

SPECIAL ISSUE: GERMAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY FROM A COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

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This special issue sets out to examine aspects of German politics, philosophy, and society through the multifaceted lens of cosmopolitanism. A complex and contested concept, cosmopolitanism has particularly important implications for the study of contemporary nation-states, as conventional understandings of bounded territory and sovereignty are reassessed in the context of globalization, migration and transnationalism. Accordingly, this introduction aims to outline several key strands of cosmopolitan thought with reference both to contemporary Germany and the wider global conjuncture, in order to provide a conceptual framework for the articles that follow. It begins by briefly placing cosmopolitanism in the context of the evolving concepts of German *Heimat* (homeland) and nation, because contemporary cosmopolitanism can only be fully understood in relation to nationalism. It then looks at the relevance of methodological, political and ethical cosmopolitanism for the study of nation-states today, before introducing the five articles in the special issue.

In his book entitled *Nation as a Local Metaphor*, Alon Confino traced the process of “imagining” the German nation.¹ Based on an exegesis of printed texts and images produced in Germany between 1871 and 1914, he charted how the definition of the term *Heimat* was gradually widened to mean not only the locality, but also the nation. From being a mediating concept between local life and the abstract nation, Confino demonstrated that the *Heimat* came to symbolize Germany as a whole, until the conception of *deutsche Heimat* became corrupted by Nazi ideology. Celia Applegate, however, points out that the concept was “pulled out of the rubble of the Nazi *Reich* as a victim, not a perpetrator” and came to embody once



more the local patriotism which had been discouraged by Nazism.² Both authors are of the view that the *Heimat*—as a symbolic haven of peace and thus the antithesis of war—was an apolitical focus of solidarity.³ As such, it became a vehicle for “speaking the unspeakable” horror of the Third Reich in order to transcend it.⁴ Nevertheless, as Peter Blickle notes: “Any concrete interaction with the idea of *Heimat* in the political realm has, historically speaking, served sooner or later to further sharp exclusions of certain groups—usually ethnic minorities.”⁵ Indeed, it is in the very nature of nation-building to create a distinction between the insider and outsider, between those who belong and the alien “Other.” Linked to this, there is a historical and ethical tendency to contrast national belonging with cosmopolitanism. Particularly stark illustrations of this are the antisemitic associations of cosmopolitanism with rootlessness and disloyalty, which were prevalent both in nineteenth century Germany and in the postwar Soviet Union under Stalin.⁶ It remains to be seen, however, whether nationalism and cosmopolitanism are necessarily mutually exclusive concepts.

Reflecting on the difficulties of writing Jewish history, Shulamit Volkov writes: “A stress on minorities may provide a defense against the pitfalls of nationalism, indeed, but not against the provincialism and the limited comparative force of national history.”⁷ These words have particular resonance in the context of “methodological nationalism,” considered below. In a similar vein, Till van Rahden points out that the “paradigm of national homogeneity” has shaped the writing of German-Jewish history in terms of integration and assimilation, minority and subculture, all terms which are only meaningful relative to the existence of a dominant national majority.⁸ This view is also relevant to defining the contours of “national” literature and “German” history. More recently, this category has widened to include those who were hitherto labeled minority voices as full protagonists in shaping that history. Similarly, the (re)turn towards cosmopolitanism as a way of thinking about “outside” influences on German society and culture seeks to break free from this national paradigm by characterizing Germanness as a negotiated, evolving space. As such, the contested concept of cosmopolitanism has evolved *within* the German context as elsewhere, sometimes laden with negative connotations of antinationalist or “un-German” leanings, but increasingly reinterpreted as a contributory factor to nation-building.

A counternarrative of migration, cosmopolitanism, and difference always emerges to complement or disrupt the creation of any unitary narrative of nationhood and belonging. This is particularly clear in the case of Germany. In early 2005, an ambitious exhibition entitled *Zuwanderungs-*

land Deutschland set out to trace the history of immigration to Germany since 1500. Mounted at Berlin's German History Museum (Deutsches Historisches Museum), it showed how victims of religious persecution, journeymen, entrepreneurs, seasonal workers, and refugees from all over Europe have played an important part in German life for over five hundred years. The title of the exhibition might strike anyone familiar with Germany's immigration debate as rather controversial. Indeed, successive West German governments long maintained that theirs was *not* a country of immigration (*Einwanderung*).⁹ This attitude was most famously embodied in the term *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker), which clearly categorized those foreigners "invited" to work in postwar West Germany for a limited time, with no prospect of becoming citizens. Today, the second or third generation descendants of these migrants, the largest group being of Turkish extraction, continue to feature strongly in debates surrounding citizenship, integration, and national belonging, all of which say a great deal about Germany's evolving understanding of how to define the nation, or the *Heimat* writ large.

