for this conclusion seems weak. Moreover, this explicit argument does not obviously speak to the substantive claims that Sartre makes about non-self-identical consciousness. Crucially, it does not tell us how pre-reflective self-consciousness relates
Sartre’s Implicit Argument for the Non-Self-Identity of the Subject
Jean-Paul Sartre's account of the Look in Being and Nothingness is not straightforward and many conflicting interpretations have arisen due to apparent contradictions in Sartre's own writing. The Look, for Sartre, demonstrates how the self gains thematic awareness of the body, forming a public and self-conscious sense of how the body appears to others and, furthermore, illustrates affective and social aspects of embodied being. In this article, I will critically explore Sartre's oft-cited voyeur vignette in order to provide a coherent account of the Look and to illustrate the significance of intersubjectivity and self-consciousness in Sartre's work. Through considering Sartre's voyeur vignette and other examples of reflective self-consciousness, this article will examine epistemological, self-evaluative and ontological concerns in the constitution of reflective self-consciousness. It will be contended that Sartre's accounts of the Look and reflective self-consciousness within social relations can provide insight into the intersubjective nature of the shaping of the body and the significance of self-presentation within the social realm.
Jean-Paul Sartre argues that human beings are fundamentally incomplete. Self-consciousness brings with it a presence-to-self. Human beings consequently seek two things at the same time: to possess a secure and stable identity, and to preserve the freedom and distance that come with self-consciousness. This is an impossible ideal, since we are always beyond what we are and we never quite reach what we could be. The possibility of completion haunts us and we continue to search for it even when we are convinced it can never be achieved. Sartre suggests that we have to continue seeking this ideal in the practical sphere, even when our philosophical reflection shows it to be an impossibility. Sartre puts this existential dilemma in explicitly theological terms. 'God' represents an ideal synthesis of being and consciousness which remains a self-contradictory goal. This dilemma remains unresolved in his thinking.
Matthew C. Eshleman, Eric Hamm, Curtis Sommerlatte, Adrian van den Hoven, Michael Lejman, and Diane Perpich
consciousness, whether reflective or pre-reflective, not only has an intentional object but also is a “non-positional” or “non-thetic” consciousness of itself ( conscience de soi ). This form of self-consciousness does not take consciousness as an intentional
David Detmer and John Ireland
Sartre’s reasoning entails an implicit commitment to a distinctive theory of pre-reflective self-consciousness, which she calls “the non-iterative theory.” Four reviews of important recent books round out the issue. Happy reading! David Detmer John
could agree with, given his commitment to a permanent non-positional self-consciousness ( BN , 173). However, the infant differs from the adult in that she lacks reflective self-awareness. She has not yet posited herself as an object of consciousness
Can Being-for-itself Avoid Bad Faith?
Ronald E. Santoni
desire to be such is a bad faith way of seeing ourselves or the world. But if at the birth of our self-consciousness we are “congenitally oriented” 25 to doing so, may we justifiably apply the ethical judgment “immoral” to bad faith? Don't the terms
. Influenced by Dostoyevsky, he also seeks to resort to the hesitation and superfluousness of speech’s trials and errors, rather than to the speed and clarity of dramatic language which would entail the characters’ unrealistic self-consciousness. Finally
P. Sven Arvidson
waterfall. 30 In reverent awe, instead of only being presented with limitation in my existence (a limited self), consciousness is presented with a limitation in human existence. Reverent awe presents limitations of my kind – humankind. As Woodruff puts
Freedom, Subjectivity and Progress
Kimberly S. Engels
to achieve its own self-consciousness’. 17 This task can only be accomplished by understanding the practico-inert structures of one’s time, especially those related to class oppression. Sartre calls intellectuals – as members of a bourgeoisie who