Introduction As the eu' s largest economy, Germany was thrust into a new leadership role in Europe with the onset of the Euro crisis in 2010. This new role has resulted in debates about its status as Europe's “reluctant hegemon.” 1 According
Irish National Identity and Germany as a “Significant Other” during the Euro Crisis
Whither “Partners in Leadership”?
Before a farewell trip to Berlin in November 2016, (a sixth to Germany while in office) u.s . President Barack Obama hailed Chancellor Angela Merkel as his “closest international partner.” 1 Indeed, the confluence of calibrated u
Jonas Heering and Thane Gustafson
Germany's Energiewende (energy transition) is in trouble. On 20 September 2019, following an 18-hour-long summit of the so-called climate cabinet, Germany's governing coalition announced that it had agreed on the basic structure of a new climate
Continuity, Change, and the Role of Leaders
Continuity and Change in German-Russian Relations A time traveler from 1989 would hardly recognize today’s Russia—or today’s Germany. Thus, it should surprise no one that German-Russian relations have also been transformed in this period. This
Daniela R. P. Weiner
At the end of the Second World War, education was seen by the Allies as a powerful tool in the remaking of postwar Europe. The Allies believed that the denazification, reorientation, and reeducation of Italian and German children through schools and
-Eurozone) countries. Ultimately, the crisis posed a systemic risk to the future of the single currency, which required political management. Under the conditions of the crisis, Germany moved into the position of the eu ’s leadership hegemon. Initially, this was
German Economic History The social market economy is the foundation of our country's economic success. 1 —Angela Merkel … an export article made in Germany. 2 —Economics Minister Peter Altmaier on the German economic system
Luke B. Wood
Germany’s increased power capabilities in foreign affairs since reunification have prompted scholars to argue that the country should be viewed as a regional hegemonic power, exercising significant influence not only over smaller countries in Eastern and Southern