Introduction: Social Integration in the “New” Berlin

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The newly constructed central district of the city of Berlin has become a symbol of German national unity and restored pride. Beyond the country’s borders, the city’s reunification connotes the end of the Cold War, socialist dictatorship, the lingering divisions of World War II, and the beginning of a new phase of European integration. The cluster of downtown “mega-projects”—the glitzy shopping arcades of Friedrichstrasse, the new transportation infrastructures, the spanking new government center along the renovated waterfront of the Spree, and the internationally notable architecture of the multinational corporate headquarters of Potsdamer Platz—have effaced the long fault line of the Wall in a mere fifteen years.

The physical reunification of the “New Berlin” has received considerable attention throughout the world, most of it focused on the architecture and aesthetics of German identity. In public discourse, the cultural significance of the material environment has far outweighed its economic and social import. Image-making is central to the business of reconstructing the “New Berlin.”

As the capital of five different Germanys, Berlin represents the “unstable optic identity” of the nation, for it is the city where, more than any other city, German nationalism and modernity have been staged and restaged, represented and contested. Berlin is a city that cannot be contained by marketing representations of time, of the “new.”

Berlin’s bid to become a global city, a tourist destination, and the center of Eastern Europe is now inscribed on the urban landscape. The transformation of the local economy from an industrial one to a government and service center is also evident in the lively arts and cultural scene. The artistic sector includes dozens of renovated...
museums, not to mention the galleries springing up in Mitte and other quarters. The Holocaust, the Cold War, they are now occasions for tourism. Post-1990 Berlin has also hosted numerous festivals and international events. The annual Love Parade celebrates the city’s alternative, techno, and gay scenes. The Karneval der Kulturen is a multicultural celebration with increasingly diverse musical, culinary, and crafts offerings. Although Berlin lost its 2000 bid for the Olympics, Germany’s sponsorship of the World Cup soccer tournament in the summer of 2006 displayed the delights of Berlin’s public life around the globe. The city’s new image has helped make tourism and the arts into major industries.

Yet, the physical reunification and economic restructuring of the city were not enough to bridge its many social fissures. Bricks and mortar alone cannot address real issues of flesh and blood. Berliners disagree over the collective narrative of the city’s history. In making the city’s new image, some events and groups may be newly commemorated, but others are in danger of being forgotten. The new construction also entails demolition or at least covering up older land uses. Berlin, more than many other cities, has changed its image so many times that it is difficult to point to a single unifying identity among its residents. Although in fact, the place has a particular urban culture, social integration in the “New Berlin” depends upon other factors than the built environment and market image.

The city is crisscrossed by sociospatial rifts. In addition to the persisting East/West fracture are splits along lines of nationality, ethnicity, religion and culture. Overlaying cultural cleavages are class conflicts through which the fortunes of neighborhoods rise and fall. As we shall see, policies to address concentrated urban disadvantage and programs to integrate the city of Berlin socially have had a mixed record of success.

Conceptions of “Integration”

What does the social integration of a city entail? Must it include the residents’ social interaction, physical proximity, or just a common identification with a place? How important is recognition of one’s own history in coming to feel “at home”? At what scale does social
integration occur—the neighborhood, district, city, metropolis, state? Is integration always a good thing, or is it really about social control, reflecting Berlin’s ever-elusive quest for order? Is it something that public policy can actively promote? These are the questions that guided the authors in this special issue of *German Politics and Society*.

**Temporal Integration: Inclusive Collective Memory**

Healing longstanding conflicts is certainly one understanding of social integration, and Berlin is divided in many respects. Key are the city’s discontinuities across time as well as space. Temporal integration is what we might call the process of constructing inclusive historical narratives. As Maurice Halbwachs argued, the concerns of the present color what is remembered from the past. Thus, like collective memory in general, the construction of urban history is necessarily selective and exclusive. Yet, human beings cannot remember without social frameworks to help us recollect. For example, collective memory is sustained through place—the social construction of sacred group landmarks. This makes the study of memorials particularly relevant to the analysis of collective narratives.

Berliners disagree, however, about what should and should not be preserved. The process of constructing a collective narrative is controversial. The demand for social inclusion is often a claim for symbolic recognition. Alain Touraine’s theory of historicity identifies a “symbolic capacity of social actors to construct a system of knowledge and the technical tools that allow them to intervene in their own functioning, act upon themselves, and thereby produce society.”

Meanings arise from conflicts and cooperative social interactions. The state and the ruling class attempt to integrate and order society with a single set of orientations, while social movements contest the society’s dominant cultural model using the same historicity.

Scholars of Berlin repeat the fact that there have been at least five “New Berlins” during the 20th century. This would seem to preclude a singular linear story about the city’s development and identity. The “New Berlin” was already marketed as a world-class European city at the turn of the last century and in the Golden Twenties, long before this latest bid for *Weltstadt* status. The old imperial city, avant-garde Berlin under Weimar, the Nazi plan for Germania, the post-war
quartered city, and the Cold War-divided Berlin, one lasting from the construction of the Wall in 1961 through reunification in 1989-1990—each entailed efforts to remake the city in a new image.

This ruptured history and Berlin’s shifting, diverse population created “the ultimate postmodern city.” From one perspective, what makes Berlin a distinctive place is its:

... ever-changing spaces, representations, economies, and political systems made and remade by people in the past and present. Berlin is a city of multiple modernities, each typified by different desires for the future, including the future-oriented (now hip retro) modernism of the Weimar period, the romantic and reactionary modernism of National Socialism, the socialist utopian modernism of the GDR, the Cold War capitalist modernisms of the FRG, and now post-modern neotraditionalism.10

The historical texture of the city’s built environment accrued over the last century’s serial upheavals does tell a story: one of discontinuity. The selectivity of the physical remnants of Berlin also left voids and emptiness where, as Andreas Huyssen observes, memory collides with forgetfulness. In Brian Ladd’s powerful metaphor, “Berlin is a haunted city.” In this city of ghosts, “memories often cleave to the physical settings of events. That is why buildings and places have so many stories to tell. They give form to a city’s history and identity.”11 The wastelands left after the Allied bombing of WWII, urban renewal, and the Berlin Wall remind us that “Berlin-as-text remains first and foremost a historical text, marked as much, if not more, by absences as by the visible presence of its past.”12 For example, the debate over reconstruction on the land left vacant by the Wall was largely a debate over what and whom will be remembered and forgotten in the latest “new” Berlin. Increasingly, though, new groups are demanding recognition and inclusion in the history of Berlin. East Berliners, immigrants, homosexuals, and minorities protest the neglect of their contributions—and sacrifices—to the city.

Jewish Berlin, Past and Present

Noisy, matter-of-fact Berlin, the city of work and the metropolis of business, nevertheless has more, rather than less, than some others, of those places and moments when it bears witness to the dead, shows itself full of dead (Walter Benjamin).13
Sometimes people do not want to remember. They may feel guilty, indifferent or even hostile to the group whose history is physically part of their everyday environment. They may wish to remove the symbols commemorating people or events they wish to forget. In these cases, it may require outsiders—refugees, exiles, the government—to insist upon inclusion in the collective memory.

One of the most remarkable aspects of the latest new Berlin is the reappearance of visible Jewish life. Before WWII, there were 160,000 Jews (4 percent of the population) and ninety synagogues in Berlin. In the late 1940s, at most 20,000 souls remained. Yet, the Jewish population has quadrupled since the 1980s, thanks to the immigration of former Soviet Jews. Currently there are officially about 12,000 Jews in Berlin, and 100,000 in Germany, two-thirds of whom are from the ex-Soviet Union. There are at least eight synagogues in Berlin today (108 in Germany). The gold-domed New Synagogue on Oranienburgerstrasse and Daniel Libeskind’s dramatically designed Jewish Museum—with its void to signify the absence of Berlin’s doomed Jews—are just two of the centrally located institutions that this growing community has restored or established in recent years.

Berlin’s awareness of Jewish culture is even more pronounced than this community rebirth suggests. Klezmer music, Jewish comedies, and an Einstein year in 2005, with pithy sayings of the emigrant scientist displayed on banners atop Berlin public buildings, have fed a “Judeo-philia” in the city as exaggerated as persistent antisemitism. There are even occasional Muslim-Jewish events in this city. Jewish leaders—Heinz Galinski, Ignatz Bubis, Paul Spiegel—have made high profile media statements on general issues of tolerance, reflecting a new-found moral authority. If the way that elites publicly discuss the past—in this case, German treatment of Jews and the rise of Nazism—is necessarily selective, Germany’s official contrition for this history, unlike Austria’s, may have contributed to contemporary German resistance to the rise of the extreme Right, especially in the western part of the country. For example, in November 2000, on the anniversary of the Kristallnacht pogrom and after a wave of right-wing extremist violence, over 200,000 people marched from the Oranienburgerstrasse Synagogue to the Brandenburg Gate to protest antisemitism and to campaign for tolerance.
“Struggles in identity politics between Germans and Jews remain tightly linked to a dominant idea of what it means to be German.”\textsuperscript{18} The public debate over the Mahnmal or “warning monument,” as the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is called, makes clear that Berlin is the premier site for debating the historical narrative of the German nation. The design, location, and message of the memorial were all subjects of conflict.\textsuperscript{19}

Although Berlin had numerous “authentically” sited local memorials to the Holocaust and against fascism, the idea of a national monument to the victims of the Holocaust arose in Germany in 1988 after TV moderator Lea Rosh and historian Eberhard Jäckel visited Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. In 1994, the citizens group, Bundestag, and Berlin government announced a design competition. However, when the 1995 jury’s decision—Christine Jackob-Marx’s gargantuan design—was unpopular, the debate over the Holocaust Memorial led the Minister of Culture in 1997 to appoint a new commission. These art historians, architects, and one Jew (James Young, Professor of English and Judaic Studies the University of Massachusetts) invited design submissions. The jury selected Peter Eisenman’s 2,700 concrete pillars on 5.5 central city acres. Ground was broken in 1999, and after years of debates and delays, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe opened in May 2005. Upon its unveiling, Bundestag President Thierse remarked that the Mahnmal represents unified Germany’s “recognition of its own history,” and was designed “not a kind of negative nostalgia, but rather a remembrance of the victims which obligates us in the present and in the future to a culture of humanity, of recognition, of tolerance in a society, in a country in which we as a people can be different without fear.”\textsuperscript{20} This is not a bad definition of social integration.

