, of moral judgment, including a “purity” foundation whose violation is supposed to provoke feelings of moral disgust ( Haidt 2012 ; Haidt and Graham 2007 ). TDM, however, recognizes only harm-based violations as being of moral psychological status
Search Results
Toward a Model of Distributed Affectivity for Cinematic Ethics
Ethical Experience, Trauma, and History
Philip Martin
, affect is deployed to understand how various levels of ethical engagement operate outside rational moral judgments ( Plantinga 2010a ). In this case, affect refers to specific forms of nonvoluntary response, emotional contagion, and lower-level processing
Five Thousand, 5,000, and Five Thousands
Disentangling Ruble Quantities and Qualities
Sandy Ross
should reflect economic order. What is at stake here, beyond moral judgments about Russian society, is the nature of ‘big’ and ‘small’. A menu bill for approximately 4,300 rubles can be used to index social, cultural, and economic disorder only in
Peter Jones, Michael Butler, Taylor Smith, Matthew C. Eshleman, and David Detmer
Three articles analyze David Detmer’s first book on Sartre, Freedom as a Value. Peter Jones argues that Sartre uses freedom in only one sense, as freedom to choose, whereas Detmer argues that Sartre distinguishes between freedom of choice (“ontological freedom”) and freedom of obtaining (“practical freedom”). Michael Butler’s paper contends that under a Sartrean framework, any moral judgment we make regarding our own action is never final; the meaning and moral value of our past actions always remains reinterpretable in light of what unfolds in the future. Our interactions with other people reveal that we are responsible for far more than we had initially supposed ourselves to be choosing when we began our project, such that it is in fact impossible to ever finish taking responsibility completely. Taylor Smith and Matthew Eshleman tackle Sartre’s supposed “subjectivism” from the opposite angle. They agree with Detmer that Sartre’s belief that values are mind-dependent does not necessarily entail ethical subjectivism, but argue that even the early Sartre was more fully committed to a cognitivist view of normative justification than Detmer allows. Detmer’s replies to all three essays round out this section and this issue.
In Sartre Studies International
- Published (Print):
- 01 Dec 2015
- Article Type:
- Research Article
- Pages:
- 85–133
Frances Pine
The socialist states of the Soviet Bloc fell, some gently and some far more abruptly and even violently, between 1989 and 1991. In the two decades that have followed, there have been continual attempts by politicians, social scientists, and other academics, as well as by the citizens of these “former socialist countries” themselves, to come to terms with competing memories of what socialism meant, was, and might have been. Simultaneously, efforts to weigh up and assess a range of very different pasts are matched by forecasts of imagined futures that somehow continue to be driven by and predicated on this complex and kaleidoscopic remembered history. The present, the here and now, can, however, be even more complicated; in some ways it neither escapes entirely from the past nor really sets the stage for the future, but rather is a continual state of “becoming”. Just as “memory” is never a “true” reflection of a time or an event, but rather a multiple layering of recollections that change each time they are evoked, none of these complex and rather messy temporalities actually matches the “real” past, present, or future—all carry complex moral judgments, reflect moral questions, and embody the tension between what might have been, what is, and what should be.
Malcolm Turvey
associate “reasoning” with conscious activity is misleading, as we shall see. Certainly, Plantinga repeatedly acknowledges that cognition plays a role in our ethical response to screen stories. He writes: Moral judgments are sometimes highly complex
Ethical Engagement with Movies
Response to Carl Plantinga's Screen Stories
Cynthia Freeland
his book that “the moving image media [are] particularly potent in their potential manipulation of spectator sympathies and allegiances, and indeed, of moral judgment” (2). For decades in work of other theorists, this tenet has led inexorably into
Stephen Prince
viewers say about flawed characters and their situations. Hohle discusses the sense-making strategies viewers employ and the ways that moral judgment helps to bridge gaps in a character’s represented behavior. Jens Eder takes up the issue of existential
Carl Plantinga
a policy speech, screen stories promote ethical thinking in large part by eliciting powerful emotions, many of them moral emotions. This debate about the nature of our moral judgments, as Turvey notes, extends far back into the history of
Brendan Rooney, Hanna Kubicka, Carl Plantinga, James Kendrick, and Johannes Riis
describe. She begins by arguing that our understanding of viewers’ moral judgments should rely on the “dual-process model of morality” derived from the work of Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene (2002). According to this theory, our real-life moral