Convivencia and Securitization: Ordering and Managing Migration in Ceuta (Spain)

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Ceuta is a Spanish city in Northern Morocco. It is thus situated at a European Union border on the African continent. In this context, I contend that migration is generally considered a potential threat to the pacified local order of things by the Christian majority. In order to protect this order of things referred to as convivencia, *Christian Ceutíes tend to prefer de-politicizing strategies to manage migration. Nonetheless, migration sometimes becomes highly politicized and is framed as a security issue. This essay thus suggests that the concept of securitization is relevant to grasp the problematization of migration in times of crisis in Ceuta and analyzes three occurrences of local processes of securitization.*

❖ Key words securitization, migration, Spain, Morocco, Ceuta

Introduction

"We can't allow that Ceuta end up being the ghetto of Europe. The Kurds had to leave, so should it be with the Africans."

"The border has to be completely sealed so that our city doesn't become an international refugee centre."

"[With the existing tensions between the Muslim and Christian communities] Ceuta may well break into pieces if we don't solve the problem of the illegals at the border."

These comments from two politicians and an 'ordinary citizen'[1], respectively, are indicative of a fairly common discourse in both political and social settings in the border city of Ceuta in specific periods. These comments emerge mainly in times of crisis, and are representative of a particular framing of migration. "Neither Spanish, nor Moroccan", as a resident of Ceuta told me, "this city is a world in itself". In this little section of Europe in Africa, identities are strongly affirmed and reified but at the same time residents proudly defend the good *convivencia* (living-together) of their city depicted as a peaceful encounter between "four cultures".[2] Situated next to, and almost within, a European Union border on the African continent, Ceuta acts as a magnet for African and Asian migrants trying to reach Europe. The feeling that the border is under constant pressure is a prevalent theme among Christian Ceutíes. In this borderland spread on the edge of one of the world's most unequal borders, one might expect to document a very strong politicization of differences and a constant securitization of migration. The reality is however more complex.

In this article, I argue that irregular migration is generally framed as a potential threat to the local order of things by Christian Ceutíes, but that depoliticizing strategies usually prevail in the management of this 'threat'. Nevertheless, I argue that when Ceutíes consider that the local order of things is directly threatened by irregular migrants, local processes of securitization appear in this borderland. I describe three occurrences of securitization in Ceuta to underline the common themes as well as the singularities of each of these cases.

This article aims at describing the 'problematization' of irregular migration in Ceuta. By this term I mean, following Foucault, the way in which things are rendered problematic (see Caldéron 2003), that is to say, the way they are framed by discursive and non-discursive practices as a problem in need of a solution. I have therefore been concerned with mapping the discursive formation in which irregular migration is constructed as an object (or problem) as well as with the means deployed to manage this object (solve this problem). The article draws on hundreds of opinion texts (editorials, opinion articles, letters to the editor and cartoons) published in one of Ceuta's daily papers between 1995 and 2008. An approximate quantity of two hundred has been examined for qualitative content analysis. The article also draws on open-ended interviews and participant observation during the summer in 2008 to obtain an in-depth picture of migration related issues in Ceuta.

As discussed below, Ceuta's population is segregated into so-called 'Christian Ceuties' and 'Muslim Ceuties'.[3] However, these two groups tend to problematize migration differently. I focus on statements made by Christian Ceuties in trying to map out a particular problematization of irregular migration prevalent in Ceuta. This article, thus, depicts the framing of this phenomenon among Christian Ceuties who form just over half of the population but hold most of the political and economic power. In focusing on this group, I am analyzing the way irregular migration has been framed and

managed by the culturally, politically and economically dominant group since 1995.

A borderland situation

Ceuta is a Spanish enclave city in Northern Africa. From its border with Morocco, this little piece of European land extends into the Gibraltar Strait, forming an 18km^2 peninsula.


Figure 1. Map of the Spanish enclave city of Ceuta.[4]

It has all the characteristics generally associated with the borderland (Alvarez 1995). Culturally, Ceuta presents features of two overlapping cultures which have been synthesized into a 'unique' border culture. There is no doubt that Ceuta is Spanish, but it is also strongly influenced by Moroccan culture. Around 40% of the 75,000 inhabitants are Muslims. Ceuta relies centrally on close relations which it sustains with its hinterland (Planet Contreras 1998). In addition to these general cultural features, Ceuta also shares with other borderlands a peculiar sense of the political community and a somewhat securitized relationship to the border. In this sense, Rosas' definition of the borderland condition is also quite representative of Ceuta. He states:

> The coupling of exceptionality with potent political imaginaries constitutes what I call the borderland condition. The dramatic reproduction of state power through militarized policing practices in the border region in the neoliberal epoch inscribes 'exceptionality' [...] on the bodies of immigrants and sometimes those who resemble them (Rosas 2006: 336).

Being geographically and politically distant from the Spanish capital and separated from the European continent by 12 km of wild water, Christian Ceutíes express the need to defend the Spanishness or españolidad of the city. Generally, statements on Ceuta being strongly influenced by Moroccan culture, and claims by Moroccan politicians or journalists that the city is stolen land belonging to the Alaouite Kingdom provoke strong reactions in Ceuta. Most such claims are answered by local journalists and politicians defending the "historically founded" Spanishness of their city and pressuring the central government in Madrid to reaffirm its policy of never ceding Ceuta to the neighbouring state.

