THE GIFT OF SHAME
The Invention of Postcolonial Society

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The Public Man

Twenty-five years ago, Roy Wagner in his book, The Invention of Culture asked his reader to comprehend the invention of society as an ongoing effort, especially an effort made by members aware of the changes that can be wrought by their actions. In doing so, he posed the problem of what kind of society people thought they were making, contrasting the social contract of the Euro-American political thought with the processual sociality imagined by Melanesians (1975, 1974). The theoretical insights of Wagner can be brought to bear on the period of independence in Papua New Guinea when Melanesians were making a new sociality. I will discuss the dialectics of Wagner’s approach, as they are played out at the time of the publication of his book; that is, in the early years of the creation of the new nation of Papua New Guinea.

In this article, I will turn to the analysis of the role of the postcolonial writer, Bernard Narakobi, in creating a society after independence, through a series of critical essays offered to the wider readership of the national newspaper, the Papua New Guinea Post Courier. As a foil to Narakobi’s career and work, I also discuss the writing of Frantz Fanon at the time of independence in Algeria. I argue that both Narakobi and Fanon work towards the invention of postcolonial society because they assume the voice of the ‘public man.’ The ‘public man’ acts with the sense that social life is in immanent danger, should he not sustain and encourage an ethos of respect for what relations ought to be. Wagner (1987) points out that the ‘public man’ in Europe, amongst the Barok and the Daribi, and perhaps
elsewhere, acts against the possibility of suffering the sentiments of shame and the tragedy of social chaos that would inevitably follow the failure to sustain social life. However, somewhat different from Wagner’s rendering of the concept, for the description of leadership and the moral order in Melanesian villages, as developed from the analysis of the life of the ‘public man’ in the eighteenth century by Richard Sennett (1977), I focus on the critical efforts of both Narakobi and Fanon acting as a ‘public man’ in post-colonial society. In particular, I discuss how Narakobi draws comparisons between European and Melanesian ways of being. He thereby bears his gift of shame, a burden of the ‘public man’ in Papua New Guinea.

Shame and the Public Man

The circumstances of Narakobi’s intellectual project become somewhat clearer if I return to his description of that time of nation making. In an early essay written twenty-five years ago, Narakobi met with his relatives in the Sepik villages of his home in order to discuss the work of forming a new nation. This story introduces the complexity of Narakobi’s work in the essays of Foundations for Nationhood (1974) and grounds his efforts in The Melanesian Way (1980) where he retells the tale, acknowledging its tutelary importance in his life. He tells his reader that only months away from independence, the elderly men and the younger statesman conferred with each other about the meaning of the historic events unfolding. At the end of session an elderly man said to Narakobi:

Young man? You see the setting sun? That’s what we are. We belong to the age of the sinking sun. You belong to the rising sun. We don’t fully understand your talk. But you do what you think is best because you will live to see tomorrow. We tell you though, you will be old one day, and you will live with the memory of how things used to be (Narakobi 1974).

Narakobi tells us that this conversation shaped his sense of duty about fulfilling obligations to elders and to the past, while working within those public domains that constitute postcolonial sociality. I argue that Narakobi’s sense of obligation to warn the public to sustain the egalitarian relations of the “Melanesian Way” arises from this “Gift of Shame,” a name I have given to the sensibility elicited in that experience on the banks of the Sepik River. Shame as sem is used widely in the Pacific ethnography; however, Wagner made clear in both the Curse of Souw (1967) and Assiwinarong (1986) that Sem in Tok Pisin, describes an ethos that only approximates the sense by
which English language speakers use the word ‘shame.’ People in Papua New Guinea describe themselves as having *sem* or not having *sem*, thereby emphasizing the circumstances in which the affect is elicited as a state, a condition or a style which can be claimed. *Sem* is an attitude or a demeanor which one enacts, thereby making it visible to another and necessitating a similar response from them. I agree with Wagner’s (1987) definition that to have *sem* is to act publicly in an attitude of respect towards others, as if to ward off the ever-present disaster that might befall social relations, should people fail to sustain them. My concern here lies with what kind of action invents sociality in a postcolonial era. Taking the gift of *sem* into social relations, entails making an argument for an egalitarian society, as an expression of the Melanesian Way.

