The importance of freedom in Sartre’s philosophy cannot be overestimated, and the understanding of Sartre’s account of freedom is necessary for the understanding of Sartre’s philosophy as a whole. In this article, I will show that there are two distinct, but related, notions of freedom used in Being and Nothingness, and will suggest that a clarification of the two notions will open the possibility of grounding Sartre’s demand that each individual should promote the freedom of all Others.
Spinoza has been regarded as a philosophical outsider, ‘at odds with what became the philosophical mainstream . . . [and] to read him is to glimpse unrealised possibilities . . . and alternative ways of thinking of minds and bodies . . . agency and responsibility, of the relation between human beings and the rest of nature, between reason and the passions.’ and also of freedom. Today, the controversial philosophy of Spinoza’s Ethics is often described as all-encompassing and celebrated as ‘one of the most remarkable metaphysical systems in the entire history of philosophy’.
In this article I wish to discuss the problem of self-knowledge in Sartre’s early philosophy with regard to its consequences within the field of ethics. I shall not try to cover all aspects of self-knowledge in Being and Nothingness since all of the major doctrines expounded in that work concerning consciousness, identity, freedom and knowledge have implications for self-knowledge. I would be content if I could draw attention to aspects of Sartre’s thought which are interestingly different from other moral philosophies as well as from certain empirical conclusions it would seem natural to draw from Sartre’s own ontology in the sphere of moral psychology.
The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process, by Graeme Gill. London: Macmillan, 2000. ISBN 0-333-80197
History of Shit, by Dominique Laporte. Translated by Nadia Benabid and Rodolphe el-Khoury. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000. ISBN 0-2626-2160-6
An Introduction to Philosophy, by Jon Nuttall. Cambridge: Polity, 2002. ISBN 0-7456-1662-3
Xavier O. Monasterio
Ronald Santoni’s book, Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre’s Early Philosophy, has been long in the making. Indeed, Sartre’s views on bad faith and the issues related to it have constituted one of Santoni’s life-long philosophical interests, as evidenced by his article of more than twenty years ago.
Georges Barrère, Tim Huntley, and Nik Farrell Fox
Penser à deux ? Sartre et Benny Lévy face à face by Gilles Hanus Review by Georges Barrère
Critical Theory to Structuralism: Philosophy, Politics and the Human Sciences by David Ingram (ed.) Review by Tim Huntley
Sartre and Posthumanist Humanism by Elizabeth Butterfield Review by Nik Farrell Fox
Review Essay on: COGNITIVISM GOES TO THE MOVIES: Paisley Livingston and Carl Plantinga, eds., THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY AND FILM; Carl Plantinga, MOVING VIEWERS: AMERICAN FILM AND THE SPECTATOR’S EXPERIENCE; Torben Grodal, EMBODIED VISIONS: EVOLUTION, EMOTION, CULTURE, AND FILM
Ethnic Symbol in Post-Communist Sakha Republic (Iakutiia)
This report is on contemporary processes related to horse breeding in Sakha (Iakutiia), northeastern Russia. I demonstrate the importance of the horse figure in the philosophy of the Sakha, a hunting and herding people of Siberia, as well as the parallelism between the diminishing utilitarian function of the horse and reinforcing symbolism in the post-communist context.
Tim Huntley, Alistair Rolls, and David Drake
Helen Tattam, Time in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel Review by Tim Huntley
Rosemary Lloyd and Jean Fornasiero (eds.), Magnificent Obsessions: Honouring the Lives of Hazel Rowley Review by Alistair Rolls
Emmanuel Barot (dir.), Sartre et le Marxisme Richard Wolin, The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution and the Legacy of the 1960s Léo Lévy, A la vie Review by David Drake
What marks the difference between modern and non-modern political philosophy? Such a question could be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it could be understood as a question concerning formal differences between modern and pre/non-modern modes of philosophising. On the other hand, it could be understood as a question about the changing nature of the object of the philosophical enterprise, namely a question concerning the historical differences between modern and pre-modern (domestic as well as international) politics. Contemporary political philosophy has focused primarily on meeting the first, formal, challenge. By failing to take proper account of the effects that major historical developments—especially the rise of commercial society and global market economy—have had on the character of political life, much of contemporary political theory tend to view its enterprise as essentially an extension to or an application of ethics. What is needed instead is a 'political economy'. Political philosophy must rise to this challenge if it wishes to help us contend with our present predicament. The final part of the article outlines a realist, non-moralistic, political philosophy which takes account of the interplay between human 'sentiments' and 'reason' in a commercial world order.