Few scholars have addressed Arabic adaptations of The Taming of the Shrew, though it remains among the most popular Shakespearean comedies in the Arab world. The first Arabic performance of Shrew in Egypt in 1930 marked a significant landmark in the history of Arab Shakespeares, as the translator rendered the play in colloquial Egyptian Arabic, rather than in the formal, classical Arabic accessible to the educated elite. As such, the play offered the uneducated Egyptian public – and women in particular – unprecedented access to this work of Shakespeare. Instrumental to the adaptation’s success was Fāṭima Rushdī, owner and lead actress of the company that performed this first Arabic Shrew. In this and other roles as one of Egypt’s first renowned Shakespearean actresses, Rushdī not only effectively recast Shakespeare in an Egyptian mould, but also cast Egyptians in a Shakespearean mould, with effects that still echo today.
Fāṭima Rushdī and the First Performance of Shrew in Arabic
David C. Moberly
Longfellow and the Campaign for Poets' Corner
David Haven Blake
In 1884, a bust of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow was unveiled in Poets' Corner, Westminster Abbey, positioning the American between memorials to Geoffrey Chaucer and John Dryden. Longfellow was the first foreign author thus honoured, and his selection created transatlantic controversy. Through newspapers and correspondence, this article explores how Longfellow's bust came to be in Poets' Corner, tracing the role of its organizer, Dr William Cox Bennett, his benefactors in government and the Palace, and a host of distinguished contributors to the campaign. While nineteenth-century celebrity is often described as a public phenomenon accompanied by crowds of cheering admirers, the memorialization campaign centred on transatlantic elites who praised Longfellow's virtue, humility, and internationalism. The article examines how the campaign shaped the meaning of both Poets' Corner and late nineteenth-century transatlantic fraternity and argues that it also became the setting for conflicting ideas about literature, cosmopolitanism, national memory, and Victorian racial theories.
Alan B. Spitzer
The May 1948 issue of Les Temps Modernes published three short essays entitled "Nés en 1925." The young authors were Jean-François Lyotard, who was to become a philosopher of international distinction; Paul Viallaneix, his generation's outstanding Michelet scholar; and Pierre Gripari, the author of a wide variety of works including popular books for children. They had been comrades (along with the future sociologist Alain Touraine), at the khâgne of the Lycée Louis-le-Grand, which prepared a student elite to compete for entrance into the École normale supérieure. Their contributions reflected the experience of an intense traditional education under the pressures of war and the Occupation. Their subsequent careers reveal the relation of the permanent stamp of a common formation and the individual experience of particular circumstances.
Fanon, Marx, 'the Poors' and the 'new reality of the nation' in South Africa
In an earlier paper, written in reaction to those who argued that the African National Congress (ANC) had no alternative but to implement neoliberal economic policies in the context of the ‘Washington Consensus’, I discussed the strategic choices and ideological pitfalls of the ‘political class’who took over state power in South Africa after the end of apartheid and implemented its own homegrown structural adjustment programme (Gibson 2001). Much of this transition has been scripted by political science ‘transition literature’ and much of it is proactive, mapping out what should be done to establish a ‘pacted’, ‘elite’ democracy overseeing neoliberal economic policies (O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead 1986). From another vantage point, I argued that Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth is perhaps one of the most perceptive critiques of the transition literature available. This paper continues the discussion.
That democracy has won is common cause. The vast majority of states of the world today are termed ‘democratic’, a fact that stands in some contrast to the global order just some fifty years ago. Even more importantly, there is no competing alternative model of political rule, other than perhaps forms of radical Islam. Yet at the very moment of its triumph, democracy finds itself in trouble. Recent survey evidence from the United States suggests both political disengagement and a growing cynicism towards parties and elites, and similar trends are evident in Europe. Moreover, democracy faces substantial problems in the developing world, whether a tangible fragility among newly democratic states in Africa, or serious discontent at the responsiveness of government in many middle-income countries. Hence, at the very moment of hegemony we have increasing talk of democratic deficit.
This paper criticises the concept of culture as deployed within debates on moral relativism, arguing for a greater appreciation of the role of power in the production of a society's purportedly 'moral' norms. The argument is developed in three stages: (1) analysis of the relation between ideology and morality, noting that the concept of morality excludes self-serving moral claims and justifications; (2) analysis of the concept of culture, drawing attention to an ambiguity in its usage and to the hierarchical social structures within which the actual bodies of cultures are produced and reproduced; and (3) contention that (1) and (2) provide the basis for a radical and socially effective species of immanent critique: the exposure of existing norms and institutions purported to be morally justified as masks for the self-interest of elite groups.
Earl Jeffrey Richards
In May 1995 German academe was rocked by the revelation that one
of its most respected members, Hans Schwerte, the recently deceased
former rector of the University of Aachen and Goethe scholar, was
actually Hans Ernst Schneider, a high-ranking official in Himmler’s
research organization, the SS-Ahnenerbe (“ancestral heritage”). Since
this revelation there has been a veritable explosion of literature, no
less than twelve monographs and essay collections, devoted to the
questions of whether Schneider as Schwerte is an exemplary or symbolic
figure for Germany’s transformation into a democratic society,
whether his career as an “academic manager” in the Third Reich and
his university career in the Federal Republic attest to the well-known
continuity of elites, independent of political beliefs, and whether
Schneider owed his subsequent professional success to connections
with somewhat unsavory (albeit fully legal and quite public) networks
of former Nazis.
Eva Hahn and Hans Henning Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern: Legenden, Mythos, Geschichte (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010)
Reviewed by Michael Ennis
Katherine Pratt Ewing, Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008)
Reviewed by Julia Woesthoff
Shelley Baranowski, Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)
Reviewed by Daniel J. Walther
Andrew Beckford, Fallen Elites: The Military Other in Post-Unification Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011)
Reviewed by Dale Herspring
Annemarie H. Sammartino, The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914-1922 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010)
Reviewed by Catherine Epstein
Charles Lansing, From Nazism to Communism: German Schoolteacher under Two Dictatorships (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010)
Reviewed by Catherine Plum
In 1999, Germans celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Federal Republic. Unlike the fiftieth anniversary of other events in the recent national past—the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, the anti-Jewish pogrom of November 1938, and the unconditional surrender in 1945—this is not an awkward occasion for the country’s elites. On the contrary, the Federal Republic is indisputably Germany’s most successful state, and its record of stability and prosperity compares favorably with that of two prominent neighbors, France and Italy. This anniversary gives us pause to pose the basic questions about West Germany. How was it possible to construct an enduring democracy for a population that, exceptions notwithstanding, had enthusiastically supported Hitler and waged world war to the bitter end?
Many writers have argued that anti-immigration politics in Germany
and other West European countries have been driven by radical-right
parties or the electoral maneuvering of national politicians
from established parties. Others have argued that waves of violence
against immigrants and ethnic minorities have spurred anti-immigration
politics, or that racist ideologies and socioeconomic inequality
are the root causes. By comparison, authors have paid relatively little
attention to anti-immigration mobilization at subnational levels,
including the public positions taken by subnational politicians and
the activities of movement groups, or “challengers.” Nonetheless,
research has shown that subnational politicians are often important
in pressing national campaigns for immigration controls. Moreover,
as I have argued elsewhere, anti-immigration politicians in Britain
and Germany have responded in large part to local challengers, who
were aided by political elites at local and regional levels.