A recurrent theme in the data concerns the Christian Ceutíes' fear of the day that the growing Muslim community will form the majority of the population and could "take over" the local government. Although people do not express this xenophobic concern publicly, it was articulated boldly in various interviews I had with Ceuta residents. One Christian secretary in her fifties having worked for various local administrations over the last 20 years noted:

> In the old days, the Muslim lived in bad conditions but never complained. The young generation is different. In the new generations, a lot of people go to university, and I think it's good. And the knowledge gives you the power to demand more for your life (…) And what happens? The Spaniard of Ceuta would prefer that the Muslim who lives here, that he wouldn't ask for anything. But the Muslim has something: he produces a lot of kids. And therefore Ceuta ('s population) is increasing much more on the Muslim side than on the Christian side.

> The Spaniard doesn't want so many kids whereas the Muslim family has maybe five. And these people, as time goes by, they will reach 18 years old and will be allowed to vote. And the people don't want that. They think that maybe one day the City government will have a Muslim mayor. […] So the Spaniard has this concern that he doesn't express. But he thinks: time goes by, every four years there are more people voting in the elections and, well… If there are classrooms where you have 40 Muslim kids and only one Christian kid nowadays […] Each time more, each time more… And what does that mean? Well, that the people are concerned. Each time there are more Muslims. There are already Muslims representatives in the local government…

This xenophobic concern, along with tensions inherited from the colonial era and fears fuelled by current representations of Islam, creates a situation of mistrust.[5] The everyday interactions between the two communities are layered

through this mistrust although Ceutíes of all religious allegiances negotiate their daily relations peacefully and outbreaks of violence are rather rare.

The involvement of Sub-Saharan African and Asian migrants increases the complexity of these relations. Being a Spanish territory, Ceuta is, along with its sister city Melilla, Europe's only border on the African continent. This small city has been produced as a gateway to the European Union for a lot of migrants who cannot afford to enter this "Promised Land" by other means. Apart from some Moroccans who have family in the city, none of these migrants ever plan to settle in Ceuta. They are transiting migrants hoping to reach mainland Spain or other European countries (Collyer 2006). "If you can cross the physical border and gain access to Ceuta, then it should not be hard to take the ferry and travel within the country", some Punjabi Indian migrants caught in the city told me. They were mistaken in this view. It is really hard for migrants to continue their journey to Europe and they often have to wait in Ceuta for a long period.

"A pocket of illegal immigrants"

When Spain ratified the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement [6] in 1991, Ceuta and Melilla maintained the special status they had within the European Community. As a result, the two Spanish cities in Northern Morocco have a special regime for importing and exporting goods for local consumption, and allow Moroccan nationals living in the neighbouring provinces of Tetouan (for Ceuta) and Nador (for Melilla) to enter the cities without requiring the Schengen visa if they do not stay in Spain overnight.

These conditions, deemed necessary for the small enclave cities to sustain a viable economic life, have important consequences for people wanting to circulate between Ceuta and continental Spain. To comply with the Schengen requierment of strict external border control, the lack of border control between Ceuta and Morocco needed to be compensated through the implementation of stronger control between Ceuta and the rest of the Schengen zone. Consequently, migrants who enter Ceuta hoping to gain access to the European Union are not allowed to go farther. Since the mid-1990s, thousands of transiting migrants travelling to Europe have been 'accumulating' in Ceuta creating what Ceutíes have often called a "pocket of illegal immigrants". They stay in the enclave generally between two months and two years before they are either provided with a status of some kind which allows them to be transferred to continental Spain, or are deported. Hence, Ceuta has become what I call a zone of retention of unspecified duration. In this context, Christian Ceutíes are concerned that irregular migrants might disrupt the fragile pacified social order existing in the city. As the discussion brings out, these migrants are thus generally problematized by Christian Ceutíes: they are seen as a potential threat to the local order of things.

A danger to the order of things

Malkki (1995) and Haddad (2007) offer useful approaches to make sense of 'orders of things' and the way they might be considered threatened. In fact, orders of things and threats to these orders are intimately linked. It is at the physical or symbolical frontiers of an ordered space that the difference between inside and outside can best be observed. As Douglas (1966:4) writes, "it is only by exaggerating the differences between within and without […] that a semblance of order is created". The limit of the orders of things, this frontier, is framed as a highly dangerous place because its contestation is thought to represent a threat to this order. There is always a risk of pollution, to use Douglas's words, when a symbolic border is crossed. In fact, it is in the state of uncertainty, in the liminal condition that the danger lies.

When discussing the problematization of refugees in the national order of things, Malkki (1995) states that they are conceived as an abomination, a figure that underlines the precariousness of the national fiction.[7] I want to argue that a similar process is at work in Ceuta, although in this case, it is not so much the protection of the national order of things that is at stake but that of the local order of things, or convivencia.

Convivencia as the local order of things in Ceuta

The local order of things in Ceuta is organized around the concept of convivencia, or living-together. This concept is fluid and thus hard to define. Convivencia refers to an empirical historical co-existence between the four communities of Ceuta, but it is also a social norm and an 'ordering concept' (Torres Colón 2008) used to make sense of the heterogeneity of Ceuta. I consider first the historical and empirical characteristics of convivencia and will bring out the second aspect through this history.

