Love and Violence: Sartre and the Ethics of Need It could be argued that Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason substitutes Being and Nothingness' s ontological account of interpersonal violence, arising from bad faith, for a
Sartre and the Ethics of Need
This article interprets Sartre's ethical reflections as leading to a negativistic ethics, that is to say an ethics that denies the possibility of conceiving a positive ideal that has to be attained, and therefore limits itself to the criticising of the negative in the existing world as the only way left for ethics. After a brief introduction into negativism, the article sets out the negativism of Being and Nothingness and the metaethical dilemma that the ontological work poses for a conception of a traditional, positive ethics, which Sartre apparently tried to undertake in his Notebooks for an Ethics. Instead of speaking of a failure of Sartre's attempts to found a traditional ethics, the article shows how already in the Notebooks Sartre is on the way to establishing a conception of an ethics that can be called negativistic, and finally how the late Sartre attains, on the basis of the socio-ontological insights of his Critique of Dialectical Reason, a foundation for a genuinely negativistic ethics which he drafted in his 1964 Rome Lectures.
Sartrean Ethics in History, 1938–1948 – From Kantian Universalism to Derision
Translator : Ârash Aminian Tabrizi
It is very easy to read Sartre without worrying about Kant. Nonetheless, it has gradually dawned on me that, as far as ethics ( la morale 1 ) is concerned, Kant deeply impregnates Sartre’s thought. While I was working on the ‘original choice’, I
T. Storm Heter
This article presents a novel defense of Sartrean ethics based on the concept of interpersonal recognition. The immediate post-war texts Anti-Semite and Jew, What is Literature? and Notebooks for an Ethics express Sartre's inchoate yet ultimately defensible view of obligations to others. Such obligations are not best understood as Kantian duties, but rather as Hegelian obligations of mutual recognition. The emerging portrait of Sartrean ethics offers a strong reply to the classical criticism that authenticity would license vicious lifestyles like serial killing. In addition to acting with clarity and responsibility, existentially authentic individuals must respect others.
Simone de Beauvoir, Djamila Boupacha, and the Algerian War
This article situates Simone de Beauvoir's involvement in the case of Djamila Boupacha, an FLN militant who was tortured by the French Army in 1960, in the context of the repeated revelations of torture in course of the Algerian War. Drawing on Beauvoir's writings on ethics and other contemporary denunciations of torture, the essay illuminates how Beauvoir worked to overcome wide-spread public “indifference.” By focusing public attention on the Army's sexually degrading treatment of Boupacha, Beauvoir figured torture as a source of feminine and feminizing national shame.
Michelle R. Darnell
This article stresses the importance of one of Sartre's often overlooked novels, The Age of Reason (1945), and the possibility that it should be considered an early attempt by Sartre to answer the questions he raises at the very end of Being and Nothingness (1943). Considered as a preliminary response to Being and Nothingness, this novel provides an opportunity to explore how ethics might be lived, and draws a clear distinction between a theoretical understanding of being-for-itself and living authentically. As such, it is argued that Sartre's fictional writings, especially The Age of Reason, must be taken seriously in Sartre scholarship.
Joseph L. Walsh
In discussing Sartre’s contribution to a Marxist ethics of revolution, it is important first to note that it is the ethics of revolution that is under consideration and not the broader question of Marxism and morality. Much has been written in recent years on the question of morality in Marxism, focusing generally on moral theory and justice, for example, Rodney Peffer’s wonderful summation of discussions about Marxism’s moral vision regarding human action and social organization.
A Defense of Lacanian Responsibility
possible to locate the role of subjective responsibility in Lacanian theory, despite his rejection of human freedom in the sense that Sartre gives to it in Being and Nothingness . Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis To help clarify this remark on the ethical
In general, the Sartrean concept of the subject as "being-for-self" and "being-for-others" is read as if Sartre had sketched these structures as given "a priori" and therefore as unalterable. One of the consequences of this interpretation lies in calling Sartre's theory contradictory, especially with regard to his ethics, because of the assumption that, based on this concept, changing the inauthentic structures of the subject into authentic ones would be impossible. Contrary to this interpretation, I argue that Sartre's philosophical theory is by no means contradictory, neither in its relation to ethics nor as it relates to the complete edition of Sartre's philosophical writing, if one tries to understand what kind of theoretical requirements Sartre considered to be relevant and necessary. From this point of view, it is possible to work out an adequate and consistent interpretation. In order for me to argue for the immanent consistency of Sartre's theory and for the resulting possibility of an ethical theory based on it, I will discuss some aspects of the relation between epistemological, ontological and ethical elements within Sartre's philosophical system.
Ronald E. Santoni
Joseph S. Catalano’s most recent book on Sartre, Good Faith and Other Essays,1 is an important work. The fact that Part Two of this book – amounting to just over half of its extent – consists of essays that have appeared previously in journals does not undermine its significance and worthiness. For, viewed together, the essays in this part represent both some needed contemporary refinements of Sartre’s tantalising concept of bad faith and pioneering philosophical explorations of Sartre’s notions of good faith and authenticity. Ready access to them under a single cover increases the chance of their being read, and serves Sartrean scholarship. As background material, they here supplement Part One, Catalano’s brand new, masterfully honed, ‘A Sketch of a Sartrean Ethics’, which is ‘must’ reading for anyone pursuing the implications of an ‘integral’ Sartre for an ‘integral humanity’.