Prior to unification, West Germany's immigration debate long reflected its self-understanding as one part of a divided German nation, which could ill afford to redefine itself. Having granted the right to West German citizenship to all *Aussiedler*—the German diaspora living behind the Iron Curtain—any modification of these membership criteria would have had wide-ranging implications in the Cold War context. In West Germany, the official commitment to national unity was thus maintained at the expense of reworking the discourse of national identity to include migrant workers. This exceptional situation fell away at the same time as the Iron Curtain: "The peculiarity of an incomplete, vicarious nation-state for all Germans in the communist diaspora is no more."¹⁰ However, the pressing issue of ethnic German *Aussiedler* once again pushed non-German immigration to the bottom of the agenda for most of the 1990s. Following the 1998 German federal election, Gerhard Schröder's coalition government promised a debate that historical circumstance had hindered thus far. Some saw this as a key opportunity for a reassessment of German national identity and belonging to reflect its *de facto* multicultural make-up.¹¹ The result, namely the nationality law of 2000, eventually rejected the principle of life-long dual nationality and the prospect of divided loyalties it entailed. This was a direct result of a vocal CDU/CSU party and public campaign.¹²

Meanwhile, on Germany's cultural and literary scene, the slow emergence and recognition of a so-called guest worker literature (*Gastarbeiterliteratur*) was to become too restrictive for many of the authors associated

with it. They sought to “emancipate themselves from confined allegiances to and affiliations with a single social group, ethnicity, culture or nationality and assert their claims in the larger political reality and cultural citizenry of Germany.”¹³ As previously indicated, this called for a careful reassessment of what was meant by “national literature.”¹⁴ The term cosmopolitan has been increasingly adopted in this context to denote the “extension of the concept of Germanness”¹⁵ as opposed to a sphere of cultural production somehow separate and different to that of Germany “proper.” Tom Cheesman uses the phrase “literature of settlement” to reflect the fact that the authors in question were mostly permanent residents in Germany who were directly contributing to the development of its national cultural life, rather than representatives of an ethnic minority, defined in opposition to the national majority.¹⁶ At the very least, this perspective serves to destabilize essentialized notions of what it is to be German—or Turkish for that matter.¹⁷ As we shall go on to see, it suggests a kind of cosmopolitanism that is not necessarily inimical or contrary to nation-building, but rather one that can form part of today’s evolving nation-states. This does not necessarily entail the redefinition of the homogenizing ideal of nation as *Heimat*, however. There are observers who caution that some Germans’ positive engagement with cosmopolitanism is selective; it extends to the likes of high culture and travel abroad, but not to the perceived cultural “Others” to be found on their doorstep (but see Katja Sarmiento-Mirwaldt in this issue).¹⁸ Others point out that Germany’s “multicultural” literary scene tends to be marketed more vigorously abroad than at home.¹⁹ Be that as it may, the concept of cosmopolitanism is one way of addressing the impact of these issues, precisely by trying to transcend such neat dichotomies as “local” and “foreigner.” Rather than focus on *Heimat* and abroad, domestic and international, majority and minority, “the concept of cosmopolitanism is more individualistic and flexible, less inclined to reify cultures as fixed repertoires of behavior and catalogues of heritage.”²⁰

Situating Cosmopolitanism

David Held (2010), Ulrich Beck (2010 [2006]), Yasemin Soysal (2010) and Nina Glick-Schiller (2010)—all leading scholars of cosmopolitanism—have recently reviewed the field and set out agendas for future research.²¹ They agree that classic sovereignty, if it ever existed, is being redefined, and that new legal frameworks are emerging at a supranational level.²² In Beck and

Natan Sznaider's view, it is time to move on "from a nation-state definition of society and politics to a cosmopolitan outlook ... and raise some of the key conceptual, methodological, empirical and normative issues that the cosmopolitanization of reality poses for the social sciences."²³ Such a "critique of methodological nationalism" is a particularly relevant issue to the study of German politics and society, and therefore one which needs to be taken seriously and addressed explicitly.²⁴ This special issue takes a step in that direction. By considering how cosmopolitan theory and methodology can be applied to analyzing Germany, it sets out to make a theoretically grounded and methodologically sensitive contribution to the debate surrounding cosmopolitanism.

Germany exemplifies the "transnationality that is arising inside nation-states" through the kind of cosmopolitan engagement with German literature and culture discussed above, but also finds itself "in the nexus of the national and transnational."²⁵ With its long-standing commitment to European integration, its globalized economy, its experience of reintegrating a German diaspora, and its mixed record in coping with migration and asylum-seekers, Germany is thus a particularly interesting case for study from a cosmopolitan perspective. The special issue offers fresh insights into Germany's domestic and foreign politics by disrupting the binary distinction between "home" and "abroad" and privileging the analysis of cross-border flows, rather than stopping at state frontiers. Its contributors cover a range of key issues in contemporary German politics, including collective memory, security and cross-cultural trust, as well as theoretical considerations. At the same time, the articles are guided by a shared set of questions: How do we trace cosmopolitanism in the domestic sphere, if that very category is under fire? Can we discern traces of ethical and normative cosmopolitanism in German politics? Can we apply a supranational framework to the national context, or is this approach inherently contradictory? Is a cosmopolitan methodology even thinkable, when applied to a single state?

