One cannot be responsible for a generic truth, argues Badiou in his critical rejoinder to Sartre; one can only be its militant. Challenging Badiou’s formulation, I propose that his plea for a new stage of the communist hypothesis, which unfolds in the wake of subjective decomposition of the Left, must draw upon the Sartrean notion of collective responsibility to affirm interminable inscription of the egalitarian axiom in a novel political sequence without forcing a violent realisation of equality. Encapsulated in an enigmatic formula, ‘one and one make one,’ Sartrean ethics of the Same compel the Badiouian militant subject to heed the excluded demands of the new proletariat insofar as the latter occupies ‘a point of exile where it is possible that something, finally, might happen.’
Badiouian Diagnosis, Lacanian Cure, Sartrean Responsibility
Hamish Fulton’s Cairngorm Walk-Texts
, specifically for an environmental ethics. Bennett’s argument for enchantment responds to what she diagnoses as the prevailing disenchantment narratives of modernity, which she traces through, among others, Max Weber, Hans Blumenberg and Simon Critchley. 8 A
Sartre and the Ethics of Need
Love and Violence: Sartre and the Ethics of Need It could be argued that Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason substitutes Being and Nothingness' s ontological account of interpersonal violence, arising from bad faith, for a
Counterfeits, Comedy and the Supreme Court
condensed via the ethical analysis of valour and imposture in Aristotle, the crucial intermediary between Homer and humanism. 23 A key passage is Aristotle’s discussion of courage at Nicomachean Ethics 1115a6–17b22. 24 The approach is both quantitative
This article interprets Sartre's ethical reflections as leading to a negativistic ethics, that is to say an ethics that denies the possibility of conceiving a positive ideal that has to be attained, and therefore limits itself to the criticising of the negative in the existing world as the only way left for ethics. After a brief introduction into negativism, the article sets out the negativism of Being and Nothingness and the metaethical dilemma that the ontological work poses for a conception of a traditional, positive ethics, which Sartre apparently tried to undertake in his Notebooks for an Ethics. Instead of speaking of a failure of Sartre's attempts to found a traditional ethics, the article shows how already in the Notebooks Sartre is on the way to establishing a conception of an ethics that can be called negativistic, and finally how the late Sartre attains, on the basis of the socio-ontological insights of his Critique of Dialectical Reason, a foundation for a genuinely negativistic ethics which he drafted in his 1964 Rome Lectures.
Sartrean Ethics in History, 1938–1948 – From Kantian Universalism to Derision
Translator : Ârash Aminian Tabrizi
It is very easy to read Sartre without worrying about Kant. Nonetheless, it has gradually dawned on me that, as far as ethics ( la morale 1 ) is concerned, Kant deeply impregnates Sartre’s thought. While I was working on the ‘original choice’, I
T. Storm Heter
This article presents a novel defense of Sartrean ethics based on the concept of interpersonal recognition. The immediate post-war texts Anti-Semite and Jew, What is Literature? and Notebooks for an Ethics express Sartre's inchoate yet ultimately defensible view of obligations to others. Such obligations are not best understood as Kantian duties, but rather as Hegelian obligations of mutual recognition. The emerging portrait of Sartrean ethics offers a strong reply to the classical criticism that authenticity would license vicious lifestyles like serial killing. In addition to acting with clarity and responsibility, existentially authentic individuals must respect others.
Michelle R. Darnell
This article stresses the importance of one of Sartre's often overlooked novels, The Age of Reason (1945), and the possibility that it should be considered an early attempt by Sartre to answer the questions he raises at the very end of Being and Nothingness (1943). Considered as a preliminary response to Being and Nothingness, this novel provides an opportunity to explore how ethics might be lived, and draws a clear distinction between a theoretical understanding of being-for-itself and living authentically. As such, it is argued that Sartre's fictional writings, especially The Age of Reason, must be taken seriously in Sartre scholarship.
A Critique of Thad Metz’s ‘Towards an African Moral Theory’
his moral theory renders it relevantly African. And, when it is compared to extant (individualistic) attempts to capture African ethics, Metz considers his account to be (more) plausible insofar as it best captures moral intuitions prevalent below the
Joseph L. Walsh
In discussing Sartre’s contribution to a Marxist ethics of revolution, it is important first to note that it is the ethics of revolution that is under consideration and not the broader question of Marxism and morality. Much has been written in recent years on the question of morality in Marxism, focusing generally on moral theory and justice, for example, Rodney Peffer’s wonderful summation of discussions about Marxism’s moral vision regarding human action and social organization.