cultural studies, it is also strangely absent from related academic places where one might expect to find it. It is largely missing from UK criminology, despite dealing with crime and policing (in both specific and wider senses), and from media studies, despite some original work on primary and secondary definers and on the popular/vernacular voice in the press. Perhaps I should not be surprised: after all, these are largely conventionalized fields of study. But then it also goes missing from what one might expect to be more “friendly” places: for example, Bob Jessop’s work (e.g., 2008; 2009) on “cultural political economy” eschews any mention of the book (and largely avoids cultural studies more generally), while Loïc Wacquant’s examination of the penal turn associated with neoliberalism also seems to not know the book exists, despite an apparently shared interest in authoritarianism and law and order (Wacquant 2009; for some of the debates around Wacquant, see Kalb 2012; Lacey 2010).

The uneven visibility of Hall’s work in anthropology is hardly unique, but it means the neglect of a body of work with strong affinities
around both crucial issues (such as power, racialized formations, hegemony, and what Gramsci called the field of the “national-popular”) and a sustained orientation to thinking better about the problem of the present. Incidentally, Focaal has consistently been one of the places where his work has been picked up and these connections noticed and explored. It is his recurrent concern with the current, the concrete, and the conjunctural that disciplines the “detour through theory” in his work. Talking at a US conference in the 1980s, he highlighted the political struggles over AIDS, arguing that this was what concrete issues demanded of intellectual work:

I’ve used that example, not because it’s a perfect example, but because it’s a specific example, because it has a concrete meaning, because it challenges us in its complexity, and in so doing has things to teach us about the future of serious theoretical work. It preserves the essential nature of intellectual work and critical reflection, the irreducibility of the insights which theory can bring to political practice, insights which cannot be arrived at in any other way. And at the same time, it rivets us to the necessary modesty of theory. (1992: 286)

This view of the “necessary modesty of theory” did not imply a simple empiricism. On the contrary, his recurrent touchstone for addressing the specific/concrete example was Marx’s observation in the Grundrisse that the “concrete is the concentration of many determinations” ([1939] 1993: 101). As a result, analyzing the concrete demanded supple theorizing, rather than a theory that announced in advance what was true, right, or correct (and thus treated the concrete example only as an illustration of what is already known). Hall’s theorizing was continuously engaged with a dialogue about the limitations of a Marxist political economy that lacked that “necessary modesty” in the face of the concrete, preferring instead to return to the security of solidified (if not ossified) theoretical categories. Instead, Hall argued for a practice of theorizing about the concrete that would always be “without guarantees” (1996; see the collection by Gilroy et al. 2000).

Thinking conjuncturally

As someone forged in the making of the British New Left in the 1960s, Hall sought to shape an intellectual project that had political questions at its heart—that the study of the present was necessarily intersected by politics in different aspects. Most obviously, politics was at stake in understanding the character of the present moment—the forces, tendencies, forms of power, and relations of domination and subordination that were condensed in a conjuncture. Equally, the work of doing conjunctural analysis was political in the sense that it was designed to reveal the possibilities and resources for progressive action—easier said than done, it is true, but Hall never lost sight of that obligation of intellectual work.

This orientation to the particularity of the conjuncture—and attention to its complexity—is characteristic of Hall’s work. The concept of conjuncture highlights the ways in which moments of transformation, break, and the possibility of new “settlements” come into being. Conjunctures have no necessary duration (they are neither short nor long); rather, their time is determined by the capacity of political forces—the leading bloc—to shape new alignments or to overcome (or at least stabilize) existing antagonisms and contradictions. This is (again) not a Theory, but an orientation—a way of focusing analytic attention on the multiplicity of forces, accumulated antagonisms, and possible lines of emergence from the conjuncture (rather than assuming a singular crisis and one line of development). It was, for Hall, an insistence of the complexity of such a moment, such that the nature of the crisis could not be reduced to a single cause, force, or even primary contradiction. Characteristically quoting Gramsci, Hall recently insisted that:
Gramsci argued that, though the economic must never be forgotten, conjunctural crises are never solely economic, or economically-determined “in the last instance.” They arise when a number of contradictions at work in different key practices and sites come together—or “conjoin”—in the same moment and political space and, as Althusser said, “fuse in a ruptural unity.” Analysis here focuses on crises and breaks, and the distinctive character of the “historic settlements” which follow. The condensation of forces during a period of crisis, and the new social configurations which result, mark a new “conjuncture”. (2011: 9)

