possible to locate the role of subjective responsibility in Lacanian theory, despite his rejection of human freedom in the sense that Sartre gives to it in Being and Nothingness . Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis To help clarify this remark on the ethical
A Defense of Lacanian Responsibility
In general, the Sartrean concept of the subject as "being-for-self" and "being-for-others" is read as if Sartre had sketched these structures as given "a priori" and therefore as unalterable. One of the consequences of this interpretation lies in calling Sartre's theory contradictory, especially with regard to his ethics, because of the assumption that, based on this concept, changing the inauthentic structures of the subject into authentic ones would be impossible. Contrary to this interpretation, I argue that Sartre's philosophical theory is by no means contradictory, neither in its relation to ethics nor as it relates to the complete edition of Sartre's philosophical writing, if one tries to understand what kind of theoretical requirements Sartre considered to be relevant and necessary. From this point of view, it is possible to work out an adequate and consistent interpretation. In order for me to argue for the immanent consistency of Sartre's theory and for the resulting possibility of an ethical theory based on it, I will discuss some aspects of the relation between epistemological, ontological and ethical elements within Sartre's philosophical system.
Joseph L. Walsh
In discussing Sartre’s contribution to a Marxist ethics of revolution, it is important first to note that it is the ethics of revolution that is under consideration and not the broader question of Marxism and morality. Much has been written in recent years on the question of morality in Marxism, focusing generally on moral theory and justice, for example, Rodney Peffer’s wonderful summation of discussions about Marxism’s moral vision regarding human action and social organization.
Ronald E. Santoni
Joseph S. Catalano’s most recent book on Sartre, Good Faith and Other Essays,1 is an important work. The fact that Part Two of this book – amounting to just over half of its extent – consists of essays that have appeared previously in journals does not undermine its significance and worthiness. For, viewed together, the essays in this part represent both some needed contemporary refinements of Sartre’s tantalising concept of bad faith and pioneering philosophical explorations of Sartre’s notions of good faith and authenticity. Ready access to them under a single cover increases the chance of their being read, and serves Sartrean scholarship. As background material, they here supplement Part One, Catalano’s brand new, masterfully honed, ‘A Sketch of a Sartrean Ethics’, which is ‘must’ reading for anyone pursuing the implications of an ‘integral’ Sartre for an ‘integral humanity’.
In his book The Anxiety of Influence. A Theory of Poetry,2 Harold Bloom presents several ‘revisionary ratios’, that is, several ways in which an author may critically refer to his predecessor in order to separate himself3 from the latter. The author’s criticism of his predecessor manifests an anxiety of influence insofar as it overstates the differences and neglects the similarities between his and his predecessor’s works. In this paper I shall show that some aspects of Sartre’s criticism of Kant’s moral theory in the Notebooks for an Ethics mani- fest an anxiety of influence.
Sketch of a Materialist Ethics
Translator : Marieke Mueller and Kate Kirkpatrick
pre-condition for an act capable of transforming the real, or more precisely, as the root of a materialist and dialectical ethics. Alienation in the Critique of Dialectical Reason In the passages dedicated to collectives and to class-being, 3 Sartre
The importance of freedom in Sartre’s philosophy cannot be overestimated, and the understanding of Sartre’s account of freedom is necessary for the understanding of Sartre’s philosophy as a whole. In this article, I will show that there are two distinct, but related, notions of freedom used in Being and Nothingness, and will suggest that a clarification of the two notions will open the possibility of grounding Sartre’s demand that each individual should promote the freedom of all Others.
Philosophers, especially moral philosophers, repeatedly turn to examples to show their principles in action, or to put them to the test, or to refine them. But examples are also a distrusted resource; narrative (even a minimal narrative such as a philosophical example) may have a semantic waywardness which makes it an uncertain ally in philosophical discussion. What is at stake here is the extent to which stories can be contained within clearly delineated conceptual frames. To put it bluntly,
The transition made by Sartre to an increasingly political brand of commitment after the Liberation proved to be one of the most challenging and difficult transitions of his career. L’Etre et le néant had been taken by many, both followers and critics alike, to be the fullest exposition of his world-view, but the type of commitment Sartre spoke of in this work did not seem to be an obvious candidate for reconciliation with a radical political agenda.
Is Liberation without Freedom Possible?
not a pre-packaged set of speculations but rather a series of flexible instruments to be confirmed and relived. Sartre’s legacy in ethics and politics consists not only of the entire body of his theoretical works but also, and mostly, of the