*Sem*, then, is a public demeanor adopted by Narakobi to sustain the egalitarianism of the Melanesian Way. It is an ethos that informs his public writing, and a style of engagement making the negotiation of egalitarian politics possible. It is an ethic that directs behavior to the achievement of a desired moral order. *Sem* sustains Narakobi as he argues for egalitarian politics in the face of the incipient hierarchies of the nascent State. I think that Narakobi’s public call for an egalitarian politics of the Melanesian Way can be situated in the ethos of shame, thereby permitting comparison with the essays of Fanon, who argues that deracinating the colonial politics known as Negritude, can be achieved by acknowledging the experience of shame.

Like Narakobi, Fanon wrote while living in a colony on the way to independence. Whereas Narakobi held up for public examination the intricacies of egalitarianism in the new State, Fanon held up to public examination the nationalist ideology of Negritude, and exposed its construction within the relations of colonial power. Fanon’s critique of the postcolonial subject has been considered ‘incomplete’ (Bhabha 1986), a ‘response to trauma’ (Kaplan 1999) or ‘symptomatic’ of more widely felt structures of postcolonial subordination (Allessandrini 1999) by those academics seeking to theorize cultural politics. Another way of dealing with Fanon’s work is to understand him as a public intellectual forwarding a political project, rather than as an academic with symptomatic understandings of postcoloniality. Then, to address the intellectual project he had chosen to write about on his own accord, also recognizes the warning he raised to his peers that they should turn their attention to the ways in which the colonial condition blinds scholarship. It returns his work to his first public claim, that “my consciousness is not illuminated with ultimate radiances. Nevertheless in complete composure, I think it would be good if certain things were said (1967[1952]: 9)”. In this paper, I characterize Fanon’s (and Narakobi’s)
projects as distinct intellectual engagements of the wider public, and consider each as an instances of the ‘public man’.

**Fanon as a Public Man**

It is as a ‘public man’ that Fanon confronts the “fact of blackness.” Fanon’s opening account of his recognition of the public fact of his race in *Black Skin White Masks* (1967[1952]) details his humiliation in recognizing the fact of his skin color in a public place. He appeals to Sartrean historicity, to explain the fact of his identity.

In the train it was no longer a question of being aware of my body in the third person but in a triple person. In the train I was given not one but two, three places. I had already stopped being amused. It was not that I was finding febrile co-ordinates. I existed triply: I occupied space. I moved toward the other ... and the evanescent other, hostile but not opaque, transparent, not there, disappeared. Nausea... On that day completely dislocated, unable to be abroad with the other, the ‘white man’, who unmercifully imprisoned me, I took myself far off from my own presence far indeed, and made myself an object. What else could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a haemorrhage that splattered my whole body with black blood (1967[1952]: 112).

Fanon compares the effects of an anti-Semitic ideology upon the Jewish identity with Negritude’s impact on black consciousness, highlighting the difference between the ideologies and thereafter opening debate amongst his own critics about the virtues and failings of Negritude. He argues that anti-Semitism over-determines the identity of the Jew whose internalization of the doctrine creates his fear of his own identity. He hesitates to confirm the public stereotype, preferring to remain unknown in his Jewishness and thereby finding freedom in what he is not. The ‘black’ finds no freedom for the person in the guise determined by skin color. Beyond the fact of blackness, Fanon warns that there is only the shame of being liked or disliked in spite of his color (1967[1952]: 116). That experience of shame reminds him that within, he remains “a soul as immense as the world,” writing that to experience life so vastly saddens him because “without responsibility straddling nothingness and infinity, I begin to weep (1967[1952]: 140).”

In taking up Fanon’s awareness of the fact of blackness as constitutive of himself as a ‘public man,’ I am focusing principally upon the most recent rendering of the Martinique writer’s arguments for Algerian independence. Earlier criticisms have included those who found his work troublesome because it blurred race and class carrying attitudes akin to those of the
petty bourgeoisie rather than the ‘black’ labourer (Robinson 1983); because it appealed to red-blooded nationalism (Robbins 1998); because it advocated violent revolution as the means to shuck off the trauma induced by the constraint of colonial racism (Samuel 1997; Sekyi-Otu 1996); because it was a symptomatic rendering of the critique of the colonial subject which later inspired cultural studies (Bhabha 1986). Fanon’s effort to expose racism continues to trouble the contemporary readers “from whichever direction we read him (Hall 1996, cited in Alessandrini 1999).” In this, I take my lead from Hall’s insight that we must heed Fanon’s troublesome public call to create a way of living differently.

