twinned birthing of liberalism and imperialism in the nineteenth century, gave rise to liberal authoritarianism. This ideology, which underpinned Britain’s civilizing mission, took form in various enabling legal scaffoldings, including the evolution of
Violence in Britain’s Twentieth-Century Empire
Do “Bad” Concepts Drive Out “Good” Ones?
The aim of this article is to explore to what extent the rule of economics commonly known as Gresham's law (“bad money drives out good money”) can be extrapolated to verbal language (“bad concepts drive out good concepts”). Consequently, the goal of this article is twofold. First, for Gresham's law to be applied simultaneously to money and language, its unfortunate (“good”/“bad”) and obscure (“drives out”) wording should be clarified. Second, one should identify the contexts in which the validity of the law could be assessed best, and run a very preliminary test. For this purpose, the circulation of the adjective (“hard”, “strong”, or “stable” in Russian) in the word combination (“hard currency”) in use in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s was scrutinized.
Jennifer Ruth Hosek
The West Berlin anti-authoritarians around Rudi Dutschke employed a notion of subaltern nationalism inspired by independence struggles in the global South and particularly by post 1959 Cuba to legitimate their loosely understood plans to recreate West Berlin as a revolutionary island. Responding to Che Guevara's call for many Vietnams, they imagined this Northern metropolis as a Focus spreading socialism of the third way throughout Europe, a conception that united their local and global aims. In focusing on their interpretation of societal changes and structures in Cuba, the anti-authoritarians deemphasized these plans' potential for violence. As a study of West German leftists in transnational context, this article suggests the limitations of confining analyses of their projects within national or Northern paradigms. As a study of the influence of the global South on the North in a non-(post)colonial situation, it suggests that such influence is greater than has heretofore been understood.
Examining the Alternative for Germany in European Context
successfully mobilizing voters nationally. Thus, Germany is now, after all, no longer an exception to the new normal of successful—or at least politically relevant—radical-right, nationalist, and authoritarian populist parties within Europe’s liberal
Beginning in the 1980s, several historians began to challenge the view that fascism was a marginal phenomenon in interwar France, a view dubbed "the immunity thesis" by one of its critics. Surveying a range of works on far-Right intellectuals and movements during the 1920s and 1930s, this article suggests that "the immunity thesis" has been increasingly challenged by a variety of historians since the mid-1990s. However, a consensus on the issue has not emerged, as a number of historians stress the need to differentiate between fascism and other forms of right-wing nationalism in the French context. At the same time, there are signs that scholars are beginning to move beyond questions of categorization and address other themes relating to the inter-war Right. These new agendas have the potential to broaden our understanding of the late Third Republic in general.
This article explores a key claim underpinning Russian official memory politics, namely, the notion that Russia’s past (and especially the role it played in the Second World War) is the object of a campaign of “historical falsification” aimed at, among other things, undermining Russian sovereignty, especially by distorting young people’s historical consciousness. Although “historical falsification” is an important keyword in the Kremlin’s discourse, it has received little scholarly attention. Via an analysis of official rhetoric and methodological literature aimed at history teachers, I investigate the ideological functions performed by the concept of “historical falsification.” I show how it serves to reinforce a conspiratorial vision of Russia as a nation under siege, while simultaneously justifying the drive toward greater state control over history education.
Gustave Hervé and the Great War
Michael B. Loughlin
romantic, or authoritarian—the rather ingenuous Hervé had come to feel betrayed. The former history professor perceived his failure to unite revolutionaries as a rejection. This conclusion propelled him toward increasing identification with the nation as
Pınar Melis Yelsalı Parmaksız
examining Turkish modernization. 15 However, in this article, I aim to understand the way that modernization operated to validate an authoritarian political power (i.e., a single-party regime) on the basis of a specific understanding of gender relations
Misplacing the Dilemmas of the European Union--In Memory of Stanley Hoffmann
Charles S. Maier
countries were living under the Nazi yoke, and Brussels 2017 were Berlin 1942. For all of the EU’s vaunted achievement in spreading democratic values to Eastern Europe, leaders in Poland and Hungary seem intent upon imposing conformist if not authoritarian
Angela Merkel and the Challenges of Far-Right Populism
Joyce Marie Mushaben
among these groups, the socialist-capitalist axis and the authoritarian-libertarian axis. As of 2015 I would add a third dimension, the cosmopolitan-particularistic axis, encompassing the values, fears of social exclusion and “undervalued” personal