This introduction offers a way in to the diversity of definitions and debates surrounding cosmopolitanism and their relevance to the study of Germany. Cosmopolitan thinking is not merely a utopian vision for doing away with national allegiances and the existing nation-state system. Instead, it provides the basis for a nuanced critique of state-centric reasoning and policy-making spanning a whole range of ethical, legal and political issues. At the same time, cosmopolitanism refers to the global trend that Beck and Sznaider, cited above, called "the cosmopolitanization of reality." This encompasses a range of pressures confronting contemporary

nation-states, including globalization, regional integration, transnationalism, migration, and diaspora. A cosmopolitan approach allows for integrated analysis of international dynamics, not only in the field of migration and population flows, but also concerning security questions, international law and intervention, transatlantic relations, economic networks, and trading regimes—among other issues. Nevertheless, we should be aware of the theoretical and methodological limitations of cosmopolitanism (see Roland Axtmann, and Stephen Welch and Ruth Wittlinger in this issue).

The word cosmopolitan derives from the Greek term *cosmos*, or universe, and *polis*, or city. In the small-scale democracies or city-states of Ancient Greece, early cosmopolitans sought to undermine the boundaries of the *polis*. The concept is also strongly associated with Immanuel Kant, who argued for an individual's right to hospitality when travelling abroad.²⁶ In the social sciences, cosmopolitanism experienced a revival at the turn of the twenty-first century, and this special issue is principally concerned with its relevance to analyzing contemporary German politics and society.²⁷ Like nationalism, the concept of cosmopolitanism covers a wide variety of phenomena today, which can be broadly divided into its cultural, political, and ethical dimensions. Of these, the cultural cosmopolitan is perhaps the most readily recognizable, as embodied in the men and women of means, who travel the globe for work and play. One should not be too quick to associate this kind of cosmopolitan only with professional or educated classes, however, since migrant workers taking on menial jobs also build up transnational networks through diaspora communities, remittances and a concomitant hybrid culture.²⁸ Politically, cosmopolitan democracy demands supranational institutions capable of tackling and managing global issues, with or without the coexistence of state governance.²⁹ Finally, ethical cosmopolitanism aspires to achieve a worldwide standard of human rights based on common values, and to tackle social disparities on a global scale.³⁰ Examples of cosmopolitanism's normative impact include embracing the politics of difference within nation-states, or looking beyond state-based governance to envision global systems of rights and justice. Such views need not be directed towards a global "imagined community" to replace the nation, however, even though the cosmopolitan outlook certainly transcends nation-state boundaries.³¹ Neither must these different strands of cosmopolitanism overlap, or even pursue the same goals. Ethical cosmopolitans, for instance, tend to emphasize what people have in common, whereas cultural cosmopolitans highlight their diversity. In order to grasp cosmopolitanism's relevance for

German politics and society, it is important to understand how this perspective relates to national identities and state politics.

In his book *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom*, David Harvey surveys a number of so-called “adjectival cosmopolitanisms,” which all attempt to reconcile “respect for local differences with compelling universal principles.”³² These include the “rooted cosmopolitanism” and “cosmopolitan patriotism” put forward by Anthony Appiah, which echo Ulf Hannerz’s view that “home is not necessarily a place where cosmopolitanism is in exile.”³³ Though keen to avoid essentializing the concept of culture, Appiah argues that local loyalties are a necessary springboard for pursuing universal goals, if these are to be historically informed and respectful of diversity. In other words, multiculturalism is an important basis for Appiah’s approach. David Harvey, on the other hand, sees in this and other cosmopolitan projects the need to convert those who do not conform, to denounce violence and fundamentalism in the name of recognition and tolerance, and thereby run the risk of sliding into the very forms of chauvinism and exclusionary nationalism they seek to condemn.³⁴

Maintaining a sense of national solidarity in order to support state legitimacy is an ongoing process that continues to underpin a world order organized around nation-states. The continuous need for this sort of nation-building, however, suggests that notions of belonging are never cemented and secure. For instance, soldier and civilian morale must be boosted with assurances that their country’s cause is right and good, and even the most patriotic citizen’s loyalty can be eroded if the state continually disappoints or fails to deliver. To take another example, government appeals for individual sacrifices during an economic downturn are routinely justified on grounds of national solidarity, but this is not always a winning argument. In the wake of the global, so-called credit crunch of 2009-2010, strikes and demonstrations greeted news of large government cuts in Greece and Spain, which were badly hit by economic mismanagement and unemployment respectively. The scaled-down political cosmopolitanism embodied in the European currency zone, one of the world’s most advanced experiments in supranational solidarity, was also put under severe strain by the ongoing financial crisis. This directly pitted the need for member states to stand together in defending the single currency against public opinion hostile to transnational bailouts. In the face of domestic opposition, Germany’s government eventually opted to contribute to supporting Greece, Ireland, and Portugal’s flailing economies. Although the issue has often been presented in the German media as a fundamentally irreconcilable conflict, the strength and stability of the

EURO currency was as much in the national interest of each Eurozone member as that of the group as a whole.³⁵ Nevertheless, a zero-sum analysis organized around the opposition of nation-state sovereignty and supra-national solidarity remained dominant, illustrating one way in which nationalism and cosmopolitanism collide in practice. How else do the cosmopolitan and the national combine?

Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism

Like cosmopolitanism, the nation is an eminently contested concept.³⁶ Some scholars define the nation as a “psychological bond”³⁷ uniting members of a community. Others consider it purely a creature of ideology, or rather a form of ethnicity or identity. In specific cases, markers such as language, religion and descent are also used to set the boundaries of national belonging, but theorists mostly agree that it is pointless to try to identify an objective “checklist” of nationhood criteria. Still others confuse the nation and the state, because the two concepts are so tightly bound together that they are commonly used interchangeably. The term “nation-state” sums up how closely the nation is identified with the state as a territorial entity and a reservoir of power. Indeed, the adjective “national” is often used to describe matters pertaining to the state, as in the phrase “the national interest.” This is because the nation has become the key means for states to legitimate their power over people and place, and exercise both domestically and internationally recognized authority. Nevertheless, it is crucial to distinguish between these two concepts. The nation refers to the cognitive, legitimating basis of authority, whereas the state embodies the territorial and institutional dimensions of authority. As the primary focus of nationalist ideology, the nation is a way of justifying where borders are drawn and a means of contesting those borders. It serves both to underpin the legitimacy of modern states and the conflicting claims of sub-state nationalists. Therefore, a nation need not have a state, but states need some kind of national construct to legitimate their control. The means of achieving this is through nation-building, defined here as state-led nationalism. From migration to globalization, however, current trends are affecting the evolution of the nation-state in Germany as elsewhere.

As a geographer, David Harvey is concerned with the concepts of space, place and territory, and how they ground our understanding of everything from local knowledge, through living in our homeland—or *Heimat*—to a more inchoate sense of national belonging. He distinguishes

between absolute space, exemplified by border posts and the idea of sovereign states as bounded power containers, and spaces which are partly defined through their relationship to periods in time, emotions, symbols, and other associations.³⁸ Harvey himself is interested in what links territory as a basis of political organization with the emotional power invested in people's sense of place. He also thinks about how people's loyalties are most effectively mobilized across these dimensions: "While regions, states, or nations may appear at one level as mere imagined abstractions, the sense of a territorial bond and of an affective loyalty to it has enormous political significance."³⁹ This suggests that territorial bonds continue to shape both individual allegiances and state practices, without necessarily excluding the cosmopolitan dimension.

There are scholars, like Martha Nussbaum, who urge individuals to "construct relational loyalties with everyone living on planet earth" by imagining a set of concentric circles around the self, family, community, nation and finally all of humanity.⁴⁰ This approach, however, seems to employ the same notions of bounded communities, territories and regions that an analysis of nation-states as flexible, porous, and open to cosmopolitanism seeks to transcend.⁴¹ Thinking about nation-states in territorial terms may make them easier to grasp, but it can also distract us from the many other markings of belonging—including myths of common descent, hostile constructions of the "Other," heroic sacrifice and sporting symbolism— all of which serve to bind people to their nation. Of course, nation-building is also premised on enforcing borders, and the sort of policing and passport checking that are relatively recent innovations.

A central strand of cosmopolitanism in practice lies precisely in confronting nation-states with the oft-divided loyalties of diaspora communities, with how to integrate migrants and other transnational flows, and with how to respond to regionalization and globalization. This questions the assumption that state sovereignty simply derives from controlling territory, when information, trade, and population flows pierce state borders at every moment of the day or night. These flows do not magically make borders disappear, because borders continue to have life-changing meaning for the identity and status of asylum seekers, so-called illegal immigrants and irredentist movements among others. Yet, the increasing porosity of borders suggests the need for a reappraisal of territorial boundaries and how these connect to wider, multidimensional understandings of belonging related to cosmopolitanism. An analysis in terms of concentric circles or other bounded metaphors does not do justice to these complex networks of crisscrossing population flows and transnational allegiances.⁴²

By contrast, a cosmopolitan approach to studying the nation-state incorporates some of these dynamics.

As discussed above, some critical studies of cosmopolitanism have moved away from its universalist tradition as a commitment to a global community of human beings, in order to locate it in a more “rooted,” particularist philosophical tradition.⁴³ Gerard Delanty, for one, “reject[s] a purely dichotomous view” of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, pointing out that the “national has never been entirely national, but has always been embroiled with immanent cosmopolitan orientations.”⁴⁴ Mary Kaldor, in turn, whilst condemning the backwardness and violent exclusivity of much “new nationalism” and lauding a cosmopolitan alternative, still deems it possible that “nationalisms could be harnessed to a cosmopolitan politics that reflected the complexity of contemporary conditions.”⁴⁵ In a discussion of nationalism and cosmopolitanism published in 2007, Craig Calhoun sees “tensions between two different ways of imagining the world.”⁴⁶ A later intervention, however, suggests that we “need not simply oppose cosmopolitanism and belonging ... They can be complements to each other.”⁴⁷ Similarly, the interplay between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is not understood here as an inherently conflictual, zero-sum game—it is not a question of two ideologies confronting one another, or even “national identity versus cosmopolitan identity.”⁴⁸ Instead, there seems to be potential for complementarity between the two.