Fanon’s discussion of Negritude is not the expression of a fully comprehended ideology. He admits he does not comprehend the Algerian woman. He admits that the inter-relations of sexual politics and racial politics are poorly developed. Fanon admits he has no invitation to address the expatriate readership that first picks up his text. The Black élite (petty bourgeoisie or otherwise) made no better request for his views. But it is, nonetheless, a manifesto written for an eager public readership.

Narakobi Initiates his own Public Testimony to the Melanesian Way, Amidst his Critics

An examination of Narakobi’s *The Melanesian Way* does not show the author suffering in the way that Fanon does in his writing against the fact of blackness. Although Melanesian means from the ‘dark’ islands, Narakobi’s cause to argue against inequality common to the politics of the State subsumes his arguments against the racism of colonial politics. Whereas, I learn from Fanon that the violence of racism commits cruelties against the spirit that extend even beyond the brutality of domination, I learn from Narakobi that to argue for equality at every turn of everyday life, and at every turn of national development has caused him pain.5 He acknowledges that over the centuries, “Melanesians have come to see themselves as they are understood and written up by foreigners. Melanesians are walking in the shadows of their Western analysts, living under dreams and visions dreamt and seen by Westerners (1967[1952]).” From this experience of themselves as despised and over-idealized by Western scientists, Narakobi challenges his peers:

> Will we see our own true size images, or will we see ourselves in the images and the shadows of others? Will we see ourselves in the shadows of the dwin-
dling light and the advanced darkness of the evening dusk, or will we see ourselves in the long and radiant rays of the rising sun. We can choose if we will (ibid.: 9).

Writing about the egalitarian politics of an indigenous sovereign State, Narakobi’s public differs from Fanon’s, and so too does his sense of historicity. Born in the Sepik region, he participates in the educational program towards independence. He participates in the work of the Catholic Mission, becomes a lawyer and is already practicing at independence. At the time of independence he headed the Papua New Guinea Law Reform Commission, a body given to the work of social research and the criticism of legal policy. Its initial task was the re-evaluation of customary ownership in order to devise a plan and law such that land would never leave the interests of the clans who held claims in it, nor the hands of the citizens who worked the gardens in the new nation. Along side this work, he formed a small political party, the Melanesian Alliance which never came to hold power, although it kept the respect of the voters in the country. As a senior statesman, Narakobi has held significant power as the Minister of Justice and Speaker of the House of Parliament. Throughout his life, Narakobi filled public offices, practised a professional life and reflected upon his legacy while considering the words of his critics.6

I have no intention whatsoever to look over my shoulders whenever I write or utter a word. Accordingly I have no intention to reply to every criticism that is levelled at me personally or at the thought, content or the literary merit of my writing. In any case, it is good to have opposing views because out of all that will emerge Melanesian identity (ibid.: 15).

Narakobi acknowledges the worth of those journalists and academics criticizing his work. He believes they share his concerns.7 He believes in speaking with a Melanesian voice to warn against the dangers of seduction into the styles of the West.8 He, like them, argues that imperialist politics distinguishes between European and Melanesian modernity, and finds the Melanesian version failing. Unlike Fanon, Narakobi does not embrace the negation of the Melanesian identity. Unlike Fanon, he does not feel caught in the contradictions “between nothingness and infinity” but inspired to cross that abyss. Unlike Fanon, he seeks to elicit *sem* from others, as a personal response of egalitarian relations. Narakobi recognizes that the Melanesian way must emerge through debate and provocation from sources of inspiration within the nation, and that those responses will be elicited in the spirit of egalitarianism.
In his essay, “Personal and National Identity,” Narakobi asks the question “Who Am I?” and answers with a series of reflections on youth and intergenerational politics in Papua New Guinea. He writes that for the younger generation, independence is a very painful road to follow. Just as youth come to the university after years in the village and in the Church schools, the nation came to independence with the values born in generations in the village, and tempered with the colonial education with the missions. Youth, like the nation, evaluates its situation in the light of the more liberal acts of peers, rather than of its history. The error of youth is one and the same as the error of leadership. They mistake fashion and stylish appearance—“keeping up with the Jones’s”—with becoming modern people (1980: 29). “The West has labelled us a Third World country. And yet, everything we are doing is fashioned after the West. Take a look at almost any institution today and you will see your image in the Western mirror (1980: 29).” Europeans make Papua New Guinea a third world country, not Melanesians. Comparisons with the European that find Melanesians failing to ‘keep up’ are made in a European not a Melanesian spirit. He challenges the reader to reflect upon the terms of the supposed delinquency of the emerging middle class. He argues that the delinquency that they bear as a label from the West, and their stylish way does not lay a road to a Melanesian modernity nor edify their wish for a good life.