For Christian Ceutíes, the immigration question first became a public issue in 1985 when the Spanish government voted the first comprehensive immigration law. The law gave non-Spanish residents until 1986 to regularize their status, and initially, Spanish nationality was to be granted only to immigrants born in Spain if one of their parents was also born there. This was not the case for most Muslim Ceutíes who, because their parents were not born in Ceuta, were not considered citizens. According to Gold (2000:91), by "1989 in Ceuta, there were some 15,000 Muslims (22.5 per cent of the total population), of whom 2,400 (16 per cent) had a national identity document conferring Spanish Nationality". The situation was worse in 1986. The law did not consider the special situation of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and, fearful of being deported from their hometown, the Muslim communities of these cities therefore organized to modify the legislation. There have been large protests and even riots in Melilla and somewhat smaller protests in Ceuta. This created great tensions that lasted until 1989. All immigrants born

in the enclaves were finally given a resident card and could apply for citizenship after 10 years. By 1989, a number of 3 667 Muslims had obtained Spanish nationality (Gold 2000). This "normalized" the situation. However, Christian Ceutíes realized that Muslims could now make their voice heard and could take an active role in politics. It was the emergence of 'new political subjects'.

Forming some 22.5 % of the population in 1986, the Muslim population is now evaluated between 40% and 45% (El Faro de Ceuta 2008; Irujo 2005). The city is geographically segregated, the city centre being mostly inhabited by Christians and the peripheral neighbourhoods by Muslims. There are contacts for business between communities but, though friendship does exist between individuals, these two communities also maintain social boundaries. I have already described the xenophobic concerns that a lot of Christian Ceutíes express towards the growth of the Muslim community and mentioned the mistrust that can be witnessed in everyday relations. In his dissertation on local politics in Ceuta, Torres Colón (2008) describes five types of inter-community relations: friendly, neutral, evasive, confrontational, and violent; neutral and evasive being the most prevalent forms. Evasive responses to mundane conflicts leave most of them unresolved and there are constant latent tensions in the enclave. A Christian Ceutí told me that he sees Ceuta as a boat isolated on the ocean with a time bomb on it: everyone has to work together to defuse it. The worst thing to do would be to politicize the problem. "When there is such a precarious yet dangerous situation, you do like policemen do when there is an accident, you say: 'Keep going! Everything is fine! There is no problem!'", he explained. So there are race and faith based tensions among communities in Ceuta, but also a general will to depoliticize them. Whether discussing the conflictual relationship between Christians and Muslims, the history of this relationship, or the ideal social order towards which almost all Ceutíes want to work, the people of Ceuta always use the term convivencia.

Ceutíes, and Christian Ceutíes especially, use it to present a good image of Ceuta to foreigners. If a journalist or an anthropologist asks if there is racism in Ceuta, the first answer is always: "No! You know there is good convivencia here, Ceuta is the result of a four cultures encounter". But, the data brings out different layers where Ceuta is shown as a highly segregated city with islamophobia and discrimination inherited from the colonial era remaining prevalent. However convivencia is also an ideal, and Ceutíes do wish there would be more of it and some work towards achieving it. It is also a social norm, and anyone acting in a way contrary to the convivencia would be criticized. In this sense, it is similar to the concept of multiculturalism in its more restricted meaning (Modood 2007; Bannerji 2000; Torres Colón 2008). It is an empirical reality, a norm, and a way of representing the world.

Convivencia is therefore the imagined and desired social order as well as an ordering concept. It is, for Christian Ceutíes, a way to integrate differences

into the national context and help structure the narrative of Ceuta's Spanishness. It is the normal order of things in which fears, tensions and dreams regarding the enclave's identity and future are ordered in a precarious equilibrium. Confronted with the demographic growth and political influence of the Muslim community, it is often portrayed as the only way to defend the Spanishness of the city. In other words, it is also a precarious attempt to pacify the differences and sustain the cultural, political and economic privileges of the Christian community. And because this pacified order of things is so fragile, it can easily be threatened.

In this context, all transiting migrants are seen in one context as potentially endangering the negotiated local order and therefore threatening the future of the enclave as a pacified Spanish city. This is especially the case when these migrants share physical characteristics with some Ceutíes. For example, when Algerian migrants or unaccompanied Moroccan minors stay in the city for some time, some Ceutíes express concerns about the possibility that these migrants may be confused with Muslims Ceutíes, and that any crime or misbehaviour they may commit would be attributed to the Muslim community of Ceuta. Such a situation is considered a potential threat to the good convivencia. Letters published in local newspapers in 2000, when parents of students were trying to impede the schooling of unaccompanied Moroccan children at Juan Morejón College, reveal this preoccupation. In a letter entitled "We are not equal", a man deplored the decision to school the Moroccan minors. He defended:

> Here, there are 25,000 Muslims waiting for their rights and for enhancements on social issues before those from outside, who can "spatter" their kids in our schools. If some quarrel or vandalism [occurs], those who do not distinguish between Spanish Muslims with their rights [and others], will accuse them all the same as those from outside because the orders of Madrid, obeyed […] by the delegates of Ceuta, do not [take into account] that we are not all equal […] And if Ceuta keeps like this, it may well break into pieces if we don't solve the problem of the illegals at the border. [8]

Many Christians see convivenci as a fragile order essential to the survival of Spanish Ceuta. They show great preoccupation when they consider that this order might be threatened by individuals blurring the distinctions between inside and outside. But here again, as is usual when convivencia is at stake, depoliticizing strategies prevail. They often imply re-classifying the migrants as 'outsiders inside'. This is exemplified by the constant call for differentiating between transiting migrants and Ceutíes, as well as by the physical displacement of the migrants to a retention centre far from the downtown area.

Depoliticizing strategies thus prevail in the management of irregular migration in Ceuta. However, when an important or influential number of

Christian Ceutíes suggests that the convivencia is facing an imminent threat, that it is no longer possible to keep the outsiders inside, then there are calls for exceptional means to quickly eliminate the threat. The expulsion of the outsiders by any means necessary and claims for a complete sealing of the border then become salient themes. This produces a process of securitization.