Nevertheless, this monument did not necessarily promote the intended social integration. Politicians and the new Jews of Berlin were not all in favor of the initiative. Some objected to the abstract monumental design with no mention of the identity of the victims or the perpetrators. “It provides one place where the genocide of the Jews by the German state can be remembered, leaving all other places free of that responsibility … a final laying to rest, rather than a living provocation, as long as power and wealth march on undisturbed all around it.”\textsuperscript{21} The memorial threatened to absolve the
country of guilt, others said. It marked a generational turning point. Other new commemorative sites—Christian Boltanski’s Missing House exhibit, for example, or the Topography of Terror exhibit at the old Gestapo headquarters site—strive for greater authenticity and public education than the Mahnmal. Many Jews rather consider the authentic sites of the Holocaust—the concentration camps—as the most appropriate way to remember the crime. Paul Spiegel, president of Germany’s Central Council of Jews, criticized the memorial as inauthentic, a place for Germans, not for the victims.

The Mahnmal, located on a large and very central plot of land within a stone’s throw of the Reichstag, Brandenburg Gate, and American Embassy, took on an international significance that transcended even the national debate over German history. The Holocaust has transformed the Jews into the symbol for all sorts of questions about German tolerance of those who are different, yesterday and today. Who belongs to, or is excluded from, an imagined homogeneous, ethnic, Christian society with its own *Leitkultur* (leading cultural identity)? Shall the persecution of the Roma and Sinti or homosexuals become part of German history? What about the immigration stories of the 8 million foreigners and 2.6 million Turks in Germany?

**Local Memorials**

While national and even international debates over German identity rage, citizens groups have advocated for memorials below the radar screen of the mass media. Local groups aim to preserve authentic places where historic events actually took place, not dedicate central, arbitrarily contrived places where tourists and politicians can easily assemble to pay their respects. There are Holocaust memorials at the Wittenbergplatz U-Bahn station and Grunewald S-Bahn station, on Rosenstrasse for the German wives who protested the arrest of their Jewish husbands, and the moving “Mirror Wall” in Steglitz. Ordinary citizens speak to the neighborhood, not the world.

Jennifer Jordan’s article in this issue offers two examples of the social construction of collective memory at a more local district level. Whether the memories associated with a place are remembered or forgotten, she argues, largely reflects the intersection of four forces: land use, property ownership, the resonance of a site’s meaning with a larger public, and the presence of an advocate for
memorialization. During the years of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the central Eastern Bezirk (borough) of Mitte laid dozens of memorial plaques, many of which marked resistance to the Nazis. Some of these disappeared after 1990, perhaps because their GDR provenance was evident, but new ones appeared at the initiative of local “memorial entrepreneurs.” There was a contest between those wanting to efface the memory of socialism and those anxious to preserve it. While the local districts, which govern the “landscape of memory” through land use rules, have approved most citizens’ requests for new plaques, land ownership also determined what is remembered. In some cases, when building owners objected to a plaque recalling terrible events that happened in their houses, citizens insisted on embedding the plaque in the sidewalks in front of the buildings, on public land outside the property lines.

Jordan’s second case of local memory-making is the Marzahn cemetery, already situated on public land. Here the many layers of memory and history in Berlin are visible, albeit primarily only to those who live nearby. Many markers were put in place before the Wall fell, but since 1989 the cemetery continues to be an active site of memorial work. Memorial entrepreneurs or activists, for example, unveiled a new commemorative tablet (in addition to already extant markers) to the Roma and Sinti who were deported from Berlin to Auschwitz during WWII. Others have created new markers for the forced laborers buried in the cemetery, with much of the work being done by local district residents, but also resonating more broadly in dedication ceremonies attended by national and even international officials. This case shows how the site spoke to a broader public, and actively engages local residents in the work of shaping collective narratives of the past in the urban landscape. Indeed, the recovery of memory about the treatment of the Roma and Sinti symbolizes contemporary issues in multicultural Berlin, especially as Marzahn absorbs new immigrants. “People shape the memorial landscape,” Jordan concludes, “and the memorial landscape shapes people.”

Memorial initiatives promote social integration in several ways. First, they include former “outsiders” in the collective memory of the city. Just as the Jewish Museum and Holocaust Memorial helped incorporate one group in Berlin’s history, local memorials integrate other groups into the narrative. There are now attempts to
commemorate non-Jewish victims of the Holocaust in more central places. Second, the process of establishing a memorial entails active local participation and enlisting the support of the press, voluntary associations, and politicians. This builds networks in neighborhoods and throughout the city. Third, the “consumers” of symbolic landscapes—the passersby, tourists, and visitors who read the plaques and memorial texts or participate in ceremonies in these spaces—learn who Berliners were and are, and come to identify with the city.

Nevertheless, there are still many who are forgotten, those long or newly excluded from the symbolic community of Berlin. For example, Easterners may want to forget the privileged enclaves of the city where the Stasi and their families lived, such as the Obersee district. However, many in the Eastern sector of the city feel that the latest incarnation of the “new” Berlin is too western. The exclusion of the physical remnants of their lives under socialism is giving rise to what some call “Ostalgie.”

**Spatial Integration**

Spatial integration means overcoming involuntary segregation and increasing access to places in order to encourage contact and promote solidarity among diverse residents of the city. Social exclusion is physically inscribed in the organization and control of space. Through markets, planning legislation, and social practices, cities exclude some people from certain places based upon their economic resources, political status, cultural practices, regulated behaviors, and ascribed characteristics. Four aspects of sociospatial integration are discussed in this section: the movement of the united German government to Berlin; the reknitting of the East and West of the city; the rise of multicultural Berlin, a city of immigrants; and class conflicts over space.

**Berlin: Capital City**

A capital is the space that symbolically integrates the social, ethnic, religious, or political diversity of a country. A capital creates or enhances the national ideology, political values, or common political
beliefs of a state. A capital thus allows disparate social and political groups to be represented either physically or through participation in national political bodies and symbols (Andreas Daum).27

Capital cities serve nation-states. They are home to national administrative, economic, and social functions as well as performative, representative, preservative and informative cultural functions. They are places where “power, memory, and culture were set in stone to create the impression of a coherent and strong nation,”28 serving as sources of social integration. Capitals also connect a city to a global system of capital cities with similar functions, providing a focus for both national and international identity.

The “new” Berlin is not a new capital city. It was the capital of Brandenburg-Prussia since the 15th century and then, in 1871, of united Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and, after division by the Allies, the GDR. Although the West German seat of government provisionally moved to little Bonn during the Cold War, the preamble of the 1949 constitution declared Berlin as the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) official capital too. In 1989, many assumed the government would automatically return there, but Bonn, which had grown into its role, resisted. As a result, debate continued for two years over the movement of united Germany’s capital from Bonn to Berlin.

There was quite a bit of opposition to Berlin, and not only by vested interests and bureaucrats comfortable in Bonn. Not everyone loves Berlin.29 Historically, Frankfurt, site of the first German National Assembly in 1848-1849, was a serious contender for Germany’s capital city. Berlin was considered profligate, corrupt, and politically unstable. The 1991-1992 capital debate was about “the burdens of the past, about the kind of future Germany wanted, about the way it would be treated by the rest of the world.”30 Berlin was tainted by its Nazi history, some said, and Germans were still uneasy about expressing nationalism through a grand capital. Moreover, after victory in the Cold War, the capital of united Germany should remain in the West of the country. Berlin was “expensive, militaristic, Prussian, Stasi, non-European, nationalistic, and eastward-looking. And, of course, there was ‘the N-word.’”31

In rebuttal, advocates for Berlin argued that the city’s population was never friendly to the Nazis, especially compared to Munich and
Nuremberg. Indeed, “red Berlin” was diverse and tolerant to outsiders like immigrants, Jews and homosexuals. Berlin symbolized resistance to socialist totalitarianism. Practical arguments were also heard. The new democratic countries of Eastern Europe needed a nearby anchor in the European Union (EU). Berlin was not only a cultural center, as befits the German national capital, but also needed an economic stimulus after subsidies and tax breaks ended and industry collapsed.

The June 1991 decision was close. The Bundestag voted 337 to 320 to move the seat of government to Berlin by 2000, but left eight ministries in Bonn. The rebuilding of the Regierungsviertel (governmental quarter) signified a new start for the capital city and made the reunification of the German state concrete. While normally the Bezirke are responsible for planning, the federal and state governments took over the process of rebuilding Berlin as a national government center.  

However, that was not the end of the controversy. In the mid 1990s, faced with high costs, conflicting planning goals and an economic slowdown, the government center was scaled down. Even so, debates over the urban plan and architecture, as with the Mahnmal, scarcely concealed broader symbolic struggles. Critics objected to any monumental buildings and slammed the “landscape of power” represented by the “fortress” character of the new government center. There was also a recurring debate over whether, in a democracy, demonstrations nearby—by the extreme Right or the Left—could be banned. Indeed, back in 1928, Berlin’s Police Commissioner did make all “public demonstrations” illegal in an attempt to master the streets. Yet, today, it is hard to argue that the new Berlin will enjoy the same concentration of power as imperial or Nazi Berlin. The city is ensconced in a federal state and in an urban system with other cities (e.g., Munich and Hamburg) more economically powerful. Nor is nationalism as resurgent as it was in the 1930s. Indeed, the city’s current fiscal crisis shows that the rest of the country is no longer prepared to prop up a city that does not live within its means, capital or not.

East and West: Frontier/Crossroads City

The GDR was legally incorporated into the FRG on 3 October 1990 and the entire city of Berlin became a state (Land). The fall of the
Berlin Wall and within a year, its virtual disappearance certainly provided physical access to places once off-limits, but the “wall in people’s minds” remains. Diversifying access to space is alone insufficient to guarantee social inclusion.

When the Berlin Wall went up in 1961, it simultaneously excluded and included. As Durkheimian theorists note about social boundaries and classifications more generally, separating groups serves to reinforce internal solidarity on both sides. Gradually, the Wall gave rise to mirror-image societies, two sets of identities, practices, institutions, and cultures. Each side had its own transportation infrastructure, university, opera, and media. When the Wall fell, knitting institutions together proved easier (although by no means easy) than socially reuniting the two populations.

