Philosophers, especially moral philosophers, repeatedly turn to examples to show their principles in action, or to put them to the test, or to refine them. But examples are also a distrusted resource; narrative (even a minimal narrative such as a philosophical example) may have a semantic waywardness which makes it an uncertain ally in philosophical discussion. What is at stake here is the extent to which stories can be contained within clearly delineated conceptual frames. To put it bluntly,
This article brings together the Sartrean concept of bad faith and Edward Upward's novel, Journey to the Border, first published in 1938. The aim is to provide an overtly political reading that challenges the surreal obscurity of Upward's psychological narrative, while at the same time showing the continuing relevance of Sartre's understanding of the psychological tensions and existential dilemmas of the modern condition. Upward's novel has been the focus of much critical debate as to the meaning of the story - the descent of the main character towards madness in the context of the 1930s threat of fascism and war - as well as the generic characterisation of the text in terms of satire, fable, fantasy or political parable. The article argues in contrast a more unequivocally ideological reading of the series of existential choices, both personal and political, of the main character as a struggle for individual freedom and authenticity through a radical commitment to socialism and responsibility for the Other.
This study of Sartre's first novel seeks to move beyond the metaphysical constraints that are implicit when specifically focusing on either the work's literary or philosophical qualities, instead approaching the text as metafiction. Through an understanding of the novel's self-referentiality, its awareness of its accordance to narrative technique or reliance on existential verbatim, one gains an understanding of Sartre's fascination with the dialogue that exists between literature and philosophy. The examination of La Nausée and its Anglo-American criticism leads to a re-evaluation of the role of bad faith, in which character, author and, particularly, reader, are implicit. For reading is, like Roquentin's concluding understanding of existence, a balancing-act between the in-itself and the for-itself; an interaction with bad faith in which it is the individual/the reader that is responsible for attributing meaning to experience/La Nausée.
The article advances an interpretation of the self as an imaginary object. Focusing on the relationship between selfhood and memory in Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, I argue that Sartre offers useful resources for thinking about the self in terms of narratives. Against interpretations that hold that the ego misrepresents consciousness or distorts it, I argue that the constitution of the ego marks a radical transformation of the conscious field. To prove this point, I turn to the role of reflection and memory in the creation of the self. Reflection and memory weave past, present and future into a consistent and meaningful life story. This story is no other than the self. I propose to understand the self as a fictional or imaginary entity, albeit one that has real presence in human life.
At the center of his ontological treatise, Being and Nothingness, in a section titled "The Look," Sartre creates a small narrative moment of dubious virtue in which he is able to resolve one of the truly vexing problems of phenomenology up to his time. It is the problem of the Other. How is it that one can apprehend the Other as subject? Previously, philosophy had sought to understand the other through reflection or attribution (and Sartre deals in particular with the Hegelian and Heideggerian accounts). But to regard the other as a reflection of oneself ends in an obvious solipsism: all others would be only reflections of oneself. To define the other as a subject simply because one saw a person standing there reduces subjectivity irretrievably to object status. And to attribute subjectivity to the other as an extension of experience with oneself as a subject renders one a source of mere doctrine through which to see others. Yet to proclaim the other to be unknowable as a subject leaves no basis upon which to speak about personal and social relations. I will argue that because Sartre's account of the look, his vision of the interpersonal as a subject-object relation, is couched within the realm of the visible, it takes the form of conflict. It will be my contention that being-for-others takes on a different character when articulated in terms of the spoken or "audible." And this difference will have certain socio-political ramifications.
Sarah Horton and Adrian van den Hoven
). Indeed, one could go farther than O'Shiel and ask whether literature and philosophy are ever as distinct as one might suppose. He suggests that “broadly speaking one can claim literature primarily evokes images and imagery through a narrative of some kind
The Genesis of Sartre’s Theatrical Career in Writings to, with, and by Beauvoir
Dennis A. Gilbert
criticizes in The Words . While the examples given in “Reading” suggest that the eventual nature of Sartre’s “Writing” would be narrative prose, references to theater and the use of theatrical terms are not at all absent from this autobiography. The problem
Nik Farrell Fox and Bryan Mukandi
‘merging narrative’ expounded by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium , which tells of humans born with two heads and four limbs, cut in half by Zeus through anger and destined to be incomplete until they merge with another and become whole again through love
John Gillespie, Kyle Shuttleworth, Nik Farrell Fox, and Mike Neary
. As contemporaries of Sartre and self-proclaimed existentialists (at least initially), it would be interesting to see how they fit into Webber's narrative. In the positive phase of his project, Webber sets about determining who ought to be included
Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth and Nik Farrell Fox
meticulously orchestrated ideals but composed of complex and messy concepts which are often forced into overly simplistic frameworks at the expense of accuracy. Indeed, the authors do not offer a simple narrative that all existential philosophers were