Securitization in times of crisis in Ceuta

Taking part in the debate in Security Studies on what makes an issue a security one in international relations, Waever (1995) offered a constructionist view on security through the concept of 'securitization'. He suggested that a security matter is an issue which has been framed as such by political elites in order to legitimize exceptional means to resolve the problem. Drawing from Austin (1962), Waever therefore considers that security is a speech act. To state, along with Austin, that discourses may have a strong performative capacity to objectify reality would not have received any special interest in anthropology or sociology in the 1990's. However, it marked an important shift in Security Studies.

Recently, some scholars associated with what has been called the School of Paris in Critical Security Studies have criticized Waever's definition of the securitization process (CASE Collective 2006). They contend that his definition accords too much importance to elites' discourses and they promote a definition that would take practices and daily routines into account. They also deplore that Waever's definition is too linear (Huysmans 2006; Bigo 2002). Studying the securitization of immigration in the European Union, Huysmans (2000; 2006) introduced the idea that securitization is achieved through the convergence of various 'domains of insecurity'. Although he did not find openly securitizing discourses on immigration in the EU's official documents, he was convinced that this issue had been securitized and he succeeded in demonstrating that this securitization was the result of converging domains of insecurity.

Drawing from Waever and his colleagues as well as scholars influenced by Foucault (Huysmans 2000; 2006; Bigo 2002; 2005), I define securitization as follow:

> *   It is a process in which an existential threat is clearly associated with an issue (discursively or otherwise).

> *   This is done in order to legitimize, or with the effect of legitimizing, exceptional measures to deal with the issue. Whether or not these measures are actually taken is not important here; the idea is that they should be thought of as legitimate by the population.

There are two main cases of securitization in Ceuta's recent immigration history: the riot of El Ángulo in 1995, and the 'assault' on the border fences in 2005. In both cases, the "threat" came from Sub-Saharan African migrants who succeeded in entering the city 'illegally'. Both in 1995 and 2005, the securitizing rhetoric was about the need to protect Spain's sovereignty and Ceuta's residents. The exceptional measures that Christian Ceutíes demanded were, in both cases, the sealing of the border at all cost and the migrants' expulsion from the city, either to the Spanish peninsula, to Morocco, or to their countries of origin. Apart from these two main crises, there is also what we could call 'low-intensity' or 'mundane' securitization processes in Ceuta.

Attempts to frame migration in terms of security always occur when there are important debates about the reform of Spanish immigration law, for example. Another example of these less spectacular securitizing moves is the effort by parents of children at the Juan Morejón College to frame Moroccan immigrant pupils as a security issue in 2000. As noted further below, the parents depicted these children as a major threat to the security of their own children, in order to force the authorities to send the Moroccan minors to another college. First, however, I will outline the case of El Ángulo and that of the events of the fall of 2005.

El Ángulo : When transit migration became "a serious problem"

The Schengen Agreement creating a European zone of free circulation became effective in 1993. Spain thus emerged as a desirable point of entry for migrants who wanted to reach Europe. The first transiting migrants arrived in Ceuta around that year. As it was rather easier to sneak into the city than it was to continue on through the security and immigration check to board the ferry going to mainland Spain, or to obtain a refugee status, the population of transiting migrant in irregular situation started to grow. According to the local government, around 300 migrants were living in the streets near the old walls of the city at El Ángulo (the corner), a few meters from the downtown area in September 1995.

On October 2, a group of more than 70 Kurds started a hunger strike in front of the Central government delegation in Ceuta in order to give weight to their demand for regularization and transfer to continental Spain. The City government also became impatient and requested that Madrid find a solution that would 1) Force the migrants to leave the city; 2) Prevent new ones from crossing the border; and 3) Deploy the military to control the border if necessary. The same week, the Kurds were arrested, and later transferred to Málaga in continental Spain to be deported. In the following days, local journalists depicted these migrants as liars and stated that some of them had been deported from Germany before for "antisocial conduct and offences". Journalists also published articles about Moroccan migrants being arrested without the proper documentation and detained for begging, searching in

trash containers, stealing money in a car and driving a motorcycle without a license, before being deported to Morocco.

On the day the Kurds were transferred to continental Spain to be deported, a rumour spread among the Sub-Saharan Africans. They thought that the Kurds' cases were being processed and that they had finally been transferred to the "Promised Land". Angry about having to stay behind, and not knowing that the Kurds were being deported, many African migrants started to riot. At least, this is how Christian Ceutíes recall the story. As a large segment of the police force was out of the city, busy deporting the Kurds, some Ceutíes took part in the riot in response to the migrants throwing rocks.[9] A local policeman was seriously injured by a mysterious gunshot. The riot lasted many hours until all migrants had been arrested. Some were freed the same day where police became certain they had not taken part in the riot; some were detained and later charged, others detained without charges.

This event marked a change in the way Christian Ceutíes consider the migrant 'problem'. Migration had already started to be framed as a security issue in the months previous to El Ángulo, but after the event, it became much more obvious and calls for exceptional measures came from all sides. In the weeks following this crisis, the migrants of El Ángulo and all non-European migrants were often depicted as unworthy of the "generous hospitality" of the people of Ceuta. Several Christian Ceutíes wrote essays and letters published in local newspapers denouncing the irresponsibility of the authorities for having allowed these violent migrants to accumulate in their city. Some journalists and other citizens tended to present them as inherently violent because of their harsh life experience. "They are nationals of war-torn countries and they carry this reality along with them, even if most of them are generally peaceful", a person noted to me during fieldwork. This image of the dirty refugee contaminated by the violence of war, described by Agier (2002), was present in the weeks following the events of El Ángulo as well.