Each has developed stereotypes of the other. Westerners intended to integrate East Berlin into the Federal Republic. East Berlin’s duplicate institutions were no longer necessary and hence, disposable. The capital of the GDR, the showplace of socialism, could be dismantled. By 1994, most East German factories closed or were privatized. Easterners perceived all this as a strategy of “power and humiliation.” Westerners fantasized that “Ossis” wanted to join “their” Germany, the rich, desirable, and powerful West Germany. Since unification, West Berliners tended to infantilize Easterners, laying out a blueprint for their assimilation to Western values. To illustrate, one notable urban observer remarked, “the marked xenophobia of the East German population is an heirloom of the vulgarized black-or-white ideology of Communism and a result of political immaturity and the injunction of the totalitarian state against independent thought.” Easterners supposedly have militaristic, bureaucratic, and non-de-Nazified behavior that must change before the essential unity of the German nation and the normalization of Germany in Europe can be accomplished. In line with the sociological analysis of boundary formation, a reactive, defensive identity arose among Easterners, maintaining the longstanding divide. As Andreas Glaeser observed:

Overcoming the reality of a political division made the intensive experience of a cultural division possible. It became apparent to Germans from East and West that forty years of separate histories, of increasingly divergent biographic experiences within a set of diverg-
ing institutions, and participation in fundamentally different discourses had indeed made a difference. And the Berlin Wall, symbol of the political division of the country, gave way to a discourse on the “wall in the heads of people,” a symbol for the experiential division of Germany.41

“Ossis” and “Wessis” differ over what should be remembered and forgotten, valued and discredited. Westerners complain about Easterners’ “Ostalgie” for socialist products and brands and for the greater solidarity and security in GDR society. Glaeser explains that “the debates that go on between east Germans and west Germans about the quality of the GDR, about the preservation or destruction of monuments from GDR times, about the naming and re-naming of streets and squares are all in part a fight over legitimate memories, about the way to integrate life experiences into a whole.”42 Similarly, in Huysseren’s words, the “new Berlin” entailed “the politics of willful forgetting: the imposed and often petty renaming of streets in East Berlin … the dismantling of monuments to socialism, the absurd debate about tearing down the GDR’s Palace of the Republic.”43

Indeed, the debate over the demolition of the Palast der Republik—constructed in 1976 on the site of the bomb-damaged baroque Stadtschloss (royal palace) blown up in 1950 by Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party—illustrates the different viewpoints about the symbolism of Berlin’s built environment. The government closed the Palast shortly after unification because of the asbestos found throughout the communist building, ordering its removal (completed in 2003). Also in 2003, the government decided to demolish the building, work which began in 2006 and will be completed by mid 2007. East Germans loved the democratic accessibility of the place, remembering the theaters, restaurants and other amusements there. Until the asbestos removal began, they threw parties, staged theater, and held concerts in the building. Many favorably compared the Palace with the “transparency” of the new glass dome built over the renovated Reichstag, site of the imperial German Parliament and since 1998 the new home of the Bundestag. For many in the West, however, the Palace is well done away with, symbolizing the empty promises and questionable aesthetics of the communist dictatorship.44 In their view, Eastern nostalgia is being allowed to overwhelm the fact that the “People’s
Parliament” had little power in the GDR (in contrast to the West German Bundestag)

Western stereotypes contribute to resurgent identification with the GDR and the successor to the communist party, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) in the East. East Berliners resist the western devaluation of socialist modernism. They remember how appreciative they were to move out of slums into newly built housing with modern amenities. Wolfgang Kil and Hilary Silver in this issue describe the continuing appreciation of peripheral high-rise neighborhoods by some in Marzahn and Hohenschönhausen where Russian, Vietnamese, and other immigrants have moved as suburbanizing Germans vacated them.

Despite many changes since November 1989, the challenge of reuniting the city remains. A 2006 poll of Berliners by TNS EMNID found that one out of three West Berliners has no contact with the East. Sixteen years after the end of the GDR, 79 percent of Eastern Berliners and 68 percent of Westerners disagree with the statement “I have regular contact with people who live in the West/East of Berlin.” Moreover, 46 percent say the difference between East and West matters a lot or a little to them.45 There are few East-West friendships in Berlin because people reduce those on the “other side” to categories. Common citizenship has proven insufficient to encourage shared identity or equal treatment.

Differences between the two sides of the city are also politicized. The majority of voters in the Western wards support the Christian Democrats, but a plurality in the Eastern Bezirke opted for the ex-communist Party of Democratic Socialism.46 “We [Westerners] preach, punish, ignore, and exclude,” was Richard von Weizsäcker’s explanation for the Easterners’ political disaffection. The West German parties did not make sufficient efforts to integrate Easterners into the political elite (Angela Merkl, Wolfgang Thierse, and Matthais Platzeck notwithstanding), which, in turn, encouraged a protest vote for the PDS. The two parts of the city even tend to read different newspapers.

In sum, the fall of the Berlin Wall signified the end of the Cold War, and with it, Berlin’s longstanding significance in geopolitics. In this “normal” capital city, East and West Berliners could have focused together on their shared problems of deindustrialization, unemploy-
ment, segregation, and housing and infrastructural deterioration. In fact, as Kil and Silver’s article in this issue points out, there are unexpected commonalities between some east and west Berlin neighborhoods. For example, even before unification, dissidents in eastern Prenzlauer Berg as well as countercultural youth and Turkish immigrants in western Kreuzberg each developed a local “oppositional solidarity” to state-sponsored “modernist” urban renewal and successfully organized to resist the planned demolition of older workers’ housing. However, since unification, the east has lagged behind the west in active local participation, partly because high rates of residential turnover during the last decade mean that neighbors do not know one another, and partly because district administration, which has turned over less, has still not tried to break down the dependency and passivity of eastern residents. In many ways, residents on either side of the former dividing line continue to lead different lives.

Multicultural City

Germany is a country where there was, is and always will be immigration. And because this is so, integration is the order of the day. Those who come to us should not just be here, but also belong here. And they should know and feel that they belong. (President Johannes Rau in 2002)

The persistent, historically- and spatially-grounded cultural difference between the eastern and western sectors of the city is not the only important cultural cleavage in Berlin. There are also tensions between Berliners based upon religion, nationality, and class.

Indeed, religious diversification is inscribed on Berlin’s urban landscape. Between 1991 and 2003, while the Jewish community of the “new” Berlin increased 39 percent, the Muslim community also grew 35 percent. Of Berlin’s Muslims, 70 percent are Turks; the rest come mainly from Bosnia and Lebanon. In 2006, Berlin had about seventy-six mosques in which Friday prayers are recited (there are around 2,500 in Germany). Only three of them are actual mosque buildings, however, and the others are located in flats, store-rooms, industrial buildings, and other facilities. Religious tensions spill into the open whenever Muslims propose to build new mosques that would allow longstanding congregations to move out of their
cramped and unattractive quarters. Conflicts with their German neighbors take different forms (NIMBY protests, code violation citations, zoning regulations, delaying tactics), but usually result in preventing the construction of new mosque buildings.

The need for greater religious co-existence is not confined to Jewish and Muslim relations with Christians. There is also competition among Muslims to serve and represent the faithful. German authorities often complain that divisions among Muslim organizations make it difficult for the government to find a legitimate Sprachpartner (interlocutor) on the Muslim side, allegedly impeding the integration of organized Islam in Germany. Mosque building is not the only issue that calls for negotiation. The clash of German norms with Islamic customs about dress, food, and treatment of women, children, and animals has posed major obstacles to social integration.

In January 2005, Berlin enacted regulations of religious attire—headscarves and other outward symbols—in public employment, including in schools, courts, and police. Religious instruction in the schools, where Muslim Turkish students constitute almost 8 percent, has been controversial since 1980. Although Berlin differs from other Länder in that the government is not obliged to offer religion classes at public schools, it now allows religious communities to carry out instruction directly, based on a curriculum checked by the government. The present arrangement dates to 2001, when the Islamic Federation Berlin, which represents the more conservative Sunnis, and the liberal Muslim Alevi community finally won the right to teach Koran and Islamic tradition in the German language in some Berlin public schools. Berlin’s position is that there is still no suitable organization to represent the city’s Muslims, and the City Council urged the major Islamic organizations to form a joint association to set up a standard curriculum. In the fall of 2006, Germany’s Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble convened a National Islamic Conference which set up four working groups in an attempt to address these issues.

Very few Muslims live in East Berlin. Indeed, very few immigrants of any religion do. Today, about 7.3 million “foreigners” (non-German citizens) live in Germany (8.8 percent of the total population) and of those, 1.8 million (26 percent) are Turks. In contrast, Berlin’s nearly 450,000 foreigners comprise a higher 13.3 per-
cent of the city’s than the country’s population. Even this is an underestimate since there are 100,000 foreign-born naturalized citizens in Berlin, and an unknown number of undocumented migrants. Foreigners are unevenly distributed across districts, and different nationalities live in different parts of the city (Table 1). Consequently, the eastern and western sides of the city also have different experiences with non-German immigrants.

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<tr>
<td>America (North and South)</td>
<td>22,661</td>
<td>5.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and Oceana</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless/no entry</td>
<td>14,944</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Foreigners</td>
<td>450,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 2006

With the construction of the Berlin Wall, labor shortages developed, and both sides recruited migrant workers. The number of foreigners in Berlin boomed between the 1960s and 1995, but then leveled off. In the early 1960s, West Berlin concluded “guest worker” agreements with southern European countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia) and increasingly, Turkey. In 2004, Berlin had about 120,000 people with Turkish nationality to which must be added around 50,000 naturalized Turks.

In the west of the city, Turks and other non-German citizens concentrated in the poorer, low-rent districts of Kreuzberg, Wedding, northern Neukölln and Schöneberg, while affluent districts tend to be homogeneously German (Table 2). The articles in this issue by Janice Bockmeyer and by Kil and Silver discuss the Turkish enclave that developed in the western district of Kreuzberg. Joined by draft evaders and unconventional youth, Kreuzberg residents succeeded in halting destructive urban renewal in order to preserve and renovate older worker housing. In this disfavored neighborhood along the Wall, new lifestyles, multicultural creativity, and interethnic
tolerance flourished. Today, Kreuzberg, though partially gentrified and in other parts poor, is in the center of the united city and has become home to a thriving local ethnic economy.