Gerard Delanty’s wide definition of cosmopolitanism as a transformative process, whereby the dynamics of cultural and societal interaction create the conditions for “new ways of thinking and acting,” provides a useful starting point for exploring the evolving relationship between the cosmopolitan and the national.⁴⁹ This approach does not see cosmopolitanism as an “alternative to globalisation or the nation-state,” but rather as an orientation “embedded ... in current societal developments.”⁵⁰ Neither does it regard identities, ideologies or communities as either mutually exclusive or essential categories. People will flit or gravitate between any number of these depending on time and circumstance, and no single label can sum up any individual. This interpretation of identities and cosmopolitanism is also open to—and indeed premised on—transnationalism, since it is composed of cross-cultural encounters. Yet, at the same time, the transnational “signifies the resilience of nations and the state” because the concept of “trans-national” also presupposes the existence of national borders to be crossed.⁵¹ This suggests that cosmopolitanism is not necessarily on course to clash with the nation-state. Accordingly, Germany can indeed be placed “in the nexus of the national and transnational,” while also tran-

scending the national/transnational dichotomy by containing transnationality within itself.⁵² Despite the fact that Chancellor Angela Merkel considers multiculturalism to have “utterly failed” in Germany, it is undeniably home to manifold hybrid identities.⁵³ A cosmopolitan perspective, such as those developed by Sarmiento-Mirwaldt or James Koranyi in this issue, offers insights into how those identities are constructed within and across the borders of the German nation-state.

Methodological Cosmopolitanism

By considering how cosmopolitan theory and methodology can be applied to the social sciences—which have long been structured around nation-states—Beck and Sznaider propose a “critique of methodological nationalism.”⁵⁴ In so doing, they question the frequent equation of states with societies in both qualitative and quantitative academic analyses, as well as the assumption that nation-states are the “natural and necessary form of society.”⁵⁵ An alternative approach might, for instance, focus on transnational flows rather than bounded communities, or seek to deconstruct “the unexamined territorial frame of the nation-state.”⁵⁶ This signals a shift away from nation-states as rather monolithic units of analysis and comparison, towards an emphasis on relational, heterogeneous identities and the transnational dynamics that shape our ever-evolving understanding of the nation-state. In other words, “methodological nationalism needs to be transcended because, rather than allowing us to capture the actual complications of the history of the nation-state in modernity, it turns the nation-state into the natural organizing principle of modernity.”⁵⁷ According to this view, an emphasis on transformation is deemed to hold greater analytical power than the tendency towards reifying, or essentializing national identities and interests. Following Delanty, examples of cosmopolitanism as a dynamic process of transformation range from the limited horizon of mutual recognition and a consumption-led appropriation of other cultures, through liberal multiculturalism, to new forms of national unity as a result of contact with the “Other.”⁵⁸ Far from requiring the transcendence of the nation-state, these forms of cosmopolitanism can take place through the nation-state.

The empirical encounter of nationalism and cosmopolitanism can best be grasped, then, by an analytical perspective that looks beyond the boundaries of methodological nationalism. For instance, a cosmopolitan perspective could be helpful in understanding the impact of international

communism and capitalism on East and West Germany, as well as the Berlin Republic. From this point of view, the nation-state remains the nodal point of analysis where diverse aspects of transnationalism intersect. Globalization, migration, and regional integration are just some of the transnational forces affecting Germany, and self-consciously cosmopolitan approaches seek to capture these flows both conceptually and methodologically. As we have seen, cosmopolitan thinking encompasses much more than a utopian vision for doing away with national allegiances or the existing nation-state system. It has both normative and methodological implications for the way in which we study politics and society in general and Germany in particular. By privileging the analysis of cross-border flows rather than stopping at state frontiers, a cosmopolitan approach disrupts the binary distinction between “home” and “abroad.” At the conceptual level, a cosmopolitan orientation leaves behind so-called methodological nationalism by also looking beyond borders for the sources and routes of transformation. At the empirical level, it examines “a process of globe-spanning fundamental social change that is making new theoretical insights possible.”⁵⁹ Germany can nonetheless remain a key subject for investigation because cosmopolitan transformations can occur through the nation-state empirically, while also offering new conceptual perspectives on those nation-states. Germany may be reinterpreted as more or less multicultural, porous, tolerant, or open as a result. Cosmopolitanism therefore combines “analytical-empirical” with “normative-political” concerns, and a final word on ethical cosmopolitanism is warranted here.⁶⁰

Ethical Cosmopolitanism

In addition to its role as a conceptual framework and a tool of empirical study, cosmopolitanism has an important normative dimension that, as we have seen, can be portrayed as a desirable alternative to nationalism. Calhoun points out that as a “normative program,” cosmopolitanism “offers an ethics for globalisation,”⁶¹ and charts its rise as an elite project of “world citizenship” in which particularism, unless it is of Appiah’s liberal, tolerant stripe, is frowned upon. Calhoun opines:

[C]osmopolitanism may be a cultural orientation, but it is never the absence of culture. It is produced and reinforced by belonging to transnational networks and to a community of fellow-cosmopolitans. There are different such communities—academic and corporate and NGO, religious and secular.⁶²

This raises the question as to whether and if so, how, allegiance to a cosmopolitan community can coexist with belonging to a national community. For example, much of the debate and soul-searching surrounding Germany's "normalization" during the 1990s turned on exactly this issue. In normative terms, a sense of solidarity towards other human beings can conceivably go hand in hand with a sense of national belonging. To put it another way, it should be possible to celebrate at once the unity and diversity of peoples, a formula which Germany has often brought to bear in the context of the European Union and other regional organizations. As Calhoun reminds us:

Nationalism was also (at least often) an attempt to reconcile liberty and ethical universalism with felt community. This doesn't mean that we should not seek more cosmopolitan values, cultural knowledge, and styles of interpersonal relations in modern national democracies.⁶³

When Calhoun goes on to pose the seminal question: "Does cosmopolitanism actually underpin effective political solidarity, or only offer an attractive counterbalance to nationalism?" he asks whether it can potentially be reconciled with a form of nationalism that is inclusive, aware of porous borders and shifting populations, and espouses an ever-evolving self-understanding.⁶⁴ Setting the parameters of this ideal-type nationalism has exercised many scholars.⁶⁵ Partha Chatterjee, however, doubts whether it is possible to "experience the simultaneity of the imagined collective life of the nation without imposing rigid and arbitrary criteria of membership."⁶⁶ This necessarily endangers the ethical cosmopolitan ideal by distinguishing a relatively privileged "in-group" of citizens from an "out-group" of non-members. Notwithstanding this sobering warning, a pragmatic combination of cosmopolitanism and nationalism would seem more attainable than jettisoning nationalism altogether in favor of an all-but-unrealizable global community. Contemplating such a community would simply mean constructing a form of nationalism writ large, insofar as it would replicate its need for solidarity, loyalty, and legitimation on an impractical and unmanageably broad scale. Rather, as Calhoun puts it: "We need to be global in part through how we are national."⁶⁷

On the one hand, cosmopolitanism shines the spotlight on diversity within nation-state boundaries as they are currently recognized. On the other, in so far as it scrutinizes cartographic, political, and legal boundaries, it reveals their porosity and limited applicability to how people's lives actually map out "on the ground." Nevertheless, to use this spatial metaphor suggests some sort of tiered analysis of territorial levels; namely the local, national, regional and perhaps global. Similar to Martha

Nussbaum's approach to cosmopolitanism, this soon encounters its self-imposed limits, and therefore limitations, which critical geographers have done much to illuminate.⁶⁸ By contrast, the wider, more dynamic definition of cosmopolitanism put forward here attempts to reflect its multifaceted nature by privileging cross-border flows in the analysis of German politics and society.⁶⁹ Using cosmopolitanism to describe this approach may be criticized as simply serving old wine in new bottles, as Welch and Wittlinger suggest in this issue. Nonetheless, it can serve as a useful shorthand for focusing attention and renewing emphasis on the transnational dynamics to which Germany must respond in the current global climate. A cosmopolitan perspective thus goes some way towards capturing the complexity of contemporary nation-states, not least in the Berlin Republic. The conception of cosmopolitanism put forward here also encourages a reassessment of the bordered definition and delimitation of nation-states or "methodological nationalism." If we look beyond Nussbaum's focus on a single universe of human beings, we encounter a whole range of possibilities: "adjectival" cosmopolitanisms, "situated" cosmopolitanisms, and cosmopolitanisms that commingle a global perspective with a national or local level. Writing in 1998, Bruce Robbins already observed that "[f]or better or worse, there is a growing consensus that cosmopolitanism sometimes works together with nationalism rather than in opposition to it."⁷⁰ Despite the changes to sovereignty and control over populations wrought by globalization, states still use appeals to national solidarity in order to mobilize loyalty and foster legitimacy. This is reason enough to explore the implications of conceptual and methodological cosmopolitanism for German politics and society.

Structure and Contents

The articles in this special issue begin with an analysis of cosmopolitanism as theorized by Kant, Hannah Arendt, and Beck, which offers a comparative perspective on the evolution and reinterpretation of the concept through key thinkers. In his article, Roland Axtmann highlights "the idea of plurality, the thesis that cultural difference, cultural pluralization and heterogeneity are fundamental aspects of cosmopolitanism" as a shared, connecting theme. However, Axtmann also identifies a range of shortcomings in Beck's work, including a neglect of the relationship between neoliberal capitalism and cosmopolitanism, as well as a failure to provide an empirical demonstration of the alternative to "methodological nation-

alism.” This critique of Beck is echoed in part by Stephen Welch and Ruth Wittlinger in their article on the evolution of Holocaust memory in Germany. They too find Beck’s “methodological cosmopolitanism” wanting because, in their view, an event like the cosmopolitanization of Holocaust memory “cannot be fully understood without invoking the analytical grid of the nation state.” Instead, they trace developments in German national identity through different phases of the postwar era alongside the evolution of Holocaust memory as a “global phenomenon,” concluding that the “partial de-Germanization of Holocaust memory” has actually served Germany’s interests.