In the days following the riot, the well-known cartoonist of a daily newspaper represented the migrants as mad individuals screaming in front of the Central government delegation building in Ceuta: "We not care die, not have nothing to loose! We fed up. The entire world will know!", and then starting to throw rocks. On the previous day, he had drawn one of his characters demanding: "Solution now!! Not even one illegal in *our* city!" [10] All opinions expressed in the two local daily papers seemed to agree on the need to expulse the migrants, although humanitarian concerns appeared in several texts.

Apart from some humanitarian considerations, the public discourse is overwhelmingly framed around the security threat that migrants posed. All local political parties and many journalists called for two measures to protect the citizens: the expulsion of the migrants from the city (either by deporting them or transferring them to continental Spain), and the sealing of the border

to prevent new migrants from entering the city. A motion was adopted unanimously by all local political parties at an "extraordinary and urgent" assembly a few days after the events, demanding that the Central government (responsible for border and immigration issues) act to protect Ceuta's residents. Some Muslim Ceutíes who openly displayed reservations concerning the project of border sealing were denounced as unpatriotic. The mayor even issued an ultimatum to the Central government in Madrid threatening to use illegal procedures to personally transfer migrants to mainland Spain "in the case [the government] does not expulse the migrants and guarantee the security of Ceutíes".

Finally, most migrants who were transferred to the Spanish peninsula either ended up in immigration detention centres or were deported. Other migrants who did not face legal charges after the riot were transferred to Calamocarro, an open space outside the city where the Red Cross and other NGO's attended to their minimum needs. Afterwards, some actually succeeded in regularizing their situation, but as some migrants left, others arrived.

If Ceutíes did not succeed in expulsing the migrants, they did, however, obtain tighter control of the borders. In the days following the events, some 110 Civil Guards and one helicopter were sent to patrol the border while the military installed a 1.8 meter fence made up of three spirals of barbwires. This was announced as a temporary measure to stop migrants from entering pending the completion of a project aimed at definitively sealing the 8.3 km border. The project took four years to complete. However, it did not end there. As soon as the first phase was over, the Spanish Ministry of Interior started to build higher and more complex fences. Between 1995 and 1999, 5,500 millions pesetas (€33 millions) were spent to build a border control route and two 2.1 meter fences. It was not even completed when a new project begun in 1999. This 2,800 millions pesetas project (€16,8 millions) involved building two other 3.1 meter fences and 17 watch towers, along with spotlights and cameras to better control the border.[11]

While the border enhancements made in 2004-2005 can be considered a response to other events, the first stages of the border 'sealing' are clearly related to the first migration crisis of El Ángulo and the following securitization of the migration question.[12] It is not to say that these repressive measures were undertaken solely as a result of the local securitization of migration. As Huysmans (2006) and Bigo (2002; 2005) have shown, securitization is not a linear process and there are always a multitude of subjects and institutions involved in it. This local problematization of the migrants as a threat and the concomitant claim for sealing the border took place in a wider Spanish and European movement of securitization. Nevertheless, the local dynamics that emerged from El Ángulo played an important role in the enhancement of border control in Ceuta.

Pre-emptive securitization: the "assaults" of the border fences in 2005

This process of securitization of transit migration from Morocco goes beyond the immediate context of El Ángulo. Since 1995, the European Union (EU) works actively to prevent migrants from crossing the southern Spanish borders and to force the Moroccan government to control transit migration. In 2003, Morocco adopts the law 02-03 announcing repressive measures (fines, detention) against anyone who tries to emigrate illegally or help migrants to do so. Moroccan security forces also conduct raids against migrant camps near Ceuta and Melilla and in migrant neighbourhoods in the major cities. These raids intensified in 2005, leading to the dismantling of many temporary camps near Ceuta, the detention and deportation of many migrants by the Moroccan forces and unprecedented level of violence against them.[13] Also is it not surprising that this year, "Ceuta has the most quiet summer in terms of immigration since 1995".[14] At least it is what Ceutíes authorities contend in August and September 2005. Irregular entries have greatly reduced. For the spokesperson of the Delegation of the Central Government in Ceuta, this is due to several factors, the main ones being: the intensification of the Moroccan security forces presence around Ceuta, a rise in controls due to the anti-terrorist measures taken after the London attack in July as well the recent enhancement of the physical border infrastructure. This includes a raise of 3 meters in height to reach more than 6m 20 in zones where migrants generally attempted to cross.[15] The spokesperson of the Delegation of the Central Government thus attributes this diminution in irregular migration to theses security measures, a point of view shared by most Ceutíes of Spanish origin interviewed in 2008.

However, while the Delegation of the Government and some journalists celebrate this "victory", "assaults" against the border fence of the neighbouring Melilla is a recurrent theme in the opinion and op-ed articles published in the local newspapers. By the end of August, migrants attempt to enter in Melilla in large groups, a strategy that took the border officers by surprise. Although the border fences are higher in Ceuta, thus supposedly preventing these tactics, some groups campaigned for more resources at the Ceutí border. On September 7, the first page of the daily paper El Faro de Ceuta read "The border in alert because of the immigrant assaults" along with photos of human masses climbing the border fence in Melilla. At the same time, the police unions Sindicato Unificado de Policía (SUP) and Asociación Unificada de la Guardia Civil (AUGC) demanded a better coordination at the border post of El Tarajal in Ceuta, while the Unión Federal de Policía (UFP) demanded more personnel to control the Biutz Bridge, a fenced corridor for institutionalized contraband at the border post.[16] Facing "avalanches" of individuals doing local trans-border tolerated contraband, the UFP asked for "urgent measures" to enhance their capacity to implement an effective control

at the border. The AUGC also claimed that it lacks personnel to reduce the illegal entries of Asian migrants by sea and calls for more resources.[17]