### Table 2: Registered Foreigners in Berlin by District, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bezirk</th>
<th>Number in 2004</th>
<th>Percentage of Berlin Foreigners</th>
<th>Percentage Unemployed</th>
<th>Percentage Unemployed who are Foreigners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mitte</td>
<td>88,345</td>
<td>19.59</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg</td>
<td>58,425</td>
<td>12.96</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pankow</td>
<td>21,388</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf</td>
<td>55,777</td>
<td>12.37</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spandau</td>
<td>22,863</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steglitz-Zehlendorf</td>
<td>29,099</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempelhof-Schöneberg</td>
<td>50,913</td>
<td>11.29</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neukölln</td>
<td>66,034</td>
<td>14.65</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treptow-Köpenick</td>
<td>7,676</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marzahn-Hellersdorf</td>
<td>8,096</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lichtenberg</td>
<td>19,007</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinickendorf</td>
<td>23,277</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Total</td>
<td>450,900</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 2006

The old East Berlin has very few immigrants compared to the West. After a temporary agreement with Algeria in the 1960s, the GDR signed contracts with Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and Cuba. By late 1989, over 88,000 foreign contract workers lived in East Germany, including 59,900 Vietnamese. Most lived in dormitories, isolated from the German population, and after unification, became targets of racist violence. As the Kil and Silver article discusses, most of these contract workers were ultimately repatriated in the years after reunification, but a sizable population of Vietnamese remains, especially in Marzahn and Lichtenberg. They were joined in these eastern districts by a large population of Spätaussiedler, ethnic German newcomers from Eastern Europe who moved into the newly vacant public housing projects at the city’s eastern periphery. Like the Turks, these groups have gone into small business, especially restaurants and retailing. As in Kreuzberg, multicultural practices are gradually developing in the far suburbs of East Berlin.

Berlin leads Germany in business start-ups, and 14.2 percent of the population is self-employed. Breaking this down by nationality,
13.8 percent of working Germans in Berlin are self-employed, compared to 17.9 percent of immigrants. Despite rising self-employment rates, foreigners have over twice the unemployment rate of Germans (Table 2). In 2005, 44.2 percent of non-German citizens in Berlin versus 19.2 percent of German citizens were unemployed. This gap has grown since 1998, when 33.5 percent of non-Germans were unemployed compared to 16.4 percent of Germans. Berlin districts with large populations of foreigners are also the districts with the highest unemployment rates. Foreigners constitute 20 percent of the unemployed in Berlin as a whole, but in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, 25.8 percent of the unemployed. They are over a third of the unemployed in Mitte and Neukölln.

Integration problems confront the second generation as well as their immigrant parents. Children of immigrant background are far more likely to be in the lower division schools and to leave school without a diploma of some kind. In Berlin schools, 16.5 percent of the pupils have non-German nationality, but this percentage rises to 70 percent in Mitte, Neukölln, and Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg schools. In 2003-2004, 9.2 percent of German students and 20.5 percent of non-German students in Berlin dropped out of school without a certificate. Only 14 percent of Berlin’s non-German origin students, compared to 34.4 percent of German ones, matriculated (with Abitur). In 2001, one sixth of foreigners aged sixteen to twenty years old had vocational training compared to one-half of young Germans. Even among those with training, immigrants find it more difficult to get a job in the area for which they are qualified. The education gap may even be getting worse, suggesting a process of “segmented assimilation.”

There are very few places in Berlin where foreigners constitute the majority of the population and in those areas, such as the Kottbusser Tor neighborhood of Kreuzberg, the majority rarely exceeds 60 percent of the population. Nevertheless, ethnic concentration and the spatial concentration of multiple disadvantages have given rise to German fears of “ghetto” formation. Sociability is ethnically segregated. A German social survey reports that less than half of Germans have contact with foreigners at work or as friends. There is anxiety that parts of Berlin may not feel “German” in the cultural sense. Thus, in 1998, there was a proposal to forbid non-EU citizens from
moving into neighborhoods like Kreuzberg with already high percentages of minority residents. Similarly, there were official attempts to keep classes from consisting predominantly of children from migration backgrounds so that the students would learn German.

These and other policies reflect the German notion that nationality or membership is mainly cultural. The 2005 Immigration Law earmarked over EURO 200 million to give new immigrants the right to participate in state-funded German language classes and receive an introduction to the country’s justice system, culture and history. Such courses were previously only offered to Aussiedler. The new law requires ethnic Germans as well as their family members to pass a language test before they will be allowed to move to Germany. As a consequence of this cultural emphasis, multiculturalism in Germany also overemphasizes ethnic, cultural and linguistic factors, transforming social problems into ethnic ones, exoticizing minorities, and encouraging reactive ethnicity.

The emphasis on German language is also seen in official notions of integration. There has long been much concern that over half a million of the 3.4 million Berlin residents do not speak German as their native tongue. The Senate of Berlin instituted a Commissioner for Migration and Integration in 1981, long before the federal government. The Berlin Commissioner for Integration and Migration’s Integration Policy states: “Language skills are the crucial foundation for settling down in the new society and for integration into the labor market. Hence, particular importance is attached in the Senate’s policy to the acquisition of language skills as an essential part of integration.” Indeed, when confronted with the immense ethnic gap in educational achievement, the Commissioner proposed more German language instruction. Berlin’s cultural and social integration policy is “first and foremost … the acquisition of the language of the receiving society,” and only secondarily, a sense of belonging or joining social activities and informal networks.

Local initiatives that promote integration in Berlin neighborhoods receive government funds. Almost half of all German Turkish associations promote integration into German society. Of the 185 registered Turkish (non-mosque) organizations in Berlin, many provide family services and youth activities. For example, one project, “Migrant Mothers Learn German,” provides childcare in the same
place where mothers have language training, making it easier for women to leave the home. Yet, as Bockmeyer’s article in this issue demonstrates, small local initiatives like this rarely reach the scale and permanence to foster integration. They may also exclude existing ethnic organizations from the programs.

On 1 January 2000, a new naturalization law went into effect, making it easier for long-term residents and their German-born children to become citizens. As many have observed, Germany is moving from a model of hereditary (ius sanguinis) to territorial citizenship (ius soli). Politicians are slowly recognizing that Germany is a country of immigration. During the 2002 debate over the immigration law, conservative Bavarian governor Edmund Stoiber declared, “We can’t afford to expand immigration when in terms of integration, we can’t cope with the existing immigration.” Then President Johannes Rau took the lead in promoting the integration of immigrants. He launched a competition, “Auf Worte folgen Taten” (Actions Follow Words), to recognize “groups and initiatives in this country that are helping with integration.” In July 2006, Maria Boehmer, State Minister of the Beauftragte für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, held an “Integration Summit” for seventy representatives of the 15 million Germans with “migration background” and government officials at all levels. They worked on a national integration plan stressing active citizenship and centering around four areas: language acquisition; apprenticeship; labor market integration; and women. Sports, media, and other initiatives were also included. The emphasis on language was apparent at the summit. “Integration,” Minister Boehmer argued, “does not happen by itself. It is a process.”

At the level of the Land, Berlin’s new integration policy defines more precisely what is meant by “integration.”

Generally speaking, integration is the opposite of segregation or exclusion ... Integration means that individuals or groups have the equal opportunities to participate in social life and articulate their interests, as well as being protected from individual or collective exclusion. The creation of equal opportunities is the central element of the integration policy. Integration is absolutely not to be interpreted as adaptation or assimilation to the existing conditions.

At the same time, cultural factors slip back in. Immigrants and native Germans must reach agreement on “common integration targets and
core values, which are recognized by all citizens as the foundation for living together.” These include constitutional principles, such as basic rights, democracy, the rule of law and division of powers.

Berlin’s policy acknowledges that integration is a long-term process that demands change not only of immigrants, but of Germans as well. This means combating discrimination. If immigrant neighborhoods like Kreuzberg have been stigmatized as dangerous, there are also “no-go areas” in Berlin where neo-Nazis and other German hooligans attack foreigners. The number of events of racist violence has been increasing in Germany, especially in the East where unemployment is very high. Even the new construction work in central Berlin became occasion for xenophobia, insofar as foreign European workers came to Germany to work at below standard wages. In early 2007, concerned about a spike in racist crimes, the Berlin government launched a campaign to combat right-wing extremism. The program, “Youth for Diversity, Tolerance, Democracy—Against Right-Wing Extremism, Racism and Anti-Semitism,” will fund dozens of local projects to promote cultural diversity.

Germany belatedly passed the EU antidiscrimination directive which should further encourage changes in behavior towards foreigners. Official policies can encourage integration by developing shared discourses and enforcing equal treatment and rights.

In the most general sense, social integration entails the breaking down of boundaries and categories of otherness so that Berliners identify with one another as individuals and feel a sense of “we-ness.” On the face-to-face level, this can be accomplished through performance or acting together, by transgressing the lines between public and private to share intimacies and develop trust. One hopeful sign of social integration is that in 2004, nearly one in every four marriages in Berlin was interethnic, between a German and someone of foreign origin, most commonly, a Turk (477/12,569) or a Pole (320).

To summarize, Berlin is a city divided by numerous cleavages. Some of these are based upon symbolic or cultural divisions, reinforced by spatial segregation. Yet, the articles in this issue also identify some promising trends towards social integration and transcendence of these differences.
The Political Economy of Contemporary Berlin

Economic Restructuring

After unification, a sense of optimism fed market speculation. Berlin aimed to remake itself into a global, capital, tourist city, promoting its cultural industries and the arts and seducing a few multinational corporations to locate their European headquarters there. However, the collapse of industry in both the East and West of the city was extremely rapid, and joblessness skyrocketed. From 1991 to 2001, the city shed over 150,000 manufacturing jobs. Many eastern factories exposed to market competition and western factories that had been propped up by special subsidies closed. Between 1995 and 2003, the number of firms in Berlin with twenty or more employees fell. Growth in service jobs was insufficient to make up for these job losses.

Berlin’s unemployment rate rose from 10 percent in 1991 to almost 18 percent in 2003 and as mentioned above, the latest (October 2006) official unemployment rate for the Land of Berlin is 19 percent. In general, the number of unemployed Berliners rose until 2003 when it began to stabilize at around 300,000 jobseekers. The demographic breakdown of the unemployed is also instructive. Reflecting deindustrialization, men are more likely to be unemployed than women, and middle-aged workers under fifty more than youth. As mentioned, 42 percent of foreigners are unemployed, over twice the average rate of Berliners, and foreigners comprise 20 percent of the entire unemployed labor force. Moreover, these figures are misleading in that as many as 80,000 unemployed are participating in activation programs.76

Such dire conditions called out for government intervention to promote economic development. Unfortunately, urban planning in Berlin frequently provokes quarrels before action. The public sector rarely has the cohesion necessary for effective governance, and land use decisions are separated from the urban design process. Thanks to the architectural “expertocracy,” Berlin erupts in conflicts over the significance of building designs.77

As a result, the private sector, especially real estate interests, stepped in to spearhead the recovery of the local economy, leaving the Berlin government to react to development proposals. “Partners
for Berlin," headed by former Mayor Eberhard Diepgen, launched a “New Berlin” marketing campaign in 1998. With corporate financing and ebullient boosterism, it portrayed Berlin as a capital city, creative city, cultural center, and East-West metropolis. Coupling corporate savvy and creative energy, this commercial image dis-owned older postwar images of division, economic distress, and isolation. Once Berlin again assumed the status of capital city, leaders hoped it would become the economic hub of the newly capitalist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Adopting a “neo-liberal” policy after unification, the federal government passed a tax subsidy to encourage real estate investment in East Germany. The city of Berlin became one large construction site. Speculators and even the city’s own financial corporation (Bankgesellschaft Berlin) drastically overbuilt office space. When expected demand shriveled, post-1990 aspirations to make Berlin a first-tier postindustrial service-based economy were dashed. Although a number of corporate headquarters (e.g., Sony) have located in Berlin since the Wall fell, the city has many fewer headquarters, command and control functions, and advanced producer services than other large German cities. Within a decade of unification, capitalist goals still were unrealized.

