This two-part article examines whether Sartre's final interviews, recorded in L'Espoir maintenant [Hope Now], indicate a final turn to belief through an overview of his engagement with the idea of God throughout his career. In Part 1 we examine Sartre's early atheism, but note the pervasive nature of secularised Christian metaphors and concepts in his religion of letters and the centrality of man's desire to be God in Being and Nothingness. His theoretical writings seek to refute the idea of God, but in doing so God is paradoxically both absent and present. In Part 2 we assess his anti-theism and consider his final encounter with theism in L'Espoir maintenant, arguing that it is part of Sartre's long-term engagement with the idea of God.
John H. Gillespie
John H. Gillespie
These two articles examine whether Sartre's final interviews, recorded in L'Espoir maintenant (Hope Now) indicate a final turn to God and religious belief through an overview of his engagement with the idea of God throughout his career. Part 1, published in Sartre Studies International 19, no. 1, examined Sartre's early atheism, but noted the pervasive nature of secularised Christian metaphors and concepts in his religion of letters and also the centrality of mankind's desire to be God in L'Etre et le néant (Being and Nothingness). Sartre's theoretical writings sought to refute the idea of God, but in doing so, made God paradoxically both absent and present. Part 2 considers Sartre's anti-theism and its implications for his involvement with the idea of God before examining in detail his final encounter with theism as outlined in L'Espoir maintenant, arguing that it is part of Sartre's long-term engagement with the divine, but refuting the idea that he became a theist at the end of his life.
Nature, God as radical Otherness, and God as absolute Value—all of which have not been fully recognised until now. On the back of this I will show, thirdly, that because God in a more theoretical—which is to say philosophical, theological or otherwise
Matthew C. Eshleman
This essay argues that an adequate account of bad faith cannot be given without taking the second half of Being and Nothingness into consideration. There are two separate but related reasons for this. First, the objectifying gaze of Others provides a necessary condition for the possibility of bad faith. Sartre, however, does not formally introduce analysis of Others until Parts III and IV. Second, upon the introduction of Others, Sartre revises his view of absolute freedom. Sartre's considered view of freedom helps to make sense out of bad faith in a way that does not seem possible were freedom absolute.
To talk about Sartre and literature in the 1960s is to talk about a range of disparate things: at the beginning of the decade stands the farewell to Literature, the myth of literature, enshrined in the autobiographical Les Mots. At the end is the critical dissection of the myth of literature as an absolute in the third volume of L’Idiot de la famille, in a farewell of another kind. As far as Sartre is concerned, then, this was a decade framed by highly public, but also highly ambiguous, statements about literature, ambiguous by their very literariness. Statements which are undoubtedly intensified by the ideological role of literature in the constitution of the figure of the intellectual.
John H. Gillespie
. There is no ‘témoin absolu’ [absolute witness]. Individuals may try to look at themselves from the outside, but this is impossible; one must engage one’s understanding in one’s time and act historically and fully within it: ‘Dieu est encore présent dans
. Consciousness is ‘for-itself’ because it is intentional; it is always consciousness of something, and it is empty apart from the object that it aims at. ‘Being-in-itself’, in contrast, is absolute and self-identical. It roughly refers to the existence of non
Husserl and Sartre on the Hyle of Pure Imagination
Husserl's notion of immanence and the relativity of both immanence and non-intentionality. As discussed in Ideas I , the notion of immanence is ambiguous between the sense of absolute self-givenness and the sense of real containment—an ambiguity Husserl
John Gillespie and Katherine Morris
Nothingness contains three different concepts of God: God as Nature, God as radical Otherness, and God as Absolute Value. He then uses Sartre's concept of the imaginary to explain how these concepts take on anthropomorphised forms in popular religions
John H. Gillespie, Marcos Norris, and Nik Farrell Fox
as Sartre’s theological predecessors, for the absolute freedom, or nothingness, of the for-itself grows out of the theological premise that human nature depends on a deity who ‘perpetually wills being into being’ (33). What is particularly intriguing