It is not clear whether the security forces felt particularly overwhelmed at this moment and thus demanded more personnel, or whether they tried to take advantage of the "threat of migrant avalanches" to obtain resources. Bigo (1996) suggests that the securitization of an issue by those he calls "security professionals" is often part of a tactic to gain more powers and resources. The latter was confirmed, in this case, by a member of a police union interviewed in 2008. I asked him whether my position that his union fuelled fears about the border as a strategy to obtain more resources reflected his own understanding of the situation. This was after he had asserted that irregular migration did not create 'real' insecurity (inseguridad) but rather a perception (impresión) of insecurity, at least in the case of Asian and Sub-Saharan African migrants,. This was his reply to me:

> Of course in those big sacks, as no one controls them, you don't know what's in it. This is the truth. And if sometimes, for some reason, we happened to find half a stolen motorcycle in pieces in a sack, on its way to Morocco… This is not usual, but it happens… And of course if at some point we demand more personnel or that the Biutz Bridge be closed because of the negative consequences it has for the police officers, well we have to generate some insecurity and tell things that are not usual but do happen. We have to say: "Look, 4 days ago we [randomly] opened a bag found this stolen motorcycle heading to the Morocco". Then of course we can add : "Look, if they can carry even half a motorcycle in a bag, they certainly can carry other things […] maybe they smuggle also arms". As we don't know, because we don't control, no one can deny this.
>
> DM : So you generate insecurity (inseguridad [18]) to obtain more resources?
>
> Of course, we have to convince the people, the authorities. But we can demonstrate it. Some other time, we found a gun…

As a key union representative, he wishes to make clear that the union does not try to cheat the people of Ceuta. This man believes that the Buitz Bridge in particular and the border post in general present grave lacunae for security, especially regarding drug and arm trafficking as well as terrorism. But even if he distinguishes between real and perceived danger [inseguridad], he still confesses that his union has to create a sense of insecurity to obtain more resources, thus supporting Bigo's claim that security professional play an important role in pre-emptively fuelling a fear of crime to gain more power.

However, police unions are not the only one to take part in this process of securitization in the fall of 2005. An analysis of the daily papers of Ceuta reveals a politicization of the immigration question at the national level. This confrontation between the Partido Popular (PP- right) and the socialists (PSOE) on this issue finds strong echo at the local level. For instance, the PP demands that the socialist government apply the agreements on the deportation of irregular migrants signed with Morocco, including the agreement on the deportation of unaccompanied minors ratified in 2003. In this spirit of securitization, and facing the refusal of the Moroccan government to let Ceuta and Melilla attend the Hispano-Moroccan Summit on Immigration to be held in Sevilla at the end of September, anti-Moroccan and anti-immigration discourses flourish in Ceuta. Several op-ed articles and letters to the editor published in Ceuta in September accuse the socialist government of betraying Ceuta and Melilla, and call for the resignation of the President on the basis that he is unwilling to defend the españolidad of Ceuta.

In sum, the discourse on immigration focuses on three concerns: that the social gains forming the emerging providential state are threatened by the immigration 'tsunami' coming from the South; that the Spanish government betrays Ceuta and Melilla to please the Moroccan monarch; and that the security forces are lacking resources to face the threat. These are the themes around which the discourses on immigration were already organized when, in the night of September 28- 29, some 500 to 700 migrants attempted to climb the border fence to enter Ceuta. Thus, the process of securitization that follows is not solely a result of this event but appears pre-emptively weeks before this night which unfolded into a horror story.

The unfolding of the night, which deeply chocked the Ceutí and Spanish public and resulted in the death of at least 5 migrants and injuries for hundreds of others, have been discussed extensively elsewhere (see for instance Blanchard & Wender 2007). In summary, these migrants, equipped with some 120 ladders made of branches and rope, undertook to cross the 3 meter fence covered with barb wires. The Spanish police forces responded using anti-riot material (tear gas, rubber bullets, batons) while on the Moroccan side lethal weapons are also used. When rubber and bullets were shot at them, the migrants panicked and almost half of them never made it to the fence and ran away. The next morning, around 200 persons had succeeded in entering Ceuta; 37 of them were hospitalized in the process. Two migrants killed by gunshot were found on the Spanish side and at least 3 others bodies were discovered on the Moroccan side. In the next few days, raids occurred in Morocco and migrants were deported to the desert between Algeria and Morocco (Congreso de los Diputados 2005; Echarri 2005c; Blanchard & Wender 2007).

At the local level, the securitizing process already underway intensifies. Juan Jesús Vivas Lara, the Mayor-President of Ceuta, called for exceptional measures to expel the migrants as soon as possible. Insisting on expressions

such as "urgent and exceptional means" or "extraordinary measures", Vivas demanded powers allowing him to show "strength and firmness in defending the Spanish interests". To the Central government in Madrid, he demanded "that urgent measures be taken so that individuals entering irregularly could be sent back through the same border through which they entered".[19] To the European Union, he demanded more resources to control the border. Most local political parties in Ceuta supported the calls. However, there were almost no op-ed articles or letters to the editor calling for more border control in the week following this night.

