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A Structure of Antipathy

Constructing the Villain in Narrative Film

Jens Kjeldgaard-Christiansen

, of moral judgment, including a “purity” foundation whose violation is supposed to provoke feelings of moral disgust ( Haidt 2012 ; Haidt and Graham 2007 ). TDM, however, recognizes only harm-based violations as being of moral psychological status

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Toward a Model of Distributed Affectivity for Cinematic Ethics

Ethical Experience, Trauma, and History

Philip Martin

, affect is deployed to understand how various levels of ethical engagement operate outside rational moral judgments ( Plantinga 2010a ). In this case, affect refers to specific forms of nonvoluntary response, emotional contagion, and lower-level processing

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Malcolm Turvey

associate “reasoning” with conscious activity is misleading, as we shall see. Certainly, Plantinga repeatedly acknowledges that cognition plays a role in our ethical response to screen stories. He writes: Moral judgments are sometimes highly complex

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Ethical Engagement with Movies

Response to Carl Plantinga's Screen Stories

Cynthia Freeland

his book that “the moving image media [are] particularly potent in their potential manipulation of spectator sympathies and allegiances, and indeed, of moral judgment” (2). For decades in work of other theorists, this tenet has led inexorably into

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Stephen Prince

viewers say about flawed characters and their situations. Hohle discusses the sense-making strategies viewers employ and the ways that moral judgment helps to bridge gaps in a character’s represented behavior. Jens Eder takes up the issue of existential

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Carl Plantinga

a policy speech, screen stories promote ethical thinking in large part by eliciting powerful emotions, many of them moral emotions. This debate about the nature of our moral judgments, as Turvey notes, extends far back into the history of

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Carl Plantinga

behavior of screen characters and in developing allegiances or oppositional stances in the world of the imagination. It has been argued that viewers develop an allegiance for characters primarily on the basis of moral judgment. This chapter suggests that

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Brendan Rooney, Hanna Kubicka, Carl Plantinga, James Kendrick, and Johannes Riis

describe. She begins by arguing that our understanding of viewers’ moral judgments should rely on the “dual-process model of morality” derived from the work of Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene (2002). According to this theory, our real-life moral

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Laura T. Di Summa-Knoop

, not only depend on the audience’s moral evaluation of the characters, but are also likely to play an active role in inviting moral evaluations and may even be able to steer the viewer’s moral compass, thus effectively contributing to moral judgment

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Philip J. Hohle

to privilege their own rational way of making moral judgments over the activity of actual viewers. We tend to find their untrained readings incompetent and could go so far as to describe them as “bad” ( Vaage 2016: 90 ). As commonly operationalized in