This does imply an understanding of social forces in their richest sense, rather than an assumption that they are simply the transposition of class relations to the fields of politics, ideology, and party. Policing the Crisis embodied this orientation, exploring a conjuncture in which the forms of social and political consent that had sustained a postwar “settlement” (or a series of intertwined economic, social, political, and cultural settlements) had dissolved from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, creating the conditions for new alignments of political forces and the promise of new settlements—to be incarnated in the authoritarian, populist political practices of Thatcherism. Two different analytic movements are at stake here. The first concerns debates with—and within—Marxism about class relations as social forces. Following the work of E. P. Thompson (1963) and others, Hall shared an interest in the “making” of classes as social forms and political projects (see also Carrier and Kalb forthcoming). But a second analytic and political move insisted that classes were never the only social forces or political projects: for example, gendered and racialized formations of inequality, oppression, and struggle were also at stake in how people lived their subordinations—and contested them. This second move strained some of the otherwise productive relationships between Marxism and cultural studies.

Hall’s relationship to Gramsci was persistent and profound. Yet it was always held in a state of dynamic tension, entangled with the concrete problems to be analyzed and other conceptual resources for thinking about those issues. Hall himself tried to clarify this relationship:

I do not claim that, in any simple way, Gramsci “has the answers” or “holds the key” to our present troubles. I do believe that we must “think” our problems in a Gramscian way—which is different. We mustn’t use Gramsci (as we have for so long abused Marx) like an Old Testament prophet who, at the correct moment, will offer us the consoling and appropriate quotation. We can’t pluck up this “Sardinian” from his specific and unique political formation, beam him down at the end of the 20th century, and ask him to solve our problems for us: especially since the whole thrust of his thinking was to refuse this easy transfer of generalisations from one conjuncture, nation or epoch to another. (1986: 16)

I will return to the relationship between conjunctural analysis and other aspects of his work in a moment, but there are other important ways in which Hall’s work was political. These concerned the relationship between intellectual work and the university as an institutionalized field of relationships and practices devoted to the organization and disciplining of knowledge production and distribution. Hall’s vision of cultural studies was as a project that would work beyond disciplinary boundaries, devoted to a view that the social world did not divide neatly into the categories of social, economic, political—each of which “belonged” to a discipline. This was something more than multi- or interdisciplinarity—invoking a sense of working simultaneously between and beyond existing disciplines. This transdisciplinary (or, perhaps, undisciplined) approach encountered its own contradictions when cultural studies became institutionalized as a field of study (or even
discipline) with its own borders, canons, and claims. Nevertheless, the original move was liberatory, but it demanded two other acts of intellectual politics: a thorough knowledge of what the disciplines had to say about a particular field, topic, or issue and a willingness to find allies across institutional borders. Such challenges to disciplinary proprietorial authority were not, of course, well received, and cultural studies has spent a lot of its life involved in such “turf wars”.

Second, Hall was, as I have indicated, committed to working collectively and collaboratively—in both intellectual and organizational ways. During his time at the Birmingham Centre, postgraduate students developed their work in cooperative subgroups, shared the administration of the Centre, and even joined the selection panels for the following year’s students. This ethos ran deep—it shaped much of the intellectual production of the Birmingham Centre, including *Policing the Crisis*, and was one of the elements at stake in Hall’s move to a position as professor of sociology at the UK’s Open University in 1978, where much of the teaching was developed through the “collective teacher” of the course team, which planned and prepared teaching material for study at a distance. It is difficult to emphasize enough what a break this represented (and indeed, still represents) with the individualized and privatized modes of intellectual work in the academy. It marks yet another way in which Hall’s policy and practice differs from the conventional Great Man model of the public and private intellectual (on the Left as much as elsewhere).

