Globalization calls into question the fate of nation-states and, thereby, the kind of representative government that has developed within their confines. What is being challenged is, more precisely, the idea of political equality on which
Democratic Theory and Democracy beyond Borders
Anthony G. McGrew
The prospect of a global economic recession, in the wake of the financial crises in the world’s emerging economies, has injected a sense of renewed urgency into longstanding discussions about the reform of global economic governance. But the calls for greater transparency and openness in the deliberations of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are largely symptomatic of a deeper legitimation crisis which afflicts all the key institutions of global governance, including the United Nations itself. For there is a growing perception that existing mechanisms of global governance are both ineffectual in relation to the tasks they have acquired, especially so in managing the consequences of globalisation, whilst also being unaccountable sites of power.
Classical Arguments and New Issues
W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz
The world being one is a perennial dream of humanity. Since we are a single species, ideally and logically, there should be all-embracing justice and a better life for all. Should this vision come to pass, the material, political, cultural, and religious differences among human beings could be to at least some degree reconciled, and prospects for lasting peace greatly enhanced. Threatened by unsolved world problems, we might thus begin to consider the prospect of a global authority, a political organization that would transcend the nationstate and could bring about the unity of humankind, global justice, and earthly peace. Like Thomas Magnell, we might start to believe that ‘the predicament of vulnerability of nation-states calls for a global authority with sufficient power to redress or prevent attacks on themselves’.1 Accepting an elaborate argument of Alexander Wendt, we might even come to think that such an authority and a universal world state were inevitable.
In this schematic article I adumbrate an approach to normative political theory that is based on the idea that individual autonomy is a fundamental political value (Section I) and draw out some important consequences of the approach for the global political order (Section II).
Offensive Realism, the Bush Doctrine, and the 2003 Iraq War
Carlos L. Yordán
Research in the discipline of international relations finds that the great democratic powers are less likely to pursue revisionist policies. This investigation challenges this argument by showing that the United States' decision to oust Saddam Hussein's regime in March 2003 was consistent with a modified version of John Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, which finds that great powers' motivation is global hegemony. This article is divided into three sections. The first section considers the value of Mearsheimer's theory and reworks it by adding domestic variables to explain why states abandon defensive strategies for offensive ones. The second section shows how pre-9/11 American foreign policy strategy was, for the most part, status quo oriented, and section three explains why and how the Bush administration introduced a revisionist foreign policy strategy after the 9/11 attacks. This investigation concludes by showing how the 2003 Iraq War is the first step in the United States' quest for global hegemony.
A Market-based Approach to Address Garrett W. Brown's 'Deliberative Deficit' within the Global Fund
Garrett W. Brown has argued that donor voting caucuses produce a deliberative deficit between donor and non-donor members in the Global Fund International Board. Although we agree with this assessment, in our research on low-transaction cost alternatives to cope with consistent deliberative conditions (i.e. low-cost arrangements to bring about the exchange among Board members in a certain way) we have found that deliberation and interest-based preference maximisation are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as long as we manage to stop donor members from behaving like monopolists. To this end, we have to open up the Board from its present state of non-transparency, so that new input can be obtained from new constituents. This will also soften the current principal-agent structure that links members to their donors, easing the transition to market-driven governance rules that provide for the replacement of Board members if they do not fulfil the new constituents' expectations.
The theme of this article is the threat—and the opportunities—posed to progressive aspirations by the phenomenon that has come to be known as globalization. A decade ago the term globalization was a novelty both in academic circles and in the popular press. Now, no discussion of economics or political debate seems complete without reference to it. And the recent attacks of Al Qaeda and the invasion of Iraq push the problems of an international legal order and the potential universality of the rights of man to the top of the agenda. Yet in its essence globalization is not a recent—or even a 20th century—phenomenon. The view that globalization is no new phenomenon has some substance. Many commentators have pointed to the level of international trade in the decades before World War.1 And some have thought of ancient Greco-Roman civilization as an instance of globalization— was it not appealed to by St Augustine in his opinion that ‘secrus judicat orbis terrarium’? This is true in the sense that the Roman Empire provided political and legal systems in which diverse nations and cultures could be to an impressive extent integrated. But it was not global: consider the contemporary but separate empires in China, India and possibly South America. Globalization in the literal sense of the word has to do with the rise of capitalism.
Identity is a key concept in psychoanalytic psychology and, consequently, in psychohistorical studies. My task here is not to say anything further about the concept itself – my use of it will be in generalised and unrigorous terms – but to extend its use in psychohistory from its normal attachment to personal, ethnic, religious, and national contexts to the global.
Iris Marion Young
The world did not need the war against Iraq to understand that the United States of America stands alone among states in the magnitude of its military might. The blatant manner in which the U.S. flaunted that power in the face of fierce opposition from global civil society and nearly all states, however, demonstrates that the U.S. will use its power in ways that it judges right, without the approval or consent of other agents.
Samuel Moyn and Jean-Paul Gagnon
Samuel Moyn provides insight into how the history of democracy can continue its globalization. There is a growing belief that the currently acceptable fund of ideas has not served the recent past well which is why an expansion, a planetary one, of democracy’s ideas is necessary – especially now as we move deeper into the shadow of declining American/Western imperialism and ideology. Deciding which of democracy’s intellectual traditions to privilege is driven by a mix of forced necessity and choice: finding salient ground for democracy is likely only possible in poisoned traditions including European ones.