This critique of the theory of freedom and power, which Lawrence Hamilton advances in Freedom is Power (2014), maintains that Hamilton’s appeal to a genealogy of needs - (established in his earlier work, The Political Philosophy of Needs (2003)) to distinguish power from domination – is inconsistent with the theory of power he advocates. His account of needs is no less vulnerable than that of rivals to the problem of power he identifies. I advance a rights recognition theory, which is compatible with this theory of power and I argue that it helps to provide support for the distinction, which Hamilton wants to make, between power and domination, which one cannot obtain from his theory of needs.
Christopher J. Allsobrook
I make two main points in response to the two great articles on my book Freedom is Power: Liberty Through Political Representation (FIP) published in this issue of Theoria. First, I assess the power of ideas, especially vis-à-vis the important imperative to decolonise knowledge production, taking on board much of Boisen and Murray’s arguments while qualifying their tendency to overstate the case for the power of ideas. I then comment on Allsobrook’s criticism of my attempt in FIP to marry Foucault’s view of power with my genealogical account of needs. I take on board his main concern and then argue – all too briefly – that his alternative ‘rights recognition thesis’ fails to escape his own critique of my needs-based view of freedom as power aimed at overcoming domination.
This article examines the development of popular discourses of liberty as independence emerging from the struggles between peasants and landlords over the course of the late medieval and early modern periods. This discourse, relating to the aspirations of the dependent peasantry for free status, free tenure, and free labor, articulated a conception of independence that overlapped with the emerging republican discourse of the seventeenth century. However, whereas republicanism focuses almost exclusively on the arbitrary powers of the monarchical state, the popular tradition emphasizes freedom from the arbitrary powers of landlordism. After a brief introduction to the republican conception of liberty and a discussion of the dependent peasantry in England, the work of Gerrard Winstanley is presented as an innovative synthesis of popular and republican discourses of freedom as independence from the arbitrary powers of exploitation.
Helge Årsheim, Nicole Hochner, Helena Rosenblatt, Vilius Mačkinis, Søren Friis, Bogdan C. Iacob and Gennaro Imbriano
Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 288 pp.
Christopher H. Johnson, Bernhard Jussen, David Warren Sabean, and Simon Teuscher, eds., Blood and Kinship: Matter for Metaphor from Ancient Rome to Present (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013), 362 pp.
Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen, eds., Freedom and the Construction of Europe, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 878 pp.
Anna Grzes´kowiak-Krwawicz, Queen Liberty: The Concept of Freedom in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), 135 pp.
Conor Gearty, Liberty and Security (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013), 146 pp.
Balázs Trencsényi, The Politics of “National Character”: A Study in Interwar East European Thought (London: Routledge, 2012), 227 pp.
Janet Roitman, Anti-Crisis (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2014), 157 pp.
Ronald E. Santoni
In a probing paper entitled "The Misplaced Chapter on Bad Faith, or Reading Being and Nothingness in Reverse," Matthew Eshleman challenges part of my intensive analysis of Sartre's "Bad Faith," arguing that bad faith is essentially a social phenomenon, and that social elements—the Other, in particular—play a "necessary role in making bad faith possible." Although I share many of Eshleman's interpretative points about the importance of the "social" in Sartre's account, I contend, here, with textual support, that Eshleman is too extreme, and slights the original bad faith to which human reality, in its very "upsurge" as consciousness or freedom, is "congenitally" (Spiegelberg) predisposed. My continued appeal to Sartre's concept of "initial," "fundamental," project, or "natural attitude" of consciousness to flee its freedom—what I have called ontological bad faith—becomes the crux of my critical counter-challenge to Eshleman's thesis.
The impetus for exploring the relationship between Sartre and Foucault may be informed more by Foucault than by Sartre, as it would seem to be geared toward a Foucauldian determination of the discursive parameters of a particular dimension of modern philosophy; that is, of the history of philosophy, including, by extension, the history of existentialism. But insofar as this determination opens up a significant dimension of the situation of philosophy today - of our situation and of the situation of existentialism - it is also Sartrean in nature, as are the effects of this determination, a determination situated somewhere between Sartre's philosophy of freedom and the freedom afforded to Foucault and to us all by the practice of philosophy, and by its future possibilities, which include the possibility "… that I do not believe a word, not one little word, of all I've just scribbled."
James Cronin, George Ross, and James Shock, eds. What's Left of the Left: Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011)
Reviewed by Willy Jou
James Bohman, Democracy across Borders: From Dêmos to Dêmoi (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007)
Reviewed by by Conrad King
Ritter, Gerhard, The Price of German Unity. Reunification and the Crisis of the Welfare State, translated by Richard Deveson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)
Reviewed by Joyce M. Mushaben
Michaela Hoenicke Moore, Know Your Enemy. The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
Reviewed by John Bendix
Elena Mancini, Magnus Hirschfeld and the Quest for Sexual Freedom: A History of the First International Sexual Freedom Movement (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
Reviewed by Leila J. Rupp
Paul Betts, Within Walls: Private Life in the German Democratic Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
Reviewed by Charles S. Maier
Paolo Bellucci and Martin Bull
In May 2001, for the first time in the history of united Italy and,
therefore, for the first time in the history of the Italian Republic,
alternation in government occurred as a direct consequence of an
electoral victory of the opposition. The incumbent centre left government
(the Ulivo – Olive Tree Coalition, led by Francesco
Rutelli) was defeated, and a centre right coalition (the Casa delle
Libertà, or CDL – House of Freedoms, led by Silvio Berlusconi)
began governing Italy with a large parliamentary majority.
Narrating and Re-enacting the Australian Freedom Ride
This article explores the intersections between history, memoir, and collective memory. It re ects on my experience of writing, as both historian and former participant, about the 1965 Australian Freedom Ride, which protested racial discrimination against Aboriginal people. It also traces the ways in which memory of and discourse about that event has changed over time: how it was and is remembered and understood, and the di erent uses made of the event by Aboriginal people, educators, and historians.
Matthew C. Eshleman, Eric Hamm, Curtis Sommerlatte, Adrian van den Hoven, Michael Lejman and Diane Perpich
Thomas R. Flynn, Sartre: A Philosophical Biography
Steven Churchill and Jack Reynolds, eds., Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts
Benedict O’Donohoe, ed., Severally Seeking Sartre
Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer, and Clara Bravo Morando, eds., Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind
Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cocktails
Dan Williams, Klein, Sartre and Imagination in the Films of Ingmar Bergman
Mark Hulliung, Sartre and Clio: Encounters with History
Kris Sealey, Moments of Disruption: Levinas, Sartre, and the Question of Transcendence