**The question of hegemony**

Hall is most famously (perhaps notoriously?) associated with the concept of hegemony. This term, borrowed from Gramsci, has been both enormously productive and the subject of continuing controversy. For Hall (and others), hegemony marked the critical issue for thinking about social, political, and cultural domination in ways that did not assume that what Gramsci called “the leading function in the economic sphere” was simply reproduced in stabilized relations of domination and subordination. To put it another way, ruling classes did not simply rule: their power in one domain had to be translated into political, social, and cultural authority or leadership. This attention to hegemony offered a means of countering both forms of economic reductionism (or the elisions of politics and economy in political economy) and the functionalism characteristic of conceptions of ideological domination that do not move further than Marx and Engels’s claim (in *The German Ideology*) that “the ruling ideas of the age” are the ideas of the ruling class ([1932] 1970: 64). Rather, hegemony posed the question of rule differently in two ways.

First, it asks how the consent of subordinated groups is gained and maintained by ruling groups. “Consent” in this sense denotes a condition of social leadership by a ruling bloc. It is understood by Gramsci as something that is both hard work and contingent as relations of power between social groups shift. Hegemony is not a stable condition, but requires political-cultural work to bring into existence and maintain. Second, the route through Gramsci creates the condition for a different understanding of social forces (and their political representation) from an orthodox Marxist account. This may be a critical moment of translation in the relationship between cultural studies and political-economic analyses. Gramsci’s writings in *The Prison Notebooks* (the core texts available in English during the emergence of cultural studies) are famously cryptic and elusively expressed, such that he constantly writes about social groups rather than economic classes. Cultural studies has worked on this ambiguity to understand the ways in which “social forces” may be more than economic classes: other forms of collective actor may be politically significant, while classes do not necessarily understand or represent themselves as “classes”. This reflects the critique of the “overpoliticized” view of ideology developed by Nicos Poulantzas who argued against treating ideologies “as if they were political number
plates worn by social classes on their backs” (1973: 202). He went on to argue that

in reality, the dominant ideology does not simply reflect the conditions of existence of the dominant class, the “pure and simple” subject, but rather the concrete political relation between the dominant and dominated classes in a social formation. It is often permeated by elements stemming from the “way of life” of classes or fractions other than the dominant class or fraction. (ibid.: 203)

This view of ideology opened up questions that Hall addressed through concepts of hegemony and articulation. How did subordinate groups come to be “taken account of”, or become “spoken for”, in hegemonic formations? At the same time, how did different forms of social domination and subordination come to be condensed together? If classes were not the only social forces, what others were in play—and how did they come to be politically effective (or ineffective)? Here—for Hall—were critically important but troubling issues about how forms of gendered and racialized domination were articulated with (but never reducible to) class relations. They were issues that he explored through a series of terms that circle around the question of hegemony: the popular, common sense, identities, and the idea of articulation. I will take up articulation in the following section, but before that will briefly consider the many controversies in which Hall’s work on hegemony has been enmeshed. Hall’s work on Thatcherism, which developed the idea of authoritarian populism from *Policing the Crisis*, was criticized by Kevin Bonnett and colleagues (1984) for paying insufficient attention to the nonideological relations of force in the crisis of British capitalism (see also the later discussion in Leys 1990). More generally, Hall and his collaborators have regularly been challenged for undervaluing the political-economic (e.g., see the intriguing discussion after Hall’s death in Callinicos 2014). Hegemony—and Hall’s development of the idea—has also been more recently challenged by theorists of “posthegemony” or “posthegemonic” politics for misunderstanding the contemporary political scene, transformed, as they see it, by the emergence of the “multitude” as the central vector of alignment (see, e.g., Beasley-Murray 2010).