Nonetheless, the Central government sent 480 soldiers to help the Guardia Civil in controlling the border. Furthermore, the readmission agreement between Spain and Morocco (The Malaga Agreement of 1992) was reactivated and 72 migrants were deported to Morocco in the following days (Spain 1992). The Minister of Interior also announced investments of €100 millions to better control irregular migration at the border of Ceuta and Melilla, and another €63.21 millions to enhance surveillance in the Gibraltar strait (Congreso de los Diputados 2005; El País 2005). While it appeared that these new investments and the deployment of more security measures by the Central government were a response to the 'assault', at the local level the process of securitization clearly started before this event. The focus on Ceuta itself brings out that the process of securitization of the fall of 2005 was pre-emptive. As my data suggest, this was the development before the event of a discourse fuelled by the spectre of a potential threat, and contributing to a strategy of securitization structured upon a logics of anticipation.

Everyday securitization: The case of the Juan Morejón College in 2000

I turn to a third case, that of the schooling of Moroccan pupils at the Juan Morejón College in 2000. This case exemplifies the "mundane" or "low-intensity" problematization of migration as a security issue in Ceuta. In this instance, it is a solely internal situation in which no exceptional or repressive measures were taken. However, this "banal" incident reveals a lot about how Christian Ceutíes see the migration issue.

When Madrid started to build a higher border fence in 1999, it also opened two shelters / retention centres for transiting migrants: the Centro de estancia temporal de inmigrantes (CETI) for the adults who were living in tents at Calamocarro since 1995, and the Centro San Antonio for unaccompanied minors. Most of these minors are Moroccan children who sneak into Ceuta to find small jobs or other ways of earning money. Moroccan minors can be seen everywhere in the city centre, selling necklaces and watches in the streets or loitering at the port. Some come with their parents and go back to Morocco every night, some come alone and either register at San Antonio Centre or live in the street. They often have a bad reputation. During my fieldwork, my neighbours in the downtown area often accused them of stealing objects in cars and robbing shops, and of bothering them

when selling their cheap merchandise. These wide-spread prejudices make it easy for a group or person wanting to securitize this issue to frame the children as an imminent threat. This is what happened in the case of the schooling of the Moroccan children at the Juan Morejón College.

In the fall of 2000, the Ministry of Education decided to school 30 Moroccan teenagers between 13 and 16 years old living at San Antonio Centre. They were to attend special classes on a special schedule in a local high school attended by some 700 young Ceutíes. The parents of the college were not informed prior to the decision. Many were astonished when they discovered that these teenagers would attend the same school as their children. Many of these parents reacted by keeping their children at home on November 15. On November 16, these parents blocked the access to the college. They demanded that the Moroccan minors be sent elsewhere. The reason they gave was that the Moroccans were dangerous and posed a serious security threat for their children. This appears clearly in some of the Letters to the Editor published in El Faro de Ceuta. In the daily newspaper, these pupils are depicted by parents as something closer to monsters than to children. They become "delinquents enclosed in children's bodies who have no fear of using whatever means of pressure (including knives, blows or any tools they could find) to get what they want". They are even portrayed as possible sexual abusers as they are assumed to having been abused during in the past. Once this image of the monster kid is established, the parents of young Ceutíes maintain their demand that the unaccompanied Moroccan children be sent to another college suggesting that any reasonable citizen would agree with them:

> [We demand] that the Spanish state, instead of putting in our college a time bomb that would shortly explode, use its resources and build special centres to re-educate these kids and change them into normal persons.

> What would you do if you knew that your kid would go out for recess (without any sort of supervision by the teachers), with thirty delinquents who would not feel any guilt in using a knife to steal […] a sandwich?

> What would you do if you knew that [your kid] would go alone in the washroom when there are [in the college] thirty potential rapists? […]

The massive protest by parents trying to impede the Moroccan children from attending their college is also representative of the way they had problematized the issue in terms of security. They were so opposed to the project that several police officers had to escort the minors into the college on their first day of school. Finally, the Minister of Education and the College

authorities met with the parents on the situation of the Moroccan teenagers, to explain to them that they did not posed a threat, that they would study in separate classes and follow a different schedule. The parents accepted the explanations and everything went (almost) back to normal. By their actions, the parents contributed to framing these migrants as threats, but their concerns also drew on the way these minors are problematized by other people and institutions as well as by actions taken to deal with the situation. In an open letter to the Delegate of the Central government in Ceuta, a parent states:

> This fear about security that the parents have wanted to defend and expose is funded by the images of [the Moroccan minors] that have been promoted, sometime by actions that you undertook [to deport them], sometime by local leaders who repeated that we should put an end to this situation and resolve their problem by creating centres in their own country of origin, and sometime by acts that this type of minors in general have committed and that one can easily recall by reviewing past issues of the city's daily papers.

This account support Huysman's claim that securitization is not a linear process but rather that security discourse and practices tend to create a spiral of (in)securitization whose origin is hard to identify (Huysmans 2006). Moreover, it helps to understand that in Ceuta, outbursts of bold securitizing discourses witnessed in times of crisis are only strong manifestations of a larger security oriented problematization of migration. This problematization is much more the results of convergent domains of insecurity (Huysmans 2006), than of clear securitizing speech acts (Waever 1995).

Conclusion

Each of the cases highlights some features of the securitization of irregular migration in Ceuta, as well as of securitization in general. The case of El Ángulo in 1995 represents a successful process of securitization leading to the strengthening of border control between Ceuta and Morocco. This example shows explicitly how discursive practices may succeed in legitimizing and obtaining exceptional means. Furthermore, in this case the process of securitization is mainly local, the Central government in Madrid and other actors in the debate aim to solely providing solutions within a problematization defined at the local level.

