Do films that challenge us to turn away from the screen as a result of their depictions of violence raise issues about the ethics not of regarding the pain of others, but of watching films as a whole? Drawing on Stanley Cavell's notion of revulsion, recent investigations into “extreme“ cinema and, Antonin Artaud's concept of a “theater of cruelty,“ this article argues that watching violence on screen is not necessarily a negative and voyeuristic exercise, but that it can be good for viewers to see graphic violence on screen. This is not simply a question of viewing onscreen violence per se. What also is important is that the filmmakers adopt a set of stylistic techniques that are defined here as “cruel.“ Films (typically art house films) that adopt these techniques encourage viewers not to view violence for entertainment, but rather they encourage viewers to understand the potential in all humans to commit such acts. Such an understanding in turn forces us to lead our lives in an ethical fashion, whereby we do not unthinkingly follow a moral code, but rather choose and take responsibility for what we do. Furthermore, it encourages an “ethical“ mode of film spectatorship in general: we watch films to learn not just voyeuristically about others, but also about what we ourselves could become.
There is probably no topic associated with doing fieldwork with girls and young women that evokes more concern than the issue of ethics. For many members of university research ethics boards (REBs) the very term girls in the title of a project sets
Intellectual Disability and the Challenge of Opacity
catered to but are also apprehended as agents with the capacity to affect others. My analysis of this case draws upon and contributes to a recent anthropological debate about the epistemology and ethics of reading other people's minds. Interest in
For an Anthropology of Cognitive Disability
Patrick McKearney and Tyler Zoanni
, care, emotions and ethics. All this gestures towards the possibility of a vibrant anthropological conversation around the topic. In this respect, our approach takes inspiration from efforts to look at the emergent forms of value ( Friedner 2015
Sketch of a Materialist Ethics
Translator : Marieke Mueller and Kate Kirkpatrick
pre-condition for an act capable of transforming the real, or more precisely, as the root of a materialist and dialectical ethics. Alienation in the Critique of Dialectical Reason In the passages dedicated to collectives and to class-being, 3 Sartre
In his book The Anxiety of Influence. A Theory of Poetry,2 Harold Bloom presents several ‘revisionary ratios’, that is, several ways in which an author may critically refer to his predecessor in order to separate himself3 from the latter. The author’s criticism of his predecessor manifests an anxiety of influence insofar as it overstates the differences and neglects the similarities between his and his predecessor’s works. In this paper I shall show that some aspects of Sartre’s criticism of Kant’s moral theory in the Notebooks for an Ethics mani- fest an anxiety of influence.
Notes on the Ethics of Observational Documentary
even claimed that an attitude of contempt for subjects lay at the heart of works of direct cinema. Singling out the Maysles, Calvin Pryluck raised related objections regarding the ethics of observational works, referring to invasions of privacy, the
underpin CBC activities, and they are mainly considered from a normative side, there is a lack of studies that systematically focus on CBC ethics. Hence, the aim of this study is to contribute to filling this gap in CBC scholarship. Conceptual
Ethical Experience, Trauma, and History
. In some explorations of cinematic ethics that do not center on empathy, affective connections between spectators and characters may be understood as providing a “synthesis of perspectives which offers insight into the ways in which we perceive and
This article argues that the moral dimensions of the term 'culture' have been under-theorized in anthropology. The argument stems from a particular reading of the Western philosophy of ethics. Based in economic anthropology, I explore how an understanding of the moral imperative can illuminate differences in processes of accumulation. After a discussion of the concept of morality in philosophy and in recent anthropology, I go on to examine the principles of altruism and reciprocal utility in the light of theories of kinship and of rational choice. I then outline an argument concerning the general form of moral reasoning. According to this argument, kinship classifications function logically to synthesize variable distributions in different societies of two interconnected principles—altruism and reciprocal utility.