Rather, a new industrial base is incubating in this “city of talents.” Small and medium industrial firms are still in town, and Berlin is also becoming home to a cluster of global media, arts, music, and culture industries, as well as software and life sciences research.78 Indeed, given the city’s over-building and high vacancy rate, Berlin as a whole has become an affordable large city, one that is attractive to well-educated, creative young people, especially from Eastern Europe. The best hope for Berlin’s future is the new knowledge-intensive sector that draws upon this human capital: “an influx of young and ambitious talent can enable Berlin to leap over bureaucratically bound rivals as a center for Internet business and information exchange.”79 The local economy will also benefit from the consumption patterns of people who enjoy the city’s lifestyle, variety, and tolerance and mingle in its galleries, cafes, and institutes of higher learning.

Despite Berlin’s building boom and its promising media and high tech industries, economic development remains uneven. The city’s
annual gross domestic product is currently about EURO 80 billion. To put this in perspective, the northern port of Hamburg has roughly the same GDP with only half the population of Berlin. Berlin’s local economy shrunk even when the national economy grew. In sum, Berlin has not yet become an advanced service center, the conventional hallmark of a global city.80

**Housing**

The city of Berlin has been depopulating. The number of inhabitants fell from 3,472,009 in 1994 to 3,395,189 in 2005. Most Berlin districts lost residents except Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Pankow, Reinickendorf, and Treptow-Köpenick. While the population of the state of Brandenburg, which surrounds Berlin, also fell, tens of thousands of mostly middle-class Berlin residents have moved to the Brandenburg suburbs in search of single family houses. Young people also have left the East for the booming South and West of the country. This selective migration has exacerbated the socioeconomic and ethnic segregation of the city.

In the mid 1990s, the Land of Berlin, concerned about middle-class suburbanization, developed a master plan, Planwerk Innenstadt, to amalgamate the old West and East and to stem the tide out of the central city. To integrate the Western and Eastern commercial centers, the area around Alexanderplatz in the former East Berlin was especially targeted for reconstruction. The central square was redesigned to have a less monumental scale. Luxury condominiums for the middle classes were built to offer an alternative to single-family suburban homeownership. This “top-down” master plan did not solicit public input until it was unveiled. Despite the establishment of a City Forum to discuss it, experts dominated the discussion, disregarding the opinions of ordinary East Berliners. Moreover, conflicts among politicians, bureaucrats, architects and developers followed. In the end, although the city invested considerable public funds to attract affluent residents, they did not flock back to the inner city. Again, the government overbuilt, leaving tens of thousands of housing units vacant. Construction at Alexanderplatz nonetheless continues (albeit at a very slow pace).

As residents left the center, housing vacancies increased. The oversupply of housing in East German cities is so severe that the
The federal government launched a subsidy program, Stadtumbau Ost, in 2001 to help cities deal with the over one million vacancies. Although oriented to renovating inner city neighborhoods and retaining their “social mix,” most of the work done under this program so far has been selective demolition of relatively new prefabricated housing high-rises in the urban periphery, carried out by large housing companies.

It is ironic that demolitions are occurring when there is still homelessness in Berlin. The number of homeless people in temporary accommodation officially registered with the city of Berlin did fall from 10,560 in December 1994 to 6,050 in December 2001 but then rose from 2002 to 2004 by 2.6 percent to 6,850. In addition to the almost 7,000 official registered homeless in the city, there are an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 more uncounted. There is some indication that Berlin’s local policies toward the homeless are aggravating their social exclusion by displacing them from central public spaces and placing services far from areas where they could make a living. Thus, housing vacancies on the urban perimeter may not solve the social problems of this population.

Yet, by most accounts, the inner eastern districts, especially Prenzlauer Berg and Friedrichshain, are gentrifying. Gentrification entails the transformation of a working-class or lower-income neighborhood into a middle-class neighborhood, usually accompanied by renovation of existing housing and involuntary displacement of long-term residents. These older, central neighborhoods of Berlin are attracting young, well-educated singles whose consumption patterns are stamped on the commercial streets with trendy boutiques, cafes and restaurants. Market speculation is not the only force driving this neighborhood change. Some observers positively assess the changes in Prenzlauer Berg and the role of government policy in bringing them about. In this case, the government provided some funds until recently for “self-help” renovation of older housing, so as to avoid displacement and keep middle class residents in the inner city. Public funds also allowed residents to set up small businesses and cultural spaces. New buildings were infill projects constructed on vacant lots, so that no one needed to be relocated. While it is true that half of Prenzlauer Berg’s population has turned over since 1990, high mobility occurred all over Berlin. However,
the trends in residents’ income relative to rent increases are more difficult to evaluate.\textsuperscript{86}

In sum, Berlin built new unoccupied commercial properties and upscale condominiums in the center, while some of the least desirable, peripheral public housing buildings have been demolished. Overlaying the socioeconomic polarization and ethnic diversification discussed above, the spatial concentration of disadvantage is increasing. People who have low incomes, are unemployed, and dependent on social assistance, including immigrants, live in some, though not all of the inner districts of once-industrial West Berlin.\textsuperscript{87}

In contrast, East Berlin has very few immigrants, and some eastern districts are even revitalizing. The “new” Berlin appears to be a polarized, segregated, “multiply divided city.”\textsuperscript{88}

\textbf{Fiscal Crisis}

Traditionally, Germans consider the social welfare state, which alleviates class polarization, to be the premier source of social integration. Just as multiple forms of polarization are developing and the challenges of social integration have increased, however, state intervention is now declining and welfare benefits cut back.\textsuperscript{89}

Indeed, fiscal constraints are even greater in Berlin than elsewhere in Germany.

Until 1990, the Federal Republic funded half of West Berlin’s budget, but in the mid 1990s with the end of the Cold War, the special federal subsidies that kept the urban economy afloat were phased out. East Berlin too, after preferential treatment, new housing construction, and greater supplies of consumer goods, suffered a similar loss of subsidies. At the same time, the city faced the tasks of unification and the costs of high unemployment, industrial collapse, and the federal government’s devolution of unfunded mandates on the municipalities. With dwindling revenues and rising expenditures, the Berlin government suffered a severe fiscal crisis.

From unification until 2001, the Christian Democrat-Social Democrat coalition in city government was partly responsible for the deficit. Bonds floated to invest in East German housing and offices did not return the expected rents to pay for interest and drove up the city’s debt. In response, the government began cutting back expenditures and subsequently lost power. The 2001 “red-red” coali-
tion of Social Democrats and ex-communists [PDS] further slashed the budget—from public services to social programs, and especially education, health, police, arts, and recreation—despite citizen protests. The federal government’s 2003 federalism and Hartz reforms did little to help. Berlin Mayor Klaus Wowereit and his Finance Minister Thilo Sarazin cut municipal salaries of tens of thousands of city employees, eliminated police jobs, froze new hiring, increased work hours, ended grants for welfare recipients, reviewed social programs, and even privatized traffic lights in the hope of balancing the budget by 2006. In a shortsighted move, some cuts in subsidies to cultural initiatives, higher education and medical centers may undermine the city’s nascent growth industries, making it impossible to coordinate economic development and social goals.

Even with these cuts, reducing interest on the debt, constituting 11 percent of the budget, was beyond the administration’s ability. Berlin is spending €2.5 billion a year in interest on its debt, equivalent to €5,000 a minute. In 2006, the city still owed over €60 billion (U.S. $80 billion) or 70 percent of its GDP, three times the average of all other German states. There was little Berlin could do alone.

Most state spending and tax rates are fixed at the federal level. The Basic Law guarantees that revenues are redistributed according to a federal equalization scheme to insure equal living standards across Germany. In 2002, when the federal government refused to help Berlin, the city sued it for emergency funds covering half of the debt. The Land of Berlin argued that it is in a state of “extreme budget emergency,” a legal term that allows a state government to take action in the Constitutional Court to force the federal government to bail it out. Unfortunately, on 19 October 2006, the Court ruled that the federal government did not have to help the Berlin government pay off its €60 billion debt. This means that the city will have to pay the debt on its own by cutting spending and/or selling off its assets, such as its public housing or the duplicate operas, zoos, universities, and other facilities inherited from the era of urban division.

The next section discusses some of the urban programs and activities that Berlin had deployed to address social problems and promote social integration in the “New” Berlin. As several of the articles...
in this issue will argue, programs, like Neighborhood Management, might be seen as enforcing social control of the poor more than promoting their social integration, but at least integration was their ostensible goal.

Social Integration Policies in the New Berlin

Soziale Stadt

After the 1998 federal election of the Social Democratic Party government led by Gerhard Schröder, urban development policy underwent a change in orientation from strictly physical development to include social objectives. In 1999, the federal and Land governments jointly adopted the “Districts With Special Development Needs—the Socially Integrative City” program (Soziale Stadt or Social City, for short). Its goal was to counteract the widening sociospatial divisions in German cities by fostering resident participation, public-private partnerships, and cooperation among different levels and agencies of government. The sectoral integration across policy areas aimed to address multiple problems in the same urban district simultaneously. According to the National Action Plan, the program is Germany’s main anti-exclusion mechanism.