My aim is not to resolve the various arguments in which hegemony has become enmeshed but to indicate its continuing salience as a way of posing questions of political rule and social leadership. It is, however, important to stress that Hall always insisted on its contingency and fragility. It could never be imagined as a stable condition of class rule; rather, it needed to be understood as one possible moment of the “series of unstable equilibria” that Gramsci describes as characterizing the life of the state. Here we can see a typical entanglement of Hall’s analytic orientation toward the particular and conjunctural and a political attention to the making and unmaking of hegemonic moments. *Policing the Crisis* explored the disintegration of a hegemonic moment—brought about by the proliferation of ideological, cultural, and political challenges to the forms through which a particular hegemonic form had been articulated. The argument located both the particularity of such challenges and the ways in which they were entwined with multiple crises. The moment of crisis was, in fact, a conjunctural condensation of different crises: First it is a crisis of and for British capitalism…. Second, then, it is a crisis of the relations of social forces engendered by this deep rupture at the economic level—a crisis in the political class struggle and in the political apparatuses … at the point where the political struggle issues into the theatre of politics, it has been experienced as a crisis of Party…. It has been of profound importance that the major strategies for dealing with the crisis and its political effects have been drawn in large measure from the social democratic repertoire, not from that of the traditional party of
the ruling class. The dislocations which this has produced in the development of the crisis, as well as resistances to it and thus to the possible forms of its dissolution, have hardly begun to be calculated. … Third, it has been a crisis of the State. The entry into late capitalism demands a thorough reconstruction of the capitalist state, an enlargement of its sphere, its apparatuses, its relation to civil society. … Fourth it is a crisis in political legitimacy, in social authority, in hegemony and in the forms of class struggle. This crucially touches on questions of consent and coercion. (Hall et al. 1978: 317–319)

Articulation and the work of politics

The concern with hegemony led Hall to a particular view of the relationships between politics, culture, and power. Culture was the domain in which people lived—and imagined or understood—their relationship to their subordination. Culture comprised the imaginative, affective, and interpretive maps of the social world and its organization. Through cultural forms and practices, people came to see themselves and others as enmeshed in particular types of conditions, relationships, and possible lines of movement. The enormous depth, diversity, and productivity of the field of culture means that it is continuously traversed by political forces, seeking to forge the connections that would tie political projects into the everyday or commonsense forms of popular thinking. Culture never exists in a “pure” state, outside of these relations—the entanglement is both permanent and constantly shifting as each element changes and/or changes place. For Hall, this was where cultural studies intersected most evidently with Gramsci’s concern with the relationship between hegemony and common sense. For Gramsci, we are always “the product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces without leaving an inventory…. Moreover, commonsense is a collective noun, like religion: there is not just one common sense, for that too is a product of history and a part of the historical process” (1973: 324–325; see also Hall and O’Shea 2013). This insistence on the fragmentary and heterogeneous formation of common sense is important because it points to the work of political articulation that is required to “hegemonize” selected elements or fragments of common sense to create the appearance of a shared, unitary, and coherent conception of the world. This is the articulatory work of hegemony building—it attempts to draw on selected elements of common sense (the Right’s efforts to commandeer discourses of nation, work, and family, for example) and sew them into an apparently natural and necessary attachment to the specific political project. Writing in the 1980s, Hall argued for recognizing Gramsci’s importance for engaging with politics as an articulatory practice:

Since, in fact, the political character of our ideas cannot be guaranteed by our class position or by the “mode of production”, it is possible for the Right to construct a politics which does speak to people’s experience, which does insert itself into what Gramsci called the necessarily fragmentary, contradictory nature of common sense, which does resonate with some of their ordinary aspirations, and which, in certain circumstances, can recoup them as subordinate subjects, into a historical project which “hegemonises” what we used—erroneously—to think of as their “necessary class interests”. Gramsci is one of the first modern Marxists to recognise that interests are not given but have to be politically and ideologically constructed. (1987: 20)

