While the rise of populism in Western Europe over the past three decades has received a great deal of attention in the academic and popular literature, less attention has been paid to the rise of its opposite— anti-populism. This short article examines the discursive and stylistic dimensions of the construction and maintenance of the populism/anti-populism divide in Western Europe, paying particular attention to how anti-populists seek to discredit populist leaders, parties and followers. It argues that this divide is increasingly antagonistic, with both sides of the divide putting forward extremely different conceptions of how democracy should operate in the Western European political landscape: one radical and popular, the other liberal. It closes by suggesting that what is subsumed and feared under the label of the “populist threat” to democracy in Western Europe today is less about populism than nationalism and nativism.
The Internal Logic of the Monarchia
Cary J. Nederman
Dante's Monarchia has proven to be an enigmatic contribution to the corpus of medieval political theory. Although typically held up as the quintessential statement of the principles of universal imperial authority, the tract does not conform to many of the standard conventions of medieval Latin defences of the supremacy of the Roman Empire, eschewing, for instance, the theme of translatio imperii. In this article, I examine Dante's critique of the Donation of Constantine and related topics in order to argue that, by his own logic, the legitimacy of a universal Roman Empire resides not with the German Holy Roman Emperor in the West but instead with the Byzantine Emperor. By conceiving of the Roman Empire in a way that undermines the possibility of its 'translation', and by rejecting the alienability of imperial authority at the heart of the Donation, Dante leads a careful reader to conclude that the true Empire has its home in Constantinople, not in Germany or elsewhere in Western Europe.
A state of the field review (2008-2018)
Jean-Paul Gagnon, Emily Beausoleil, Kyong-Min Son, Cleve Arguelles, Pierrick Chalaye, and Callum N. Johnston
Both “populism” and “populist” have long been considered ill-defined terms, and therefore are regularly misapplied in both scholarly and popular discourses.1 This definitional difficulty is exacerbated by the Babelian confusion of voices on populism, where the term’s meaning differs within and between global regions (e.g. Latin America versus Western Europe); time periods (e.g. 1930s versus the present), and classifications (e.g. left/ right, authoritarian/libertarian, pluralist/antipluralist, as well as strains that muddy these distinctions such as homonationalism, xenophobic feminism and multicultural neonationalism). While useful efforts have been made to navigate the vast and heterogeneous conceptual terrain of populism,2 they rarely engage with each other. The result is a dizzying proliferation of different definitions unaccompanied by an understanding as to how they might speak to each other. And this conceptual fragmentation reinforces, and is reinforced by, diverging assessments of populism which tend to cast it as either “good” or “bad” for democracy (e.g. Dzur and Hendriks 2018; Müller 2015).
. Berger , Suzanne D ., ed. 1981 . Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Burke , Edmund . [ 1790 ] 1969 . Reflections on the Revolution in France
Wolfgang Merkel and Jean-Paul Gagnon
’t cope with these different demands. So this is why Huntington, Crozier and Watanuki spoke of an overload crisis of the state specifically regarding the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. What’s quite interesting is that, if you read this
Prospects for Democratizing Democracy
( Bovero 2016 ; Bobbio 1984 ). This assumption rested on the principle of the inseparability of rights and on the project of increasing democratization inscribed in many democratic constitutions of the post-Second World War order in Western Europe and in
A History of Richard Turner’s Eclipse and Resurgence
2009 ; Marwick 1999 ; Suri 2005 ). In Western Europe and the United States the New Left was critical not only of capitalism but also of the communism of the Soviet Union and its doctrinaire interpretations of Marxism. What took form as the New Left in
Autocracy Promotion in the New Asian Order?
Octavia Bryant and Mark Chou
part of an impressive new plan that, once completed, will bind China to a region extending from Central Asia and the Middle East to Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and Western Africa. This modest outpost, once a transit point on the ancient Silk Road
Democratic Theory in a Time of Defiance
Jean-Paul Gagnon and Emily Beausoleil
Technologies of Expertise and the Future of Governing . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . 10.4159/9780674915435 Pauwels , Teun . 2014 . Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands . London : Routledge . 10
incorporation into another country or by way of confederation. This point assumes singular significance if one considers that Angola, one of the territorially big countries of Africa, is ‘nearly as large as Western Europe’ ( Davidson 1981: 129 ). Why is Western