Narakobi writes of the experiences of his life in which he finds contradictions between modern values and those of his elder clan members. He sees the problem escalating around him:

By blindly following the West, we have become estranged and alienated from each other. Personal human relationships are being sacrificed for professional titles. It saddens me to see people stand on their offices or titles and refuse to deal with each other except as bosses or employers (1980: 13).

He speaks about equality as a virtue of the Melanesian Way that can sustain the politics of the new nation. Further, he examines the new circumstance in which Papua New Guineans find themselves as workers. He contrasts work given as an act of fraternal love with work given away to the bosses. “To work for others is part of the Melanesian spirit of caring for others. If we could realize this we would know the deep foundation on which many of our government policies could take off (1980: 14).” Narakobi is concerned that this spirit of equality will continue into the future. Throughout his writing, he moves to make that equality come into being.

Narakobi calls for action in *The Melanesian Way*; first, for introspection and second, for defence of the Melanesian soul against the traumas that State politics may inflict upon it.
What is needed is a period of introspection into which we are, and planned action to take deliberate and sometimes painful steps to effect change … The traumas and tragedies that have befallen many nations, both old and new, can be avoided if we continuously rediscover our souls and the soul of our nation. That is at the heart of my search for a Melanesian Way (1980: 30).

In Narakobi’s words, he offers a choice to his reader. The Papua New Guinean should make an ongoing interrogation of the soul or submit to the possibility that the State will not only disappoint its citizens, but also cause them pain.

Comparisons of Narakobi’s Melanesian Way and Fanon’s Negritude

Historicity

The comparison between Narakobi’s and Fanon’s efforts to establish a political identity reveals the difference in their personal relationships to the State and their different experiences as intellectuals in postcolonial nations. In this, the matter of their very different senses of the historicity of their identity matters more than any other issue. As I have pointed out, Fanon expresses his frustration with the impossibility of finding freedom within the history of relations that disguise him as a ‘back man.’ The masking is done by the ‘white man,’ who is responsible for forcing the identity of the ‘black face’ on the ‘black man.’ Fanon argues that it is a matter of the ‘black face’ that he must always live within the constraints of the labels of Negritude, always finding himself reflected in the mirrors held up by the ‘white.’ The ‘black man’ is constrained by the image he sees in the ‘white man’s mirror: of his past, in his present and for the future.

By contrast, Narakobi urges Papua New Guineans not to measure their well-being by reference to the livelihoods of Europeans and Australians. He does not perceive danger for the Papua New Guinean in a search to be ‘white’; rather, he perceives a danger to the people of the new Nation if they imitate the lifestyles of the European. He urges his reader to find freedom in recovering the Melanesian Way through interrogating their consciences. In such acts of soul searching, Papua New Guineans will become heirs to the Melanesian Way that their own ancestors thoughtfully practiced.

Recognition of the Spirit

Negritude, as the mask made by the European for the ‘black man,’ fixes an identity in the substance of the person and differentiates him from others according to his skin color. In the midst of this experience, Fanon asks
what is left after the images of the ‘white man’s mirror have been played out. In the state of Negritude, Fanon finds no hope for the recovery of his soul except to know that in his pain he exists between nothing and infinity. His soul becomes an immense world of experience. Having lived with definitions of the person that rely upon the fact of his blackness as the recognition of the color of his skin, Fanon hopes to find the stuff of his soul. He worries that he cannot find it in essence or in act, but acknowledges that he is aware of its existence. It is as more than the image he sees in the disguise made for him by ‘white man’s attributions. In the shame of recognizing the impoverished ‘black soul,’ and of acknowledging its negation in a white world, Fanon is given a vision of his soul’s greatness in a deracinated world.