Articulation was always used by Hall in a double sense—referring, on the one hand, to expressing or giving voice while, on the other, to making connections (like the cab and trailer of an articulated lorry). Although cultural studies
(and the critics of cultural studies) have tended to focus attention on the first of these—the ideological, discursive, symbolic practices of articulation—Hall never forgot that hegemony was also the site of the second type of articulatory work. This required the assembling of a (would-be) hegemonic bloc that involved compromises, alliance building, and the creation of a (temporary) set of mutual alignments and interests. It also required the work of engaging subaltern social groups in this project: taking account of them, bringing them to recognize or endorse the need for “leadership” in the direction prescribed. The moment of “consent” is never just ideational or cultural—but nor can it exist without that dimension. As another significant figure in the emergence of cultural studies once argued:

A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. It is a realised complex of experiences, relationships and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits. In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular. Its internal structures are highly complex, as can readily be seen in any concrete analysis. Moreover (and this is crucial, reminding us of the necessary thrust of the concept), it does not just passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own. (Williams 1977: 112)

This understanding of the critical but always contingent relationship between hegemony and the popular remained an organizing thread throughout Hall’s work until his death. It was an analytic orientation that connected his work on conjunctural formations with the exploration of identities and identifications (see, e.g., his remarkable 1986 essay on Gramsci and the study of race and ethnicity). Equally, it was a political orientation that linked his analyses of Thatcherism to reflections on the failure of the left to mount a coherent opposition and alternative to the combined and transformative forces of neoliberalism and neoconservatism in the UK and beyond (see, e.g., Hall 1988). In one of his final essays (written with Alan O’Shea), they argued that the Labour Party’s concession of the terrain of “common sense” to the contradictory nostrums of neoliberalism left the possibility of a more progressive common sense unexamined:

Labour can only win the battle of ideas if it takes its role as a “popular educator” seriously. Each crisis provides an opportunity to shift the direction of popular thinking, instead of simply mirroring the right’s populist touch or pursuing short-term opportunism. The left, and Labour in particular, must adopt a more courageous, innovative, “educative” and path-breaking strategic approach if they are to gain ground. (2013: 25)

Important as it is, this is not the place where I want to end. None of what I have written so far provides the necessary sense of Stuart Hall’s embodied practice of articulation—his consistent commitment to a political pedagogy that sought to engage people in transformative dialogue. His writings perform this sort of style: they are exploratory, inviting the reader to consider and, possibly, to think again. His work with the Open University—in writing and in TV programs/videos—reveals an effort to find a popular pedagogy appropriate to the university’s mission to be “open” (and not merely accessible). Beyond this, the sense of loss that was widely articulated upon his death spoke of encounters with a person who thought and acted dialogically (in a Bakhtinian sense). This embodied engagement combined listening and speaking as a pedagogic, political, and ethical practice. As David Scott has argued, Hall “cultivated an ethical voice responsive to the violations that grow out of complacent satisfactions, secure doctrines, congealed orders, sedimented identities” (2005: 1). In the same article, Scott
also talks of Hall “practicing generosity,” marking a combination of an ethics and an embodied practice that remains strikingly rare in both academic and political settings. Yet any commitment to articulation (and rearticulation) can only flourish if the engagement is mutual rather than one-sided. I was one of the many beneficiaries of that generosity and would hope that readers here will recognize and borrow that disposition to practice rather than any specific concept or theoretical orientation.

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My thanks to Focaal for the invitation to write about Stuart Hall, and for the helpful comments on a first draft. However, writing this has been a strange exercise in many ways, given the ways in which my own life and work have been entangled with his: he has been a teacher, a supervisor, a colleague, a collaborator, and, above all, a friend. As a result, this article is marked by some of those connections, and its conception of what matters about his work is certainly inflected by shared concerns. It also necessarily ends with a sense of the ways in which—as the feminists taught us—the personal is political.

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Notes

1. In one of his final public appearances, Hall can be found engaging David Harvey in exactly this spirit about the limits of this way of theorizing. The exchange can be found in Isaac Julien’s film installation Kapital (2013) at http://www.isaacjulien.com/installations/kap (accessed 1 September 2014).


References


