In 2011 numerous 'Occupy' and anti-austerity protests took place across Europe and the United States. Passionate indignation at the failure of political elites became a mobilizing force against formal political institutions. In Greece a mass movement known as the Aganaktismeni (the Indignant) became the main agent of social resistance to the memorandum signed by the Greek government, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The Greek movement did not take the form of a social movement sharing a collective identity. Left-wing protestors played a prominent role. Protestors embracing right-wing populist frames also participated actively in collective mobilizations, while segments of the extreme right attempted to manipulate rage to their advantage. During the Greek Indignant movement civil society remained a terrain contested by conflicting political forces. This unique feature of the Greek movement posed a completely different challenge to the principles of diversity and inclusiveness than the one debated within the Spanish Indignados and the Occupy protests. Furthermore, it illustrates that rage and indignation may spark dissimilar forms of political contention. Hence, rage and indignation do not merely motivate ‘passive citizens’ to participate in collective protest. They are linked to cognitive frames and individual preferences, which influence protestors’ claims and mobilizations’ political outcomes. Accordingly, advances in democratization and inclusive citizenship are only one of the possible outcomes of mobilizations prompted by rage and indignation.
The Case of the Greek Indiginant Movement
Sabine Weiland, Vivien Weiss, and John Turnpenny
Ecological challenges are becoming more and more complex, as are their effects on nature and society and the actions to address them. Calls for a more sustainable development to address these challenges and to mitigate possible negative future impacts are not unproblematic, particularly due to the complexity, uncertainty, and long-term nature of possible consequences (Newig et al. 2008). Knowledge about the various impacts—be they ecological, economic, or social—policies might have is therefore pivotal. But the relationship between such knowledge and the myriad ways it may be used is particularly challenging. The example of policy impact assessment systems is a case in point. Recent years have seen an institutionalization of such systems for evaluating consequences of regulatory activities across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2008) and the European Union (CEC 2002). It is argued that, by utilizing scientific and other evidence, impact assessment has the potential to deliver more sustainable policies and to address large-scale global challenges.
Brigitte Young and Willi Semmler
Only a decade ago, slow growth and high unemployment plagued Germany, but the "sick man of Europe" has now moved to outperform the Eurozone average growth since the second quarter of 2010. This confirms Germany's recovery and its status as the growth engine of the continent. This surely is a success story. While Germany (also Austria and the Netherlands) is prospering, the peripheral countries in the Eurozone are confronted with a severe sovereign debt crisis. Starting in Greece, it soon spread to countries such as Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In the course of the debate, Germany was blamed for the imbalances in Europe. In short, German export performance and the sustained pressure for moderate wage increases have provided German exporters with the competitive advantage to dominate trade and capital flows within the Eurozone. Thus, Germany is seen as the main beneficiary of the EURO. This argument, however, is vehemently disputed within Germany. Many economists and political leaders reject this argument and point to the flagrant lack of fiscal discipline in many of the peripheral countries. Some prominent economists, such as Hans-Werner Sinn, even disputes that Germany was the main beneficiary of the Eurozone. The paper analyzes the two sides of the controversy, and asks whether we are witnessing a more inwardlooking and Euroskeptic Germany. These issues will be analyzed by first focusing on the role of Germany in resolving the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, and the European Union negotiations for a permanent rescue mechanism. We conclude by discussing some possible explanations for Germany's more assertive and more Euroskeptic position during these negotiations.
An Exploration of Populist Depictions of the European Union as a German Plot to Take Over Europe
very dna ” of the European project. 2 In the debates about leadership in Europe, it was emphasized that, more then ever, Berlin's “constructive engagement with the European Union” is “a necessary condition for the eu to meet current challenges.” 3
How Polish Political Elites Frame Their Discourse on “German Hegemony”
Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski and Maciej Olejnik
political party that saw in Germany a hegemon that has been tamed by the European Union. The sld recognizes the dominant position of Germany but regards it to be self-taming at the same time. Members of the sld indicated on several occasions that
The Lack of Trust in Government Institutions in the Czech Republic
, institutions and trust in the other member nations of the European Union is of particular importance for the European unification project. The core of the supranational idea of community is that the citizens of different nations feel positive about each other
Politics and Power After the 2017 Bundestag Election
rather critical take on Germany’s dominant leadership role in the European Union in recent years. German leadership since the Euro Crisis, including policy decisions during the refugee crisis of 2015, have greatly contributed to the severe legitimacy
Foreign Policy Beliefs and German Parliamentarians’ Support for European Integration
A. Burcu Bayram
integration and European Union ( eu ) politics more broadly. Scholars have also devoted a great deal of attention to mass attitudes toward integration and have examined in particular the electoral connection between European and domestic politics. 5 Despite
Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, Julian Pänke, and Jochen Roose
, “Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?” International Affairs 72, no. 1 (1996): 9–32. 2 Simon Bulmer, “Germany and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and Domestic Politics,” West European Politics 37, no. 6 (2014): 1244
A “Social Quality Observatory” for Central and Eastern European Countries?
Laurent J. G. van der Maesen
meaning of these was nipped in the bud. In many ways, it appears from the six articles that the ascension of the CEE countries into the European Union is perceived by many from the CEE region as due to the possibility or the necessity to imitate the