Considering the neighborhood as a complex whole, the Soziale Stadt aimed to transcend the usual “bricks-and-mortar” approach to urban renewal typical of the Ministry of Construction. Its substantive activities encompassed: employment; qualifications and training; social activities and social infrastructure; schools and education; health promotion; transport and the environment; urban district culture; sports and recreation; housing market and housing industry; living environment and public space; image improvement and public relations. The integration of diverse social and ethnic groups was a program goal in half of the districts too. As in earlier urban development programs, however, physical improvement of living environment and public space was the most frequent activity, found in 81 percent of the districts. Perhaps this is because Germans consider social, economic, and cultural goals, such as alleviating high unemployment or welfare dependency, to be the responsibility of higher levels of government.
In 2006, 390 urban districts with special development needs in around 260 German cities and communities participated in the Social City Program, although many more urban districts with comparable needs could not yet be included in the program. Special development needs were identified with a number of indicators, both social (high unemployment and welfare dependency) and physical (deficits in housing and modernization and repair backlogs). The program targeted high-density, highly populated neighborhoods in urban areas that exhibited problems in terms of social structure, the condition of the built and natural environment, supply of jobs, level of training, and provision of social and local cultural infrastructure. Many of the areas selected, including in Berlin, were already the focus of earlier targeted urban renewal efforts that were less than successful.

The Social City Program is a joint federal-state initiative, as mentioned, but there are clear differences in the program among the federal states, especially between the former West and East Germany. As Hartmut Häußermann explains in his article in this issue, unemployment in the Eastern Länder is less of a neighborhood-specific problem than a comprehensive and structural regional problem. Moreover, the proportion of foreigners in the region is very low. The main problem on the urban planning agenda there is the abandonment and vacancy of housing units, which is why Eastern cities use the resources of the Social City Program primarily to support the urban reconstruction program and the improvement of the residential environment. In the East German states, Soziale Stadt has largely become a measure supplementing the main “Stadtumbau-Ost” Program. Thus, the social and participatory aspects of the Social City Program are mainly pursued in the West German states. In western Länder, the districts were more often multicultural, as migrants composed an average of one quarter of their population.

The Social City Program employed several strategies that, if not entirely innovative, suggested a change in federal urban policy emphases. One key objective was resource pooling across levels of government (including the European Union) and between public and private resources. Another was developing an integrated action plan for each district. The third was a new governance regime. It included the deployment of “Neighborhood Management,” already
important in Berlin, to implement the program. This Quartiersmanagement (QM) was supposed to promote horizontal and vertical cooperation at the federal, Land, city and district levels, and between these levels and all other locally relevant players. A further goal was the activation and participation of residents and other local organizations.

Monitoring and evaluation of Soziale Stadt were contracted out. After consultation with Land authorities, the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing delegated information, consulting and communication during the initial program implementation phase (1999 through 2003) to the German Institute of Urban Affairs (DIFU). Funded by the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning, DIFU built a national Social City network; provided on-site support in sixteen model pilot districts, one per Land; analyzed good practices; and prepared evaluations of the Social City Program. At a May 2002 conference, DIFU presented its initial evaluation of the program’s implementation. There was a broad consensus that the program was stabilizing living conditions in disadvantaged neighborhoods and was building a framework for civic involvement. A similar assessment was found in the Interim Evaluation of the Urban Research Institute (IFS) released in 2004. On the basis of the 2002 pilot phase assessment, the Berlin Senate extended the program through 2006.

A second DIFU survey collected appraisals of municipal government officials responsible for implementing the Social City Program (as of October 2002). Responses included widely varying and even contradictory assessments. For example, the promotion of local participation is supposed to be central to the program. On the one hand, DIFU deemed the program to be a resounding success in that most governments felt the Soziale Stadt helped them to develop greater rapport with the people in the street. Government respondents from 90 percent of the districts mentioned “improved chances for residents to participate” as the most important benefit of the program. Administrators in three quarters of the districts also considered the “activation of previously hard-to-activate population segments” as successful.

On the other hand, in-depth investigations in the pilot districts cast doubt on the extent to which the task forces, urban district con-
ferences and forums, planning and future workshops really achieved neighborhood involvement, since events tended to attract only the middle class. QM uses formal communication and adopts a style that excludes less-educated groups that act more informally and spontaneously. The most excluded groups (migrants and their families, the long-term unemployed, senior citizens) who need special attention and personal contact on subjects tailored to their current predicaments, were hardly reached. Because organized actors dominated the neighborhood forum, it was frequently deemed necessary to set up an additional neighborhood conference through which individual citizens could voice their opinion. Only in some parts of the program areas did local residents actively attend neighborhood conferences. The effectiveness of these local residents’ committees remained generally much behind that of the organized actors’ committees. Nevertheless, Berlin was among the few places with effective forms of resident participation in political decision making, Häußermann notes. There, a significant degree of decision-making competence was transferred to randomly selected citizens. In fact, one Berlin community at Boxhagener Platz in Friedrichshain resisted the very label of “district with special development needs,” considering the designation as stigmatizing.104

The willingness of civil servants and political leaders to delegate authority to citizens and local organizations was crucial in encouraging activation and participation. For example, one ingredient of successful neighborhood participation was found in the more than half of all districts with “contingency funds” to allow residents and groups to accomplish small projects of their choice. This approach resembles “citizens’ budgets” in developing country settings. The Land of Berlin set aside resources from its own budget to set up an Empowerment Fund in the program areas (EURO 500,000 for two years), and a committee of local residents decided on the use of these resources. Generally, these funds have proven very effective instruments for public participation, although any given project was endowed with few resources (often around EURO 10,000). Häußermann observes that residents’ committees spend the Empowerment Funds very scrupulously and efficiently.

In sum, although the Soziale Stadt program granted considerable discretion for local experimentation, the extent of bottom-up
involvement varied among areas. As for public-private resource pooling, the second DIFU survey revealed that slightly more than half of the districts profited from housing company investment. Business, independent, private and foundation interests also contributed funds, but less so. However, the fiscal crisis has put the program in jeopardy. Häußermann notes that the Social City Program is vulnerable to shifting city-wide priorities, since fiscally strapped local authorities like Berlin must cofinance a share of it.

Although Häußermann criticizes the Social City Program because planning for the participating neighborhoods was not integrated into city-wide planning, he nonetheless concludes that after its first three years, the program “is undoubtedly a great success.” Despite unevenness in results, organizational innovations and resident participation are steps in the right direction. In contrast, Peter Marcuse’s essay in this issue is highly critical of the Social City Program. He “raises serious questions as to the actual impact of the program as formulated.” In implementation, the worthy goals of the program can be subverted and turned into their opposites, and the potential contradictions among them can be accentuated. Whether the danger of such a dark side to the program are realized or not is significantly related to the interpretation of the concepts on which it is based.

Like Häußermann, Marcuse notes that the already insufficient funding for Soziale Stadt has been declining, and is paid for largely at the expense of expenditures in other programs. Thus, it might actually be viewed as a cost-cutting strategy. Cost-sharing and devolution to fiscally strapped states and localities do little to promote redistribution to areas with special needs. But Marcuse goes further. He argues that the program rests upon a “geographical fallacy” that problems are area-wide and that they have causes in the local spatial environment, rather than the larger economy. Targeting districts with “special development needs” risks equating the problems with the people who live there, rather than with external causes of spatially concentrated disadvantage. At the same time, the program does not dismantle barriers to Turks and others moving to other, more prosperous neighborhoods. Housing costs, prejudice, and inequality more generally account largely for the segregation of poor minorities. The Social City Program, by taking segregation as given, holds excluded populations in place.
Soziale Stadt and particularly the Quartiermanagement approach not only maintain social and economic segregation, but also reduce the potential for protest and civil disturbance. Berlin has a century-long tradition of neighborhood based street protest. The QM approach includes community policing. Soziale Stadt may also defuse unrest by making cosmetic improvements in areas of concentrated poverty and by undermining the basis for organized opposition. Coordination among public agencies at different levels and in different sectors may in fact conflict with meaningful political participation of residents. In this view, top-down, efficiency-driven Quartiermanagement “manages” poor people, keeping them under control. Participation may not mean empowerment to influence important decisions. In identifying local networks and neighborhood activation as central to urban renewal, the broader public is absolved from responsibility for social exclusion, implying that the excluded should mobilize social capital to solve their own problems.

Finally, Marcuse identifies the “dark side” of social inclusion. In Soziale Stadt, inclusion can also mean dissolution of communities. For example, the juries that decide on the uses of the “contingency” or “empowerment” funds are drawn from randomly selected residents, not representatives of local organizations. By bypassing the existing social structure and neighborhood institutions of the self-organized residents, QM aims to co-opt them into larger networks, compromising their autonomy of action. Similarly, an integration program may pressure members of minority ethnic groups and immigrants to assimilate and conform to majority norms, defusing conflict.

Some of these concerns are also expressed in Bockmeyer’s article in this issue. She points out that the program’s discourse of “social inclusion” as civic engagement, participation, and activation promises more than it delivers. Soziale Stadt emphasizes superficial and limited forms of citizen and immigrant activation within the confined structure of the program. Because it emphasizes partnership in the development of an integrated action plan, it gives more weight to established social service agencies and diminishes attention to the needs of specific citizens groups. Because it is decentralized, the program may give immigrants clout within a neighborhood, but impedes
their inclusion in city-wide politics. The program also sidesteps issues of discrimination and multicultural coexistence.

In the Land of Berlin, fifteen areas participated in the 1999 pilot project of “Socially Oriented Urban Development” and two more were added in 2001. The socio-spatial strategy of Quartiermanagement was later performed within the framework of the Social City Program. In addition to the QM neighborhoods, Berlin also designated Prevention and Intervention Areas (Verfahrensgebiete) for a total of thirty-three.

Of these, Bockmeyer examines the Social City Program in Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, a heavily Turkish-origin neighborhood long the target of urban renewal efforts. Her article focuses on the incorporation of Turkish associations into Quartiermanagement decision making of two districts in the neighborhood, Wrangelkiez and Wassertorplatz. The QM staff consisted mainly of professionals of German origin who did not live in the area. Although the QM staff was charged with identifying and mobilizing pre-existing community organizations to address local needs, they conceived of immigrants homogeneously, ignoring important differences among Turks and other Muslims and neglecting the various organizations representing them. Indeed, the program made various immigrant organizations compete against one another, making it harder for them to cooperate. The QM staff often regarded these associations as part of a “parallel society” impeding, rather than enabling integration. Consequently, the local Turkish activists were skeptical, distrustful, and even disdainful of them. The immigrants continued to pursue their own issues, and for some, Turkish organizations became launching pads into electoral politics. Similarly, the random selection of resident jurors and the seating of institutions from outside the area in the committee allocating small neighborhood contingency funds led to the under-representation of the majority-minority Turks. In fact, the German minority was often awarded “inclusionary” grants over the Turks in order to forestall their outmigration. “Everyone is there, not working together,” Bockmeyer quotes a city official saying. The Social City Program did not meaningfully bring citizens and immigrants together. In sum, analysts differ as to the program’s impact on local participation or building of networks among residents in these two sites.
Labor Market Integration Policies

The role of nonprofit and immigrant associations in the Soziale Stadt program underlines their increasing importance in the German welfare state more generally. In the fiscally strapped city of Berlin, it is not surprising that government is relying upon civil society to absorb cutbacks in public funds. This is the subject of Margit Mayer’s article in this issue.

