9/11 represents less a tear in the fabric of history, or a break with the past, than an inflection in ongoing historical processes, such as the continued expansion of capitalism that at some recent time has supposedly attained a level of globalization. This paper considers the relation of war and politics with respect to three instances arising in the wake of 9/11, including the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, and finally the global war on terror (GWT). I argue that these wars are superficially dissimilar, but that on a deeper level they all relate to a single ideological position that is an important motivation in current US foreign policy, and that this position is further related to capitalism.
The scope, compass and nature of the United States of America’s power in the post-9/11 context has run as a thematic thread through recent issues of Theoria.
Roger Deacon, Ben Parker, Herman C. Waetjen, and Lasse Thomassen
Humanity, Terrorism, Terrorist War: Palestine, 9-11, Iraq, 7-7..., by Ted Honderich Roger Deacon
The Struggle for Meaning: Reflections on Philosophy, Culture and Democracy in Africa, by Paulin J. Hountondji Ben Parker
The Rationalists: Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz by Pauline Phemister Herman C. Waetjen
The Divided West by Jürgen Habermas Lasse Thomassen
U.S. Foreign Policy and the U.S. Self
Robin W. Cameron
Why is it that one feels as though they have to say that 9/11 was a ‘tragic’, ‘terrible’ or ‘horrific’ event? Why is this inclination intensified if one seeks to comment critically on U.S. politics? Is it not clear that death on that scale and in that manner is without exception horrific, terrible and tragic? Or, is it that as a critical scholar I feel compelled to clarify that I am not with the terrorists simply because I intend to critique aspects of U.S. foreign policy? The point of this is not to argue that one should stop referring to 9/11 as ‘horrific’, ‘terrible’ or ‘tragic’, but rather to examine what causes individuals to monitor the way in which they act when they engage with a powerful foreign policy consensus.
Offensive Realism, the Bush Doctrine, and the 2003 Iraq War
Carlos L. Yordán
Research in the discipline of international relations finds that the great democratic powers are less likely to pursue revisionist policies. This investigation challenges this argument by showing that the United States' decision to oust Saddam Hussein's regime in March 2003 was consistent with a modified version of John Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, which finds that great powers' motivation is global hegemony. This article is divided into three sections. The first section considers the value of Mearsheimer's theory and reworks it by adding domestic variables to explain why states abandon defensive strategies for offensive ones. The second section shows how pre-9/11 American foreign policy strategy was, for the most part, status quo oriented, and section three explains why and how the Bush administration introduced a revisionist foreign policy strategy after the 9/11 attacks. This investigation concludes by showing how the 2003 Iraq War is the first step in the United States' quest for global hegemony.
Democracy has been justified as the political system whose citizens are sovereign, which is to say most free or most equal in their political experience, participation or consent, and most likely to be benefited by economic freedoms. Most importantly, democracy is recommended as that form of government which gets things more right than any other form of government. But this traditional view, and also more recent qualifications of this view, is simply inadequate, refuted and rendered nonsensical by very real electoral, wealth, income and power inequalities in democratic societies. Nevertheless, it is this kind of hierarchic democracy, like those of the United States and the United Kingdom, whose systems of government are exactly not true to the idea that two heads are better than one and more heads better than two, which reaches to judgements about Palestine, 9/11, Iraq, 7/7 and about all that is to come after those things.
Ethics in Context: The Art of Dealing with Serious Questions, by Gernot Böhme (transl. by Edmund Jephcott). Cambridge: Polity, 2001. Reviewed by Deane-Peter Baker
9-11, by Noam Chomsky. Johannesburg: M&G Books, 2001. Reviewed by Derek Hook
The Politics of Lying: Implications for Democracy, by Lionel Cliffe, Maureen Ramsay and David Bartlett. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000. Reviewed by Ralph Lawrence
Feminism and Emotion: Readings in Moral and Political Philosophy, by Susan Mendus. London: Macmillan, 2000. Reviewed by Pamela Anderson
Stupidity, by Avital Ronell. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002. Reviewed by Patrick Lenta
Norbert Elias and Modern Social Theory, by Dennis Smith. London: Sage, 2001. Reviewed by Volker Wedekind
The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?, by Slavoj Zizek. Verso Press, 2000. Reviewed by Clayton Crockett
Inquiring the Relationship between Exception and Democracy
and management on the population used in discourses of modern governmentality ( Maguire et al. 2014 ; Dean 1994 , 1999) . Only as the last in a long series, the outburst of post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ and the establishment of a regime of ‘global civil
decision-making would lead citizens to be more engaged. Dyck and Lascher nicely lay out the causal mechanisms that are believed to explain how popular vote processes increase turnout (9–11). They suggest that popular vote processes are expected to improve
, and property; objects [like these] attract a direct personal interest which can sufficiently illuminate the people’s will”’) (Condorcet 1785: xxv). For further discussion, see Peonidis (2013: 9–11 ). 13 I discuss this feature of democratic regimes