This article explores the ways people targeted by restrictive migration and mobility policies in Algeria experience, interpret, and contest them. It focuses on the perspective of harragas, literally “those who burn” the borders. In the Maghrebi dialects, this is notably how people leaving without documentation are referred to. It reflects the fact that they do not respect the mandatory steps for legal departure. Also, they figuratively “burn” their papers to avoid deportation once in Europe. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork, this article outlines the complex and ambiguous attitudes toward the legal mobility regime of those it aims to exclude: compliance, deception, delegitimization, and defiance. It contributes to debates about human experiences of borders and inequality in mobility regimes. It helps deepen knowledge on why restrictive migration and mobility policies fail and are often counterproductive, encouraging the undocumented migration they were meant to deter.
Interpreting, Experiencing, and Contesting Visa Policies and the (Im)mobility Regime in Algeria
Eve Rachele Sanders
The letter was the single most widely used property in Tudor-Stuart plays. In that memorable stage direction from The Spanish Tragedy, the letter is an instrumental device in the plot. It provides Hieronimo, the central protagonist of the revenge tragedy, with targets for revenge by identifying his son’s killers by name. However, the letter also is a sign for the interior state of mind of its writer, the beautiful Bel-imperia, in issuing a call for reprisal. It is a materialisation of what immaterial passions ultimately drive the action: desire, loss, and rage. Red ink. Blood signifies the authenticity of the words on the page. They come, literally, from Bel-imperia’s heart. And yet, the macabre medium of the message brings Hieronimo to see in it fatal implications for himself. ‘Hieronimo, beware’, he says to himself, ‘thou art betrayed, / And to entrap thy life this train is laid’. (Indeed, in another revenge tragedy, Bussy D’Ambois, an adulterous wife is forced at knifepoint to lay a snare for her lover with that very deception of a letter inscribed in her blood). This single moment in Thomas Kyd’s tragedy, Hieronimo’s reception of Bel-imperia’s ‘bloody writ’, captures the complex of attitudes that governed the circulation of letters as stage properties.
Exactly what does Jean-Paul Sartre mean when he describes some conscious awareness as ‘non-thetic’? He does not explicitly say. Yet this phrase, sprinkled liberally throughout his early philosophical works, is germane to some of the distinctive and fundamental theories of Sartrean existentialism. My aim in this paper is to examine the concept in terms of the role that Sartre claims it plays in bad faith (mauvaise foi), the deliberate and motivated project of refusing to face or consider the consequences of some fact or facts. I will argue that non-thetic awareness could play the role Sartre ascribes to it in bad faith only if it is understood as being equivalent to the nonconceptual representational content currently discussed in anglophone philosophy of mind. I will proceed by first providing an initial rough characterisation of ‘non-thetic’ awareness through a discussion of the philosophical background to Sartre’s term, then showing how this rough characterisation needs to be refined in order that bad faith may evade the two paradoxes of self-deception, next drawing the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content, and then arguing that non-thetic awareness must be construed as nonconceptual content. This clarification of one of the most pervasive and one of the most obscure concepts in Sartrean existentialism will have the additional ramifications that Sartre’s theory of consciousness in general must be understood as involving both conceptual and nonconceptual structures and that his discussion of the interplay of these structures can provide innovative and valuable contributions to the debates over the role of conceptual and nonconceptual contents in perception and action currently raging in anglophone discussions of mind.
Counterterrorism, techno-science, and the cultural reproduction of security
Mark Maguire and Pete Fussey
as basic emotional states, deception cues, and, potentially, emotional signs of hostile intent. Today, in a re-imagining of centuries-old criminological positivism, the techno-scientific projects emerging from homeland security include AVATAR
The Cosmopolitics of an Apparently Non-religious Practice
Sergio González Varela
about inherent values and meanings that encompass different attitudes of the logic of practice, such as deception, betrayal, play, and embodiment. Here I address some of the common assumptions made by anthropologists (e.g., Downey 2008 ; Lewis 1992
Adams , 144 – 153 . New York : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich . Elster , Jon . 1986 . “Deception and Self-Deception in Stendhal: Some Sartrian Themes.” In The Multiple Self , 93 – 114 . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Iseminger , Gary
Reinventing Anthropological Topics
, perspective and power relations. The author, in the crucible of experience, asks seminal questions on an area that has suffered greatly, not only as human life is concerned, but also in regard to political deceptions and a lack of scientific attention paid to
Germans and Jews Re-enacting Aspects of the Holocaust
linked by theme and characterization. They delineated a familiar tragedy of deportation, fear, sadism, self-deception and murder, and movingly expressed these German students’ search for some form of reconciliation with their grandparents’ generation
An Appreciation and Critique
Ronald E. Santoni
‘character’; a project of running away from our freedom; of ‘denying our freedom over our character’, favouring ‘fixed nature’ over ‘freedom.’ In short, it is a project of self-deception, or ‘lying to oneself’, as Sartre, following Nietzsche, calls it, but is
The Complexity of Complaint in Chaucer’s Anelida and Arcite and Henryson’s Testament of Cresseid
interest in truth and lies here, certainly, but that interest engages too with half-truths, with the subtleties of deception, with self-deception, with the ultimate impossibility of knowledge of another’s self, or even of one’s own self. Henryson’s ‘Quha