The special issue then goes on to consider the impact of cosmopolitan thinking on different aspects of German society and governance, bringing together an article exploring German public attitudes by Katja Sarmiento-Mirwaldt and a study of Germany’s external security policy by Mary N. Hampton, which highlights its continuing cosmopolitan orientation in contrast to that of the United States. Sarmiento-Mirwaldt’s is the only article in this issue to consider the implications of cosmopolitanism for quantitative social science analysis. This leads her to take certain methodological steps in her examination of German public contact with and trust towards other nations, which include segregating the dataset into political districts and paying particular attention to border regions. While acknowledging that her approach is guilty of methodological nationalism, to the extent that it uses states as units of analysis, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt also builds on Beck and Sznaider’s work to offer valuable insights into the practical application of cosmopolitanism to empirical social science. In the next article, Mary N. Hampton helps to demonstrate the wide applicability of cosmopolitan thinking by turning the spotlight on a transnational dimension of German “high” politics, namely security. Her analysis places Germany within a tradition of postwar European thinking, which contrasts markedly with the nation-centered and religiously imbued discourse of “good” and “evil” prevalent in the United States. Instead, she traces the development of an antinationalist and secularist form of Kantian cosmopolitanism, which is key to understanding different perceptions of security threats on both sides of the Atlantic. As Hampton points out, diverging U.S. and German attitudes towards Libyan air strikes and how to interpret Osama bin Laden’s death are just some recent indicators of this two-track trend.

The final contribution to the special issue draws on both the important transnational dimension in German Studies and Germans’ lived experience, thereby returning to themes raised in the previous two articles.

James Koranyi's piece is concerned with how the histories of German minorities in the Banat region straddling the current borders of Romania and Serbia (and Hungary) have been taken up and variously turned into a cosmopolitan or other reading of the countries' respective pasts. In "examin[ing] the concept of cosmopolitanism in a space that has been understood as cosmopolitan due to its multiethnic history and has recently undergone attempts to re-experience this allegedly lost cosmopolitanism," Koranyi's analysis draws together several strands of cosmopolitan thinking addressed in this introduction and elsewhere in the issue. On the one hand, Romania's embrace of cosmopolitanism as part of its Western orientation towards the European Union and NATO not only speaks to Hampton's analysis in the preceding article, but also offers an empirical application of Beck and Sznaider's notion of cosmopolitanization. On the other hand, Koranyi transcends the boundaries of "methodological nationalism" by examining the transnational impact of German migration on "foreign" lands and its subsequent (re)interpretation by both migrants' descendants and, importantly, the nation-states of Romania and Serbia. In the final analysis, then, nationalism and cosmopolitanism meet again. Like Welch and Wittlinger, Koranyi concludes that cosmopolitan memory and national interests are often intertwined, and that cosmopolitanism's normative power can be politicized for nation-building ends. Awareness of both cosmopolitan trends and their potential national dividends thus seems necessary for understanding German politics and society within today's global conjuncture and nation-state system.

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Notes

1. Alon Confino, *Nation as a Local Metaphor*, (Chapel Hill & London, 1997); See also Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London, 1991).
2. Celia Applegate, *Heimat; A Nation of Provincials* (Berkeley, 1990), 228.