Different from Fanon, Narakobi finds the essence of the Melanesian Way in a way of being in relation to others. In order to keep that way of being, the Papua New Guinean must reflect upon the nature of his soul and find within it the cause for fraternal charity. For Narakobi, the fundamental question is not what is left of the Melanesian person after schooling, work and the event of the nation’s independence, but how should the Papua New Guinean live? The recognition of the Melanesian Way comes with its enactment because it is in the course of living by it that the Papua New Guinean can come to reflect upon his experience. Papua New Guineans define their egalitarian spirit by accepting the gift of shame. The gift burdens the soul to act charitably towards others whose suffering might well become one’s own.

Change comes differently to Narakobi than to Fanon. Negritude must be purged from the ‘black’ self in order to make egalitarian relations with the ‘white man’ (Fanon 1963). It is in conditions of Negritude that Fanon comes to imagine the ‘black soul’ but is only beyond those conditions that he imagines the life of that soul. Often accused of advocating violent revolution (Azar 1999), Fanon has argued that a cleansing and decolonization of consciousness must occur, even if the means of that purging spills blood (Fanon 1965).

Change occurs according to the the Melanesian Way in a different manner than it does in the purging of Negritude (Fanon 1965). The Melanesian Way wears down others until they become mutually committed to equality, perhaps as partners in reciprocal exchange. In Life and Leadership (1978) Narakobi describes the actions of the waves of colonialism against the rocks of Melanesian identity. It might well seem that the waves break the rocks to small stones, but other invisible changes take place. The rocks chemically transform the waves themselves, changing the
sea to mineral salt. This analogy to osmotic processes suggests much of the way in which the performance of *sem* should turn the Melanesian state to egalitarian relations.

Narakobi’s thought shares with Fanon a sophisticated insight into the work of interrogating and challenging inequality. Each writer carries a distinguished reputation in the contexts in which they lived and are known. Narakobi’s urging for a nation in which thought and action remain in constant revolution that a greater hope for egalitarian relations endures. Fanon hopes for a purge of Negritude, through violent means if necessary. But it is not in violent revolution that Narakobi’s hopes lie. The ongoing elicitation of the ethos of *sem* in public life forms egalitarian sociality from hierarchy.

As with Fanon, I have discussed Narakobi as a ‘public man,’ raising a warning against the threat posed by the new hierarchy of the State against the egalitarian moral order. The moral order may well be the given premise, as Durkheim would suggest, of the possibility of the social existence of a group as a collective with interests in common. But, as Wagner pointed out, ‘public man’ is something altogether more specific than the moral order—‘public man’ enacts a dramatic form of elicitation of the moral (1987: 165). The ‘public man’ acts, not pointing out or defending the moral principle so much, as eliciting it or making its necessity apparent to others.

Against the awareness of inequity—of class or of race—each author argues for the transformation of collective interests. But their differences are not just ones of orders of inequality; Fanon’s with race and Narakobi’s with traditions of equality. Rather they differ on the grounds of how each author conceptualizes his shame in his theory of an egalitarian society.

Narakobi differs from Fanon over the question of how a shared social consciousness of inequality emerges. I situate each in a different ethos of action and thought; but not to describe each ethos as evidence of mechanical models of sociality. I sought to explain how the Melanesian Way and Negritude each emerge with national culture as forms of association within the State that build upon assumed essential characteristics of each person in relation to the State. These characteristics of the postcolonial subject are held or possessed as the cultural life. And, following Wagner, this follows the sense that they must quickly recover their losses when they become aware that they have come to accept “the collective focus of cultural life as mechanical effect rather than a meaningful orientation (Wagner 1987: 163).”

Perhaps *sem* imbues the Melanesian Way with meaning, reorienting the mechanical work of making customary life to the important exercise of creating a meaningful world view. Narakobi wrote repeatedly of the
Melanesian Way and the significance of sustaining egalitarian relationships in the new state of Papua New Guinea. This is not an easy duty to give oneself. Indeed, Gewertz and Errington (1999) argued that even Narakobi’s ideals could not prevent the defeat of egalitarian relations by the economic inequality emergent in the new state. Although cases can be given of both, I would not assume that Papua New Guinea remains an egalitarian society, or that class already divides it. While anthropologists can make substantial contributions towards understanding the new social forms in Papua New Guinea, I did not aim in this essay to describe society per se. I described processes in postcolonial sociality as its members become increasingly attuned to the condition of inequality through acts and words.