European integration, global economic competition, and unification have all placed the German welfare state under increasing fiscal pressure. Deindustrialization, investment in urban development, and the end of special federal subsidies to the city also contributed to rising unemployment and overburdened social services in Berlin. In the early 1990s, Germany passed legislation to help the Eastern Länder cope with structural adjustment. Wage subsidies (ABM, SAM) provided incentives to retain employees displaced in the upheaval of the socialist economy. Nonprofit associations also made use of these subsidies to hire workers temporarily and train them, while accomplishing socially useful goals that would not compete with private market activities.

By the turn of the 21st century, however, ABM and similar programs were cut back. The right to unemployment insurance after participating in these programs for a year was rescinded. The Schröder government acquiesced to EU and business support for welfare state reform. The Hartz laws, especially Hartz IV, changed the terms under which the long-term unemployed and social assistance recipients could receive income support. Whether labeled “activation” or “work first,” these new policies expected recipients of unemployment assistance (ALG II) to engage in productive activities or face benefit reductions. If recipients could not find a regular job, they could still receive a supplement to their benefits of EURO one to two an hour for working thirty hours a week in the low-wage “second labor market.” The latter naturally included jobs in the nonprofit sector, such as those neighborhood and ethnic associations mobilized to participate in Quartiersmanagement.

Mayer’s article argues that many of the nonprofits supposedly enlisted by Berlin and other governments to integrate the unemployed into the labor market are doing so on less than desirable terms. Increasingly, social integration into a decent job with a living...
wage is taking a back seat to social control and management of the potentially explosive unemployed. Although civil society, social capital, social economy, and other buzzwords of the “third sector” are receiving unprecedented attention in urban and social policy, nonprofits are not necessarily liberating, innovative, or responsive to their clients’ needs. Of the 1,200 nonprofits in Berlin, Mayer notes, at least 100 engage exclusively in local employment programs, and of those, twenty are active in the fields of cleanliness and public order. These activities can hardly be said to promote social integration.

Mayer distinguishes among “good,” “bad” and “ambivalent” nonprofit employment practices. Her criteria for “good practice” include participatory “bottom up” economic development under neighborhood control without “releasing the (local) state of its responsibility for the social infrastructure.” Good nonprofits prepare residents for jobs with a future at decent wages. Some secondary labor market jobs, however, are “dead ends”—they do not lead to better working conditions and wages. The problematic social implications make these practices “ambiguous.” However, Mayer criticizes the “bad” practices of nonprofits, often enlisted in QM initiatives. These place welfare recipients in repressive, exclusionary, and stigmatized jobs at less than minimum wages and offer no training or diploma. Examples include projects to clean and police public spaces, “forcing the poor to combat the poor,” as Volker Eick puts it. To be sure, the associations participate in these activities because of the rules and restrictions of public policies. Nonprofits cannot pay more because they are legally forbidden from engaging in market activities to cross-subsidize their social activities. They have become local state agencies, executing workfare programs and dependent on public finance. In sum, there is considerable variation among nonprofits in their promotion of social and labor market integration.

Conclusion

The articles in this issue all address aspects of social exclusion and integration in the “new” post 1990 Berlin. As discussed above, the physical unification of the city has proceeded more successfully than building its social cohesion. Berlin’s myriad schisms and inequalities
overlap in complex ways. Nevertheless, this city, like many European cities and unlike most in the U.S.A., tries to do something about them. Unfortunately, the social integration that many Berliners seek remains outside their grasp. To use Glaeser’s phrase, Berliners remain “divided in unity.”

Integration is not necessarily the opposite of exclusion. Integration usually implies more than nominal membership, more than interaction and shared experiences in a vibrant public sphere, more than equal rights, more even than friendships and intermarriages. When German authorities speak of integration, they are usually referring to assimilation of foreigners. Newcomers are expected to adopt the German language, German norms, sometimes even German dress and appearance. The evolution of multiculturalism in the city—itself a different form of social integration—will disappoint them. Neighborhood, religious and ethnic institutions are agents and venues to knit Berliners together, not only keep them apart. They deserve adequate support for activities that support public goals.

Integration may also connote social control and imposed order. This can occur through violence and disciplining institutions as well as through socialization by schools, the media, and intercultural contacts. Common participation in collective action—demonstrations, strikes, and festivals—can build solidarity across conventional social categories, as well as threaten social peace. In Berlin, the local state must discipline both the right-wing extremists and left-wing protesters who express the fear and despair of joblessness. Talk of social integration may simply distract public attention from the causes of mass unemployment and government impotence to address it. Integration programs like Soziale Stadt, at best slow the downward spiral of urban deterioration and unrest, offering a band-aid instead of viable solutions.

Integration usually implies that the pieces should fit together harmoniously, precluding conflict. This means adaptation of all the pieces, the majority and the minorities. Such integration can arise through the pursuit of common goals and coming to grips with the past. Although aesthetics distract attention from material issues, symbolic debates can result in a unified vision, a collective identity, and a consensual inclusive memory of events and people who shared a given space. Yet, Berlin is still divided in these respects, too:
There is a troubling “schizophrenia” of boomtown and recession, a lack of clear planning vision to coordinate and regulate the 1990s building boom, greater tolerance of rich-poor disparities, intolerance of immigrants, a rising interest in right-wing politics, and enduring resentment and inequality between east and west. In other words, Berlin is becoming a western capital city like many others.114

Recognizing this “urban Euro-convergence” calls attention to the social integration of, not only in, the “New Berlin.” In terms of the German urban hierarchy, the country’s decentralized federalism will impede the preeminence of Berlin, even as the capital at the apex of the national system of cities. With the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the European Union eastward, Berlin is becoming better integrated into the larger Continent’s city-system. As Berlin looks westward, towards the older EU member states, it enters regional, indeed global market competition. As it looks eastward from the frontier of the former socialist world, it beckons with freedom, multiculturalism, and just a bit of democratic chaos. Berlin represents the possibility of a peaceful transition to national and European unification and the need to fight continuously against the threat of intolerance and authoritarianism. Integration into a larger social system may give rise to nostalgia for the older, insular Berlin, the “welfare-dependent” city where consumption and culture took precedence over industry, but the pressing internal challenges of social integration will force Berlin out of its parochialism.

Many of the articles in this issue discuss what government policy can do to promote social integration in the “new” Berlin. In addition to the persisting East/West fracture, there are splits along lines of nationality, ethnicity, religion, and culture. Overlaying cultural cleavages are class conflicts through which the fortunes of neighborhoods rise and fall. Policies to address concentrated urban disadvantage and programs promoting social integration have had a mixed record of success. The Social City Program did not promote much integration of immigrants and their own associations into the larger city. Labor market integration programs have left too many people unemployed when they end. Nevertheless, social integration is a slow process of adaptation, struggle for acceptance, and broadening horizons. Berlin surely offers an instructive vantage point from which to observe these endeavors.
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**Notes**

1. This special issue is based upon a conference held at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University on 14 March 2005. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support for this project of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Brown University Wayland Collegium, as well as the assistance of Mary Horning, Adam Goldman and Eric Langenbacher.

2. Much of the debate is over traditional versus international modernist styles. Berlin professionals constructed a paradigm of the “European city” that excluded American and socialist modernism. They deployed this model to oppose homogenizing globalization and privately driven real-estate development as well as “uncivilized” East German architecture of an inhuman scale. The paradigm called for older 19th century design—an historical street network, limited building heights, a traditional urban layout, mixed-use functions, limestone façades, building materials from the commercial architecture of the 1900s, and the “Prussian Style.” In contrast to the segregated, automobile oriented city, the ideal European city emphasized social integration, high density, public urban planning, public transportation, and “urbanity,” public space, and café life. See Virag Molnar, “Post-War Berlin: Reclaiming the ‘European City,’” Conference Paper at the American Sociological Association, 2004 Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1-20. On the importance of international architects, see Elizabeth Strom, *Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City* (Lanham, 2001).


4. Institutionalizing the Holocaust has the danger that it may become just a part of “heritage tourism,” even if that is the price of future generations remembering the event. See Anson Rabinbach, “From Explosion to Erosion: Holocaust Memorialization in America since Bitburg,” *History and Memory* 9, no. 2 (1997): 238-43.
5. The Love Parade, which takes place in the central Tiergarten, began fifteen years ago, but it was cancelled in 2004 and 2005 after the organizers failed to find private sponsors to pay for clean up. When new organizers found the funds for summer 2006, the parade was reinstated.


10. Till (see note 3), 50-51.


12. Huyssen (see note 8), 60.


14. For more on Berlin’s Jewish community, see Y. Michal Bodemann, “Staat und Ethnizitaet,” in *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland seit 1945* (Frankfurt/Main, 1986) and Andrew Roth and Michael Frajman, *Jewish Berlin* (Berlin, 1998).

15. Jeffrey Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany* (New Brunswick, 2006), 6-9. About 75 percent of Berlin’s Jews originated in the Soviet Union, and most but not all arrived after 1990. However, as many as 120,000 Russian Jews in Germany have not registered as such, so these figures are underestimates. Personal interview with Stephan Kramer, General Secretary of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, October 2006. He estimates that 70 percent of Russian Jews are receiving social assistance so they do not have to pay religious taxes, which requires a declaration of community membership. Some estimate the German Jewish population at 150,000 because, according to the Bundesverwaltungsamt, that is the number of “quota refugees” from the ex-USSR who joined the 28,000 German Jews counted earlier. The quota refugees include non-Jewish spouses. See Jonathan Laurence, “[Re]constructing Community in Berlin,” *German Politics and Society* 19, no. 2 (2001): 22.

16. One of the ironies of this German openness to Jewish culture is that Klezmer had little popularity among German Jews before the war. It was, and largely still is, wedding music for Eastern European Jews.


