Fragmentation has become a key concept in the analysis of international law and global governance in recent years. For many, fragmentation has both positive and negative aspects, but scholars are divided over which aspect is predominant. The
A Conceptual Inquiry
Timo Pankakoski and Antto Vihma
A Market-based Approach to Address Garrett W. Brown's 'Deliberative Deficit' within the Global Fund
Garrett W. Brown has argued that donor voting caucuses produce a deliberative deficit between donor and non-donor members in the Global Fund International Board. Although we agree with this assessment, in our research on low-transaction cost alternatives to cope with consistent deliberative conditions (i.e. low-cost arrangements to bring about the exchange among Board members in a certain way) we have found that deliberation and interest-based preference maximisation are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as long as we manage to stop donor members from behaving like monopolists. To this end, we have to open up the Board from its present state of non-transparency, so that new input can be obtained from new constituents. This will also soften the current principal-agent structure that links members to their donors, easing the transition to market-driven governance rules that provide for the replacement of Board members if they do not fulfil the new constituents' expectations.
Jeffrey D. Hilmer
Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance by John S. Dryzek
A comparison of the 2005-2009 cabinet Merkel I (the “Grand“ Coalition) and the Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition cabinet Merkel II formed in 2009 presents an interesting puzzle. Political commentators and coalition theorists alike would have expected the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition to experience a relatively high, and the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition a relatively low level of overt inter-party conflict. In reality, however, relations in the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition were relatively conflictive, whereas the Grand Coalition seemed to manage conflict between reluctant partners successfully. This article seeks to explain these seemingly paradoxical differences between the two coalitions. It demonstrates that both the positioning of the coalition parties in the policy space and important institutions constraining coalition bargaining after the formation of the cabinet Merkel II (portfolio allocation, role of the CDU/CSU state minister presidents) disadvantaged the FDP in pursuing its key policy goals (especially tax reform). As a result, the Liberals resorted to “noisy“ tactics in the public sphere. The grand coalition, by contrast, was an alliance of co-equals, which facilitated a more consensual management of inter-party conflict.
Michel Foucault on Power
How and why is it that we in the West, in our arduous and incessant search for truth, have also built into and around ourselves intricate and powerful systems intended to manage all that we know and do? This, arguably, was the key problem to which Foucault applied himself. Central to his critical, historical ontology of Western, and especially Enlightenment, reason is an investigation of the constitutive relations between the operation of power relations, the production of knowledge, and ways of relating ethically to oneself and others. This article examines Foucault’s account of the relations of power which are said to underpin contemporary thought and to regulate and subject modern individuals. Contrary to the belief that Foucault’s conception of power is dogmatic and all-encompassing, leaving no room for progressive resistance or change and flowing over into the realm of theory such that truth itself becomes questionable, it is argued here that Foucault offers us an analysis of relations of power as ‘strategies of governance’ which depend for their operation on the existence of free subjects capable not only of resistance but of positively producing effects of truth in reality.
Democratic Theory and Democracy beyond Borders
Anthony G. McGrew
The prospect of a global economic recession, in the wake of the financial crises in the world’s emerging economies, has injected a sense of renewed urgency into longstanding discussions about the reform of global economic governance. But the calls for greater transparency and openness in the deliberations of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are largely symptomatic of a deeper legitimation crisis which afflicts all the key institutions of global governance, including the United Nations itself. For there is a growing perception that existing mechanisms of global governance are both ineffectual in relation to the tasks they have acquired, especially so in managing the consequences of globalisation, whilst also being unaccountable sites of power.
Defining Politics in the Emerging Global Order
In the wake of globalisation different social science disciplines have found themselves entering into similar terrains of inquiry. However, each discipline tends to draw on different and often contradictory understandings of the political, and of related notions such as power. The lack of a shared notion of politics may prevent social scientists from gaining important insights from other disciplines. In this paper I therefore seek to demonstrate that seemingly contradictory notions of politics are better seen as different forms of political interaction. I define politics as activities through which people and groups articulate, negotiate, implement and enforce competing claims. By distinguishing different types of claims made within different institutional circumstances, I outline three basic forms of political interaction: governance, stalemate and social dilemma, and give examples of how each of these forms of political interaction has emerged in response to the global integration of market in different circumstances and areas of the world.
While the Federal Republic has been famously characterized as a "grand coalition state," the Merkel government, formed in the after-math of the 2005 federal election, is only the second CDU/CSU-SPD coalition at the federal level since 1949. A comparison of the present administration with the first grand coalition government (1966-1969) reveals a wealth of differences that include some of the basic parameters of governing and governance in Germany, such as the structure of the party system and the overall public climate. Also, the personnel features and patterns of informal coalition governance under Chancellors Angela Merkel and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger display major differences. Arguably the single most important difference between the two administrations, however, relates to the level of public policy, with the Merkel government seeking to reverse some of the key decisions of its historical predecessor. Such u-turn dynamics have been particularly tangible in the field of federal system reform.
Canada and Airport Refugee Claimants in the 1980s
modern era, focusing particularly on the history of the passport and its subtle but integral connections to race and citizenship. 14 In Canada, these dynamics prevailed in the post-Confederation period as authorities turned to various governance tools
Responding to a Response by Agafonow
Garrett W. Brown
In the preceding article Alejandro Agafonow explores the idea of incorporating market-based approaches into the structure of The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in order to address particular deliberative and democratic shortcomings (Agafonow 2011). This exploration was in response to an article I wrote on safeguarding deliberative global governance within the Global Fund and with particular deliberative deficits that were highlighted within that article (Brown 2010). In my article, it was argued that the decision- making capacity of the Global Fund suffered from a deliberative deficit in that donor members enjoyed an unfair advantage in boardroom deliberations due to two structural inequalities. First, donors enjoyed an unfair deliberative advantage because of their ability to utilise an effective veto, which manifested itself in the form of possible threats in the reduction of future donations if specific initiatives passed. Second, donors often enjoyed an unfair negotiating position due to their ability to meet prior to Board meetings and thus possessed an ability to create donor caucuses where collective voting strategies could be formulated. It was concluded that these two conditions created real perceptions of unequal deliberation between donor and non-donor Board members and therefore threatened to render the Global Fund’s multisectoral mandate for creating deliberative decision-making via agreed consensus as mere window-dressing for an obfuscated form of multilateral power politics as usual. In responding to this deliberative deficit, I argued that certain regulative devices should be incorporated into the Global Fund Framework Document as a means to safeguard deliberative procedures constitutionally within the multisectoral Global Fund Board.