In his book The Anxiety of Influence. A Theory of Poetry,2 Harold Bloom presents several ‘revisionary ratios’, that is, several ways in which an author may critically refer to his predecessor in order to separate himself3 from the latter. The author’s criticism of his predecessor manifests an anxiety of influence insofar as it overstates the differences and neglects the similarities between his and his predecessor’s works. In this paper I shall show that some aspects of Sartre’s criticism of Kant’s moral theory in the Notebooks for an Ethics mani- fest an anxiety of influence.
Ruth Hatlapa and Andrei S. Markovits
We very much appreciate Stefan Immerfall’s insightful criticism of our
recent contribution to German Politics and Society. Needless to say, we beg
to differ with his views and strongly disagree with his assessment of our
work. For brevity’s sake we will only engage a few points.
In Memory of Terry Hawkes (1932–2014)
Graham Holderness and Richard Wilson
This issue is devoted to the radical and innovative Shakespeare criticism that emerged in Britain in the 1980s; and to the memory of a hugely influential and much-loved leader in the field, Professor Terence Hawkes, who died in 2014.
Terry Hawkes' seminal essay 'The Heimlich Manoeuvre' forms the basis of this personal tribute, which tries to suggest what is special about his style of criticism, and what his interest in the oral may tell us about the sources of his energy.
I think highly of Uri Bar-Joseph’s scholarship on Israeli national security, which is why I was so dismayed to read his harsh review of my book, Defense and Diplomacy in Israel’s National Security Experience, and why I feel compelled to respond to his misplaced criticisms.
Critical Survey has throughout its existence published creative alongside critical writing. From time to time such work has included short stories and short plays; while the ‘Poetry’ section has remained a constant element in the Table of Contents. This issue focuses on something rather different: on what the guest editors Rob Conkie and Scott Maisano call ‘creative writing informed by literary criticism’.
An Interview with Lidia Vianudf
Ruth O'Callaghan and Lidia Vianu
Lidia Vianu is Professor of English Contemporary Literature at the University of Bucharest. She has twice been Fulbright lecturer in Comparative Literature in the United States: at the State University of New York, Binghamton, NY, and the University of California, Berkeley. She is also a poet, novelist, critic, and translator, who has published five books of literary criticism as well as Censorship in Romania, a book of interviews and translations. She has written one novel and three poetry collections. Her editing work includes six anthologies of British and American literature and criticism, and she has translated works into both Romanian and English. In 2005 she won, jointly with Adam J. Sorkin, the Corneliu M. Popescu Prize for European Poetry Translation.
In this article, I reconsider the question of how best to understand Sartre's concept of bad faith by investigating it through the Derridean lens of deconstruction. I argue that Sartre's discussion of bad faith in Being and Nothingness mirrors Derrida's criticisms of structuralism in 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences'. Examining their distinctive discussions of 'play', I claim that Derrida's unique deconstructive interpretation of this notion operates within Sartre's criticisms of the 'spirit of seriousness'. I reinterpret bad faith as the attempt to solidify a permanent structure of one's personality, in order to avoid or escape from the 'play' or 'freedom' built into structures and our existential condition, and conclude that embracing 'play' is an essential characteristic of authenticity.
Rivca Gordon and Haim Gordon
Modern schools have been criticised by throngs of intellectuals, quite often with justice. Adding the prefix post-modern to some schools has done nothing to temper the validity of much of the criticism. Critics of schools have addressed, among other topics, low learning achievement of pupils and an insipid milieu, a debilitating school social structure and the spread of vile and, at times, criminal behaviour among pupils, a dire lack of genuine spirituality and the spread of a congealing stupidity. Quite a few critics have also discussed a host of rather irrelevant psychological, sociological, and anthropological issues related to schooling. Yet almost all of this criticism has not addressed the ontology of modern schools; nor has it considered the ontic developments that appeared with the burgeoning of schooling.
Ronald E. Santoni
In “Santoni on Bad Faith and sincerity: A vindication of Sartre,” Xavier Monasterio uses the recent publication of my book, Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre’s Early Philosophy,1 as an occasion to “reevaluate an important piece of the Sartrean heritage” and to take me to task for some of my detailed criticisms and reconstruction of core Sartrean views on bad faith and sincerity. Charging that I have “missed Sartre’s point” in places, he sets out to show how some basic criticisms in two of my chapters are unwarranted and, hence, that Sartre is in no need of the “rescuing operation,” “salvaging efforts,” or “reconstruction” that I offer in these early chapters.