The headscarf has become a cultural flashpoint, a freighted symbol of many of the central social, cultural, political, and religious tensions of this first decade of the twenty-first century. When I first began to research the French controversy surrounding the Muslim headscarf in 2001, it was little known in the United States. Since then, the issue has attained global prominence. In late 2003, the Stasi Commission, which Prime Minister Jacques Chirac had appointed several months earlier, recommended a ban on wearing the Muslim headscarf in public primary and secondary schools.1 The legislature promptly passed such a ban, which became law on 15 March 2004.2 Since then, Germany, Turkey, and Britain, among other countries, have wrestled with their own headscarf controversies. The debate reached international proportions when the European Court of Human Rights upheld Turkey’s ban on the headscarf in universities, in the 2005 case of Sahin v. Turkey.
A Political Symbol in Comparative and Historical Perspective
A Case Study in the Export of Third-Reich Film Propaganda
Roel Vande Winkel
The Nazi propaganda film Ohm Krüger (Uncle Krüger, 1941) utilized former South African statesman Paul Kruger and his role in the Boer War to promote a virulently anti-British message. By analyzing the international career of Ohm Krüger, this article reassesses the propaganda value traditionally ascribed to the film in an attempt to encourage further research on the exportation of Third-Reich cinema. The parallels between the British invasion and occupation of Boer land, as represented in the film, and the Nazis' invasion and occupation of European countries were so striking that Ohm Krüger was exported almost exclusively to nations allied with Germany while being withheld from occupied territories. The one notable exception was France, which had a long tradition of anti-British sentiment.
Goebbels' Wunderwaffe as Counterfactual History
The most expensive film produced in the Third Reich, Veit Harlan's Kolberg (1945) represents a culmination of Nazi cinema's interwoven ideological and artistic ambitions, aiming simultaneously to entertain, impress, and instruct spectators. Joseph Goebbels, who served as the film's unofficial executive producer, conceived it as a psychological miracle weapon capable of preserving national unity in increasingly hopeless circumstances and turning the tide of the war. In theory this was to be achieved by drawing a parallel between the civilian militia's successful defense of Kolberg during the Napoleonic Wars and Germany's situation in early 1945. However, close study of the film's production, distribution, and reception suggests that the film largely failed to achieve its propagandistic goals for a variety of factors, especially Goebbels' obsessive meddling with the script and editing process.
ten years before the war broke out, the major imperial rivalries were between Britain and France and Britain and Russia, not with Germany. Germany came late to the imperial game. By 1914, it had settled all of its disputes peacefully. 5 Lenin believed
Occupation, Liberation, and Reconstruction
George Robb and W. Brian Newsome
atrocities as commonplace or as magnified by propagandists; the influence of the war on women’s work and relationship to the home; the extent to which food shortages in Germany were caused by the British blockade or by poor management of resources by German
photographs in German-occupied territory. The wartime propaganda apparatus distributed photographs of ruins for a domestic French audience and for the military archives. In addition to French archival sources, collections in the US Library of Congress and the
, among the German armed forces during World War I, the ratio of dead to wounded was roughly 1:2.36. 27 That is to say, the counterparts of many of those who a hundred years ago would have been counted among the dead more recently would have been among
Gustave Hervé and the Great War
Michael B. Loughlin
“successes” of foreign fascism in Italy and Germany but in a French manner, “without castor oil or anti-Semitism.” Responding to threats from Nazi Germany and the Popular Front in 1935 and 1936, Hervé campaigned to draft the “hero of Verdun,” Philippe Pétain
The Legacy of the 1917 Espionage Act in the United States
example, outlawing the speaking of German and coercing disloyal individuals to conform. They insisted on minimal federal government interference with the existing social, economic, and political order. State legislation, gubernatorial proclamations, and
Historicizing Édouard Dujardin’s Les Lauriers Sont Coupés
Kelly J. Maynard
petites revues , first the Revue wagnérienne and then, within a few years, the Revue indépendante . Also, as an avid promoter of the works of Richard Wagner in a virulently anti-German moment in French national history, Dujardin was particularly