Germany has reduced its emissions of greenhouse gases more than almost any other industrialized democracy and is exceeding its ambitious Kyoto commitment. Hence, it is commonly portrayed as a climate-policy success story, but the situation is actually much more complex. Generalizing Germany's per-capita emissions to all countries or its emissions reductions to all industrialized democracies would still very likely produce more than a two-degree rise in global temperature. Moreover, analyzing the German country-case into eleven subcases shows that it is a mixture of relative successes and failures. This analysis leads to three main conclusions. First, high relative performance and high environmental damage can coexist. Second, we should see national cases in a differentiated way and not only in terms of their aggregate performances. Third, researchers on climate policies should more often begin with outcomes, work backward to policies, and be prepared for some surprises. Ironically, the most effective government interventions may not be explicit climate policies, such as the economic transformation of eastern Germany. Moreover, the lack of policy-making in certain areas may undercut progress made elsewhere, including unregulated increases in car travel, road freight, and electricity consumption. Research on climate and environmental policies should focus on somewhat different areas of government intervention and ask different questions.
This article argues that state visits are highly symbolic political performances by analyzing state visits to Berlin in the 1950s and 1960s. The article concentrates on how state visits blended in the Cold War's culture of suspicion and political avowal. Special emphasis is placed on the role of mass media and on the guests' reactions and behavior. State visits to Berlin illuminate the heavy performative and emotional burden placed on all participants. Being aware of the possibilities for self-presentation offered by state visits, West German officials incorporated state visitors into their symbolic battle for reunification. A visit to Berlin with extensive media coverage was, therefore, of prime importance for the German hosts. Despite their sophisticated visualization strategies, total control of events was impossible. Some visitors did not want to play their allotted role and avoided certain sites in Berlin, refused to be accompanied by journalists or cancelled their trips altogether.
The ability to conduct academic research is partly a function of the time
available for it, especially relative to teaching and administrative obligations.
1 For the last decade, both the number of students enrolled at German
universities and the number of full-time professors has remained at
about the same level. The number of wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter, doctorallevel
research assistants, however, has increased by more than half, and
the number of Lehrbeauftragte, those on temporary teaching contracts, has
increased by three-quarters. There is thus no lack of personnel to help
professors meet teaching or administrative obligations, or to assist on
research projects.2 Nevertheless, and particularly in the humanities, German
professors complain about their teaching burdens, about added
administrative tasks their universities place upon them,3 and about what
they see as new pressures to bring in funding or produce results.4 That the
Historikertag, the biannual meeting of German historians, had “Boundaries”
(2010) and “Resources—Conflicts” (2012) as the overarching themes
for its last two meetings seems in keeping with this sentiment.
Despite several breakthroughs that indicate radical right parties' significant electoral potential, they remain highly volatile players in both Poland and eastern Germany. This is puzzling because radical right competitors can benefit from favorable politico-cultural conditions shaped by postcommunist legacies. The electoral markets in Poland and the eastern German Länder show low levels of affective party identification and low levels of political trust in mainstream parties and government institutions. Most importantly, there is a sizeable, yet largely unrepresented segment of voters who share salient counter-cosmopolitan preferences. They point to a “silent counterrevolution“ against globalization and cosmopolitan value change that displays substantive affinities to radical right ideology. Offering a transborder regional comparison of the four most relevant radical right parties and their conditions for electoral mobilization in Poland and eastern Germany, this article argues that the radical right's crossnational volatility-and often underperformance-in elections is mainly caused by internal supply side factors. They range from organizational deficiencies, leadership issues, and internal feuds, to strategic failures and a lack of democratic responsiveness. In turn, the disequilibrium between counter-cosmopolitan demand and its political representation is likely to be reduced if radical right competitors become more effective agents of electoral mobilization-or new, better organized ones emerge.
The Body Politics of Popfeminist Musical Performances in the Twenty-first Century
-rock and anti-essentialist purpose. The real site of her attack on heteronormativity, however, is her body—as topic of her songs but also as a tool for her performance. 1 In a role-play between naked alien and red-glittery glamour queen, McGowan takes five
Gender, Liturgy, and Authority among Dominican Nuns in Castile in the Middle Ages
Mercedes Pérez Vidal
in the empowering of these aristocratic women, not only through the commission of works of art, but also through the liturgical performance and the use of monastic spaces. However, all these were also highly contested areas between the nuns and male
decolonization and migration. European studies scholars have been drawn to the Eurovision Song Contest ( esc ), founded in 1956, as a particularly conspicuous cultural venue where performances not only embody changing gendered and racialized ideals and
Small Parties in the 2017 Bundestag Election
David F. Patton
in turn, and considers their recent performances, their goals, campaign strategies, and election results. Finally, it examines why their electoral gains have not led to greater executive power. Growing Support for the Lesser Parties: A Long Wave or
Pegida’s Community Building and Discursive Strategies
present a configuration that would fit into existing political institutions, they stage their own identity as a fluid performance of rebellious discontent with government and globalization. Their loose organizational structure allows Pegida to affiliate
Angela Merkel, the Grand Coalition, and “Majority Rule” in Germany
Joyce Marie Mushaben
periods with positive performance records. Both undertook complicated federalism reforms, and orchestrated serious economic restructuring with “Stability and Growth Packages” (1967, 2008). Each pulled off the adoption of unpopular domestic security