In the case of the 'assaults' on the border fences in 2005 and that of the schooling of the unaccompanied Moroccan minors in 2000, the securitization processes aimed at neutralizing the threats before they even occurred. This pre-emptive management of anticipated risks is an important feature of what Abélès (2006) calls the politics of survival (survivance) and Beck (1992), risk society. It also correlates with the logic of a governmentality

relying on apparatuses (dispositifs) of security described by Foucault (2004) and central to Huysmans' analysis of security (Huysmans 2006). In this sense, these cases exemplify a central feature of contemporary management of threats as discussed in the scholarly literature. The example of August and September 2005 is representative of another element underlined in studies on securitization as it portrays a process that is largely the endeavour of 'security professionals' stressing the potential insecurities to obtain more powers and resources. This primary role played by the security professionals in securitization processes is central in the work of Bigo, another key scholar concerned with the securitization of migration (Bigo 1996; 2002; 2005).

The example of the Juan Morejón College, adds to this by showing that if explicit cases of securitization as 'speech acts' (Waever 1995) are rather uncommon in Ceuta, it is important to also be attentive to more latent processes of securitization resulting from the converging of various "domains of insecurities" (Huysmans 2006:149) towards irregular migration. Thus, even if the option of bold securitization rarely gains great saliency, competing problematizations circulate simultaneously where there is inherently a problematization or irregular migration in terms of security. As the parent of a pupil expressed in the excerpt quoted, it is not always easy to determine where securitization starts, nor who and what participates in this process. In this sense, this case seems to supports Huysmans' thesis (2006) suggesting that securitization is not a linear process but one that generally takes the form of a spiral of (in)securitization.

Thus, I have argued in this article that in order to grasp how migration is framed as a threat to the order of things, it is essential to look at how 'threats' and the order of things are constituted in relation to one another. I have claimed that Christian Ceutíes problematize irregular migrants as a potential threat to their convivencia but that depoliticizing strategies generally prevail in the management of this 'threat'. Nonetheless, processes of securitization are also common in Ceuta, and I have analyzed three such cases. These cases have served to analyze the dynamics of the securitization of migration at a European Union external border and to exemplify some key features of securtization in the literature.

Biographical Note
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Notes

1 These three quotes are, respectively, from Jesús Fortes, then president of the Popular Party of Ceuta (1995), Antonio Alcarón, then General Secretary of the Socialist Party of the People of Ceuta (1995), and from a citizen of Ceuta (2000).

2 These four cultures are referred to in terms of religion: Christian, Muslim, Jewish and Hindu. The results presented in this article apply to the "Christian" Ceutíes, those "of Spanish descent" who form the demographic and political majority in Ceuta and publicly express more concern with migration issues.

3 The expressions "Christian Ceutíes" and "Muslim Ceutíes" are those used in Ceuta. They are both ascribed and self-given group identities and do not reflect the complex identities of individuals in the city. Hereafter, I will stop using quotation marks but I am signalling that I am referring to inter-subjective group identification by using this concept.

4 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ceuta_en.png

5 For an in-depth description of the way this mistrust affects the political relations in Ceuta and for overviews of the historical roots of this mistrust, see Torres Colón (2008) and González Enríquez (2007). For a detailed history of the relationship between these communities, see Gold (2000). For an account of islamophobia and cultural panic in Europe describing a situation similar to that of Ceuta, see Marranci (2004).

6 European Union (2000), Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders signed at Schengen on 19 June 1990.

7 I contend that the figure of the refugee framed as a danger to the national order of things can be extended to other figures of the non-citizen ('bogus' asylum seekers, 'illegal alien', non-status people, etc.)

8 This is an extract of a "Letter to the Editor", published in El Faro de Ceuta in November of 2000. Because, it is a comment published years ago in a local newspaper by a simple citizen who might not understand all implications of making such a statement publicly, I prefer not to disclose his identity (which is of no interest for my argument). Therefore, the article does not appear in the references. This is a personal translation from Spanish.

9 This event occurred at the limit of the downtown, a Christian neighbourhood. I understand that the Ceutíes who took part in this riot were mostly Christian, but have been told several times by Christian Ceutíes, among them journalists who have covered the events, that 'some Muslims' also took part in it.

10 The cartoons have been reproduced in Moffette (2009). This document can be consulted on line at: http://ariane.ulaval.ca/cgi-bin/recherche.cgi?qu=a1859336 (2009: 104-105).

11 Figures presented in the national daily El País. See González (1999) and Cué (1999).

12 The actual features of the border appear on a recent figure elaborated by El País: www.elpais.com/graficos/espana/Asalto/vallas/Ceuta/Melilla/elpgranac/20050929 elpepunac_2/Ges/

13 For details on these raids, see Blanchard & Wender (2007) and Médecins sans frontières (2005).

14 Title of an article published in El Faro de Ceuta. See Abad (2005a).

15 A visual representation of the border in September 2005 and of the announced enhancements is available on the website of El País at www.elpais.com/graficos/espana/Asalto/vallas/Ceuta/Melilla/ elpgranac/20050929elpepunac_2/Ges/

16 Morocco does not recognize the Spanish sovereignty on Ceuta and therefore refuses to establish custom services at the border post. Thousands of individuals nonetheless cross the border by foot daily for small business practices. The Spanish government has thus created this passage to contain the flow of people carrying goods.

17 See the articles in El Faro de Ceuta by Echarri (2005a: 2005b) Erro, (2005) and El Faro de Ceuta (2005).
18 The Spanish term is *inseguridad*, which can translate as "fear of crime", "danger", or "anxiety" depending on the field. I chose to translate it by "insecurity" to maintain these various meanings although this word might sound strange in English.
19 Cited in El Faro de Ceuta by Abad (2005b).

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