3. “The Heimat idea was not connected to one political party ... it was open to appropriations by various political movements. Its political message was implicit and ambiguous.” Confino (see note 1), 187.
4. Applegate (see note 2), 228.
5. Peter Blickle, *Heimat. A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland* (Rochester, 2004), x.
6. Shulamit Volkov, “Jewish history: the nationalism of transnationalism,” in *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, eds., G Budde, S. Conrad, and O. Janz (Göttingen, 2006).
7. Tom Cheesman, *Novels of Turkish German Settlement: Cosmopolite Fictions* (Rochester, 2007), 40; Shulamit (see note 6), 200.
8. Till van Rahden, *Jews and other Germans* (Madison, 2006), 6.
9. Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State* (Oxford, 1999), 62; Claire Sutherland, “Digesting Diasporas: Vietnamese Migrants and German Multiculturalism” in *Rethinking Diasporas: Hidden Narratives and Imagined Borders*, eds., A. Ní Éigeartaigh, K. Howard, and D. Getty (Cambridge, 2007).
10. Joppke (see note 9), 95.
11. Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism* (London, 2002), 6.
12. Alice Holmes Cooper, “Party-Sponsored Protest and the Movement Society: The CDU/CSU Mobilises Against Citizenship Law Reform,” *German Politics* 11, no. 2 (2002): 88-104.
13. Bala Venkat Mani, *Cosmopolitical Claims: Turkish-German literatures from Nadolny to Pamuk* (Iowa City, 2007), 4.
14. Seeba, cited in Mani (see note 13), 15.
15. Şenocak, cited in Cheesman (see note 7), 12.
16. Cheesman (see note 7); Mani (see note 13), 20.
17. Ruth Mandel, *Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany* (Durham, 2008), 6, 8.
18. *Ibid.*, 50.
19. Cheesman (see note 7), 35.
20. *Ibid.*, 44.
21. David Held, “Cosmopolitanism after 9/11,” *International Politics* 47, no.1 (2010):52-61; Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, “Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 61, no. 1 (2010[2006]): 381–403; Yasemin Soysal, “Unpacking cosmopolitanism: an insider–outsider’s reading,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 61, no. 1 (2010): 405–411; Nina Glick-Schiller, “Old baggage and missing luggage: a commentary on Beck and Sznaider’s ‘Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda,’” *The British Journal of Sociology* 61, no. 1 (2010): 413–420.
22. David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge, 1995), 54.
23. Beck and Sznaider (see note 21), 382.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Beck and Sznaider (see note 21), 389; Soysal (see note 21), 411.
26. For an overview of the history of the cosmopolitan concept, see Dora Kostakopoulou, *The Future Governance of Citizenship* (Cambridge, 2008); David Harvey, *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom* (New York, 2009); and Gerard Delanty, *The Cosmopolitan Imagination* (Cambridge, 2009). For a discussion of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, see Roland Axtmann in this issue.
27. Glick-Schiller (see note 21).
28. Pnina Werbner, “Global pathways. Working class cosmopolitans and the creation of transnational ethnic worlds,” *Social Anthropology* 7, no. 1 (1999): 17–35.
29. Daniele Archibugi, “Cosmopolitical Democracy” in *Debating Cosmopolitics*, eds., D. Archibugi and M. Koenig-Archibugi (London, 2003); Held (see note 22).

30. Montserrat Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations* (Cambridge, 2007), 159.
31. Anderson (see note 1).
32. Harvey (see note 26), 114.
33. Harvey (see note 26), 169; Anthony Appiah, "Cosmopolitan Patriots" in *Cosmopolitics*, eds., P. Cheah and B. Robbins (Minneapolis, 1998).
34. Harvey (see note 26), 119.
35. "Charlemagne: The treat of treaties," *The Economist*, 23 October 2010, 48.
36. Walter Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts" in *The Importance of Language*, ed., M. Black (Englewood Cliffs, 1962).
37. Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a..." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (1978): 379.
38. Harvey (see note 26), 250; see also Angharad Closs Stephens, "Citizenship without Community: Time, Design and the City," *Citizenship Studies* 14, no. 1 (2010): 31-46.
39. Harvey (see note 26), 171.
40. *Ibid.*, 163; Martha Nussbaum, et al., *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston, 1996).
41. Claire Sutherland, *Soldered States: Nation-building in Germany and Vietnam* (Manchester, 2010) 22.
42. Sutherland (see note 9).
43. Bruce Robbins, "Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism" in Cheah and Robbins (see note 33), 1.
44. Delanty (see note 26), 17.
45. Mary Kaldor, "Nationalism and Globalisation" *Nations and Nationalism* 10, nos.1/2 (2004): 161-177, here 176.
46. Craig Calhoun, *Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream* (London, 2007), 8.
47. Craig Calhoun, "Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 14, no. 3 (2008):427-448, here 434.
48. Guibernau (see note 30), 159.
49. Delanty (see note 26), 252.
50. *Ibid.*, 250.
51. John Binnie, "Locating Transnationalism: Agency and Method," *Sociology* 37, no.3 (2003):599-604, here 599.
52. Soysal (see note 21), 411; Beck and Sznajder (see note 21), 389.
53. "Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has 'utterly failed,'" *The Guardian*, 17 October 2010; available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed>, accessed 22 November 2010.
54. Beck and Sznajder (see note 21), 382.
55. Daniel Chernilo, "Methodological Nationalism and its Critique" in *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, eds., G. Delanty and K. Kumar (London, 2006), 129.
56. Harvey (see note 26), 267.
57. Chernilo (see note 55), 137.
58. Delanty (see note 26), 70.
59. Glick-Schiller (see note 21), 415.
60. Soysal (see note 21), 409.
61. Calhoun (see note 46), 429.
62. *Ibid.*, 442.
63. *Ibid.*, 444.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Maurizio Viroli, *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1995); Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, 1993); David Millar, *On Nationality* (Oxford, 1995); Dora Kostakopoulou, "Thick, Thin and Thinner Patriotisms: Is This All There Is?" *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 26, no. 1 (2006): 73-106.

66. Partha Chatterjee, "The Nation in Heterogeneous Time," *Futures* Vol. 37 (2005): 925-942, here 940.
67. Calhoun (see note 46), 19.
68. Sutherland (see note 9), 14.
69. Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond, "Globalization, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives," *Journal of European Public Policy* 9 (2002):147-167.
70. Robbins (see note 43), 2.