Narakobi’s takes it as a duty to act with the gift of sem. He is obliged to respond to the challenge set to him by his village elders that day on the Sepik. The fear of imminent crisis; of actually erring against the moral order to bring about social disaster; of failing to do what he needs to do in order to prevent emerging class relations to dictate the entirety of social life, haunts him. The burden of the gift of shame comes from knowing that some day he will remember how things used to be. He knows that he will recognize that he once had the opportunity to shape that present in which he will live as an elderly man, into the life ways it will have become.

Conclusions

Is Bernard Narakobi’s *The Melanesian Way* comparable to Wagner’s *The Invention of Culture*, beyond the fact that they are authored at the same time? An often-quoted section from Wagner’s book suggests he executes a critical exercise akin to Narakobi’s. Writing of the anthropologist’s gift to western society, Wagner says:

> The future of Western society lies in its ability to create social forms that will make explicit distinctions between classes and segments of society, so that these distinctions do not come of themselves as implicit racism, discrimination, corruption, crises, riots, necessary ‘cheating’ and ‘finagling’ and so on. The future of anthropology lies in its ability to exorcise difference and make it conscious and explicit, both with regard to its subject matter and to itself (1975: 158).

Would the practice of such anthropology decolonize relations in the same way that Narakobi’s Melanesian Way helped to create postcolonial society? Or put more broadly, if anthropologists work in the critical style of *The Melanesian Way* would their aim be true to the discipline?
To questions of how to practise anthropology in the public world, Wagner replies with a call for an anthropology that consistently invents itself, for a discipline in constant revolution, for the choice to doubt commitments to ideology. Perhaps he is right to say that most critics actually choose where to place their faith all the while they act to convince themselves that there is no other choice (1975: 159). If anything he calls this a very human thing to do. If this is so, then it is the anthropologist’s criticism that consistently exposes the very fact of that choice, and thereby escapes conventions of belief that restrict critical thought. If realized, that radical project of anthropological criticism then might bring the anthropologist closer to the recognition that sometimes an opportunity exists, even now, to influence relations in the future without enchaining them to the present.

NOTES
1. I acknowledge my debt to Marilyn Strathern for pointing out the concept to me, and encouraging the assessment of Narakobi’s essays as an effort at cultural criticism in the Papua New Guinean public domains.
2. This paper addresses published work by Bernard Narakobi. I do not include a discussion of his own thoughts on his work and career as part of his philosophy of the Melanesian Way. For example, Narakobi acknowledges that Catholicism remains significant to his thought. A fuller treatment of Narakobi’s philosophy should assess that.
3. Discussions of the Melanesian Way revived in Papua New Guinea during the months that I prepared and revised this article. Narakobi gave new voice to the Melanesian Way at the time of anti-privatization protests in Port Moresby. Reports in the Post Courier during those months show that students at UPNG and journalists numbered amongst those who argued against privatization because it was not the Melanesian Way (Post Courier 2001 July 4–6).
4. In my fieldwork on the Lelet Plateau of New Ireland, I learned that in social relations among the Mandak it is said that having *sem* is what distinguishes humans from animals, as if one’s expression of it can attune others to their own sense of possessing it.
5. Narakobi was criticized for advocating a racialized argument because the “Melanesian Way” can be translated into English as the ‘black way.’ The charge of racism came from a white employee in Port Moresby who complained of the exploitation of whites under laws that adhere to the Melanesian Way (1980).
6. Many of Narakobi’s critics reported in the publication The Melanesian Way (1980) challenged him on the ideological incoherence of the Melanesian Way. Such a criticism would be fair if he was held accountable only as an academic or as a politician, but if Narakobi is a ‘public man’ then another project must be considered. His essays must be read as a series of interventions in the concern of the day.
7. He holds this view, even as the critics attack the coherence of his arguments. He is charged with holding a pan-Melanesian conceit at the risk of subordinating a Papua New
Guinean identity. He is accused of advocating an ideology for which he actually feels ambivalence.

8. One reader accused Narakobi of madness in his defense of the Melanesian Way because Papua New Guinea risks being destroyed by drugs, booze and crime while the senior statesmen argued for the preservation of an indigenous ethos.


**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


