ideologies, especially against the backdrop of modern European history, it is rather surprising that neofolk has found—since the mid 1990s—its strongest fan base in Germany and Austria (and to a lesser extent, Italy), where albums have “repeatedly achieved
Introduction P olitical movements rarely prosper without at least minimal intellectual foundations underpinning their activities. Germany's far right is no exception here. However, the delegitimation of Nazism and fascism and of associated
Audible in the technological aesthetics of West German post punk is a 1980s strategy for escaping the political, cultural, and aesthetic contradictions of a nation trapped by the compulsion to, reconstruction of, and march toward a democratic
Robert Gerald Livingston
Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998 )
W.R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999)
Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, The Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1999)
Thomas Klikauer and Kathleen Webb Tunney
By the end of 2018, Germany’s secret service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) started composing a report on Germany’s most notorious right-wing political party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD). In January 2019, one of the authors asked Germany’s secret service to supply this report but was told “It’s secret.” On 28 January 2019, a short note even noted: “We will not send the document.” On the very same day, Netzpolitik.org posted the entire report online—all 436 pages of it. Netzpolitik.org stated: “We make the report available because open debate is vital in a democracy… and because it destroys the AfD’s fairy-tale of being a normal political party.” In their introduction, Netzpolitik’s Andre Meister, Anna Biselli, and Markus Reuter, who published the report, also emphasize: “We make the report available because the secret service believes ‘parts of the AfD violate Germany’s constitutional guarantee that human dignity is inviolable.”’ Netzpolitik.org is convinced that Germans have a right to know. Reading through the report one hardly finds evidence that would justify secrecy. Instead, it is a valid report written by a German state agency tasked with defending the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) concerning a political party.
This year the Jewish Museum in Berlin plans to finally open its doors to a curious world. This empty building has already achieved cult status as a Holocaust Memorial so that one almost has to wonder what more can be achieved by the addition of an exhibition, With it being the focus of ongoing worldwide attention, it is perhaps appropriate to glance at what is happening with other buildings of Jewish interest in Germany.
Ruff, Mark Edward. The Wayward Flock: Catholic Youth in Postwar West Germany, 1945-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005)
McDougall, Alan. Youth Politics in East Germany: The Free German Youth Movement 1946-1968 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004)
For a long period Australia was a British colonial offshoot and its Jewish community followed the dictates of the Chief Rabbi of Britain, Nathan Marcus Adler, who, with his son and successor Hermann Adler, brought the German rabbinic outlook to his religious leadership. Over the decades many Australian ministers (not all were fully qualified rabbis) were German or trained in the German rabbinic style, though there was often an anti-German reaction on the part of Eastern European rabbis and laymen. Though many of the ministers were quintessentially British, they were mostly trained under German Jewish scholars at Jews' College in London and displayed the German synthesis of Jewish and Western culture. Since the Second World War Australian Jewry has changed radically both as a result of post-Holocaust immigration and because of the growing diversity of the community. There is a strong Eastern European flavour and the British chief rabbinate is no longer the community's automatic authority.
Rainer Münz and Ralf Ulrich
In Germany, as in many other European democracies, immigration
and citizenship are contested and contentious issues. In the German
case it was both the magnitude of postwar and recent immigration as
well as its interference with questions of identity that created political
and social conflict. As a result of World War II, the coexistence
of two German states, and the persistence of ethnic German minorities
in central and eastern Europe, (West) Germany’s migration and
naturalization policy was inclusive toward expellees, GDR citizens,
and co-ethnics. At the same time, the Federal Republic of Germany,
despite the recruitment of several million foreign labor migrants
and—until 1992—a relatively liberal asylum practice, did not develop
similar mechanisms and policies of absorption and integration of its
legal foreign residents.
Brian C. Rathbun
Germany's behavior during the lead-up to the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003 seemed to confirm that the country is marked by a strategic culture of pacifism and multilateralism. However, a closer look at German actions and pattern of participation in military operations reveals that German pacifism is a myth. There was no cross party consensus on German foreign policy in the 1990s around a principled opposition to the use of force. Even in the early years after the Cold War, the Christian Democrats began very quickly, albeit deliberatively and often secretively, to break down legal and psychological barriers to the deployment of German forces abroad. Pacifism persisted on the left of the political spectrum but gave way following a genuine ideological transformation brought about by the experience of the Yugoslav wars. The nature of Germany's objection to the Iraq invasion, which unlike previous debates did not make ubiquitous references to German history, revealed how much it has changed since the end of the Cold War. Had the election in 2002 gone differently, Germany might even have supported the actions of the U.S. and there would be little talk today of a transatlantic crisis. It is now possible to treat Germany as a "normal" European power.