18. Peck (see note 15), 16.

19. For a history of the Mahnmal debate, see Janet Ward, “Holocaust Architecture in Washington and Berlin,” in *Berlin-Washington, 1800-2000*, eds., Andrea Daum and Christof Mauch (Cambridge, 2005),153-200. After the first design competition failed, a second one awarded the prize to Peter Eisenman in 1997. Faced with its huge size and monumental character, there was also a scholarly debate over whether to build it in the first place. See Roger Cohen’s statement in the *New York Times* (19 January 2000) to that effect, cited in Ward, 170. It was unclear whether art in any form could represent the enormity of the Holocaust, but once the proposal was raised, it would have been difficult not to build a memorial without implying that Germans just wanted to forget the past entirely. Hartmut Häußermann, “Economic and Political Power in the New Berlin: A


24. Paul Spiegel, president of Germany’s Central Council of Jews, like “many Jews around the world have said that the memorial is for Germans and not for them, since the places of Jewish remembrance are at the scenes of the crime themselves, at the concentration camps where they ‘still feel most close to the victims,’” *The Week in Germany*, 13 May 2005; http://www.germany.info/relaunch/info/publications/week/2005/050513/politics1.html. Indeed, Libeskind himself asserted that the best thing for Berlin would be to invest less in a separate “artificial” Holocaust monument than in maintaining Ravensbrück and Sachsenhausen. Ward (see note 19), 197.


27. Andreas Daum, “Capitals in Modern History: Inventing Urban Spaces for the Nation,” in Daum and Mauch (see note 19), 13-14.

28. Andreas Daum, “Capitals in Modern History: Inventing Urban Spaces for the Nation,” in Daum and Mauch (see note 19), 17.

29. Even Wilhelm von Humboldt considered Berlin “intellectually bankrupt” and “unliterary.”


32. Strom (see note 2).

33. Marcuse (see note 21).

34. Instead of a total security cordon (*Bannmeile*), regulations for a “pacified area” (*befriedeter Bezirk*) were enacted in 1999. They allow the police to ban extremist demonstrations that might disturb the business of Parliament. Demonstrations do take place near the Brandenburg Gate, and some have been permitted around the Bundestag and Bundesrat. In 2003, the Bundestag found that this system of allowing demonstrations as long as there are no parliament assemblies worked. But, when elements from the neo-Nazi movement began to hold demonstrations near historic sites, a new chapter was introduced into the Law of Assembly (*Versammlungsgesetz*) permitting the refusal of demonstrations aimed at antifascists where the dignity of victims might be derogated. In Berlin, this means the Holocaust memorial. I am grateful to Volker Eick for this information.
37. Mike Dennis and Eva Kolinsky, eds. United and Divided: Germany since 1990 (New York, 2004).
38. Borneman (see note 9).
39. Häußermann (see note 19), 183.
41. Ibid., 324.
43. Huyssen (see note 8), 60.
44. Häußermann (see note 19).
45. “Jeder dritte West-Berliner ohne Kontakt in den Osten,” Berliner Morgenpost, 1 October 2006. More generally, almost half of West Germans, and especially younger people, have not visited the east in the sixteen years since unification, according to a TNS EMNID poll, but only 12 percent of East Germans have not visited the West. See “Half of West Germans Haven’t Visited East: Divided Germany,” Spiegel Online, 28 December 2006, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,456865,00.html.
51. Jonker, (see note 50); Ulrich Bahr, “Moscheebau in Kreuzberg,” in Spielhaus and Farber (see note 44), 80-84.

52. In Germany, there is no official representative. Rather, several groups claim to represent Muslim interests nationally: the Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, which is dominated by the Turkish Islamist group Milli Gürû’s, the Zentralrat für die Muslime in Deutschland, the small Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Deutschschland, and the Diyanet, which is associated with the Turkish government. The Türkisch-Islamische Union manages nonprofit associations. For more on the relationship of Islam and the German State, see Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, Integrating Islam (Washington, 2006).


55. For the most current statistics, see Beauftragte für Integration und Migration of the Land of Berlin.

56. From 1991 to 2005, about 49,000 “repatriates” were distributed to Berlin and registered in the State. Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin, ed. Encouraging Diversity—Strengthening Cohesion: Integration Policy in Berlin (Berlin, 2006), 12.

57. According to the OECD’s Urban Renaissance Study: Berlin, ibid.

58. Ibid., 25. In Germany as a whole, 47 percent of the foreign-born have less than a secondary education and fewer than 15 percent have a higher degree. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Germany (Strasbourg, 2004).

59. The OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tested fifteen year-old students in forty-one countries in mathematics, reading comprehension, science and problem-solving skills in 2000 and 2003. When compared to native German students, first-generation immigrants (born outside of Germany) perform well below the average of first-generation immigrants in the seventeen countries participating. But the gap becomes even larger among second-generation immigrants (children with at least one parent born outside the country) and Germany ranked at the bottom of the seventeen countries on this indicator. It implies things are getting worse. Language and the geographical origin of immigrant children cannot explain national variations in performance. Even if immigrant students with families from Turkey tend to perform poorly in many countries, they do significantly worse in Germany than they do in Switzerland. On segmented assimilation, see Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 530 (1993): 74-96.


Commissioner for Integration and Migration (see note 56), 8.


The International Organization for Migration (see note 63).

On the history of these notions of citizenship, see Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, 1992). On the significance of the 1999 naturalization reform, see Antoine Pécoud, “‘Weltoffenheit schafft Jobs:’ Turkish entrepreneurship and multiculturalism in Berlin,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 26, no. 3 (2002): 494-507, and Caglar (see note 61). Perhaps ironically, since 2000, the number of formal naturalizations in Berlin fell from about 12,000 to about 6,000 a year because citizenship is automatically granted to those born in Germany and they need not naturalize.


As presented at the Bundespressekonferenz attended by Hilary Silver, 5 July 2006.

Commissioner for Integration and Migration (see note 56), 20.

European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (see note 58).


In April 2005, the European Court of Justice ruled that Germany had breached EU law by failing to pass national legislation in line with a 2000 European Directive prohibiting discrimination—in employment, vocational training, education, social security and healthcare, access to goods and services and housing—on the basis of race or ethnic origin. The directive also requires member states to create an institution to promote equal treatment and support to victims of racial discrimination. The deadline for EU member states was 19 July 2003, but conservative parties especially blocked the legislation sponsored by the Greens. In August 2006, Germany passed a General Law on Equal Treatment (AGG) on the basis of race, ethnic origin, sex, religion or creed (Weltanschauung), sexual orientation, disability/handicap, or age.

Glaeser (see note 40).

Beauftragte für Migration und Integration Berlin.

Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Regionaldirektion Berlin-Brandenburg, May 2006. Activation measures include occupational training (9587), ABM or *Arbeitsbeschäftigungsmaßnahmen* (9413), and SAM or *Sturkturanpassungsmassnahmen* (225) or Work opportunities through the newly restructured unemployment assistance (Parag. 16 Abs. 3 of SGB II) (39,551). For more detail, see http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/RD-BB/RD-BB/A01-Allgemein-Info/Publikation/pdf/Aktueller-Monatsbericht-1002.pdf. The definition of unemployment differs between the German Social Code (SGB) definition and the International Labour Organization joblessness concept; with the former, unemployment was 7.3 percent versus the latter at 9.6 percent in October 2006 (and 10.4 percent, seasonally adjusted).
77. Strom (see note 2).


82. There are no precise national statistics on the homeless, insofar as municipalities are responsible for this population, but estimates do exist. In Germany as a whole, homelessness has been declining (especially among multiperson households and Aussiedler) since 1995. The most recent (2004) estimate of homelessness in Germany is 310,000 to 380,000 (BAG Wohnungslosenhilfe e.V., February 2006). For figures on Berlin, see http://www.strassenfeger-berlin.de/ and http://www.feantsa.org/code/en/pg.asp?Page=24&pk_id_news=238.


86. Brenner (see note 84).

87. Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, The Berlin Housing Market: Summary, Report 2005 (Berlin, 2005); Kraetke, (see note 78); see also Kraetke and Borst (see note 78) and Häußermann and Kapphan (see note 81).

88. The term “multiply-divided city” is more precise than the term “dual city” that has been used to describe similar patterns. See John Mollenkopf and Manuel Castells, Dual City: Restructuring New York (New York, 1991).

89. For example, see Häußermann and Kapphan (see note 81).

90. “Germany’s Federalism and Finances: Municipal Mayhem,” The Economist, 16 August 2003, 45. The plan called for extending corporate income tax to self-employed professionals, making the trade tax municipal, increasing the local share of sales tax, federally funding child care centers, and federal assuming of a merged unemployment assistance and social assistance benefit program.


92. Kraetke (see note 78).
93. “Berlin’s Finances: Painful Relief,” *The Economist*, 29 April 2006, 56. In 1992, the Constitutional Court ruled that Bremen and Saarland also had to pay their debts when they asked for bail-outs. The court’s ruling means that Germany will be able to meet its own debt limit set by the European Union Maastricht Treaty. For the first time since 2002, Germany will have a budget deficit of 2.6 percent of GDP in 2006, under the 3 percent threshold.

94. On this point, see Brenner (see note 84).


96. Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik (DIFU), *Soziale Stadt—Strategien für die Soziale Stadt, Erfahrungen und Perspektiven—Umsetzung des Bund-Länder-Programms “Stadtteile mit besonderem Entwicklungsbedarf — die soziale Stadt,”* 2003. The population of this survey—222 districts—is 90 percent of all areas supported by the 1999, 2000 and 2001 programs.


98. Hartmut Häußermann in this issue.

99. Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik (see note 96), footnote 2.


103. Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik, (see note 96), footnotes 2, 3.

104. Mayer (see note 46).

105. Davis (see note 35), 263-84.

106. Janice Bockmeyer in this issue.

107. Ingeborg Beer and Reinfried Musch, “Berlin-Kreuzberg–Kottbusser Tor,” in *Socially Integrative City, an initial appraisal of the federal/Länder programme “Districts with Special Development Needs–The Socially Integrative City,”* ed., German Institute of Urbans Affairs (Berlin, 2002).


110. Ibid. One example is in Helmholtzplatz in Prenzlauer Berg where youth keep the peace between families and the alternative scene, including the homeless, dog-owners, and alcoholics.

111. There is one respect in which the European city is not more integrative than the American city: physical accessibility to the disabled. Despite a large number of war wounded, the American disability rights movement and Americans with Disabilities Act is far more advanced, and inspired that comparable movements
in Germany. See Carole Poore, Disability in Twentieth-Century German Culture (Ann Arbor, forthcoming 2007).

112. For the official integration policy of the Land of Berlin, see Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin (see note 56).
113. Davis (see note 35).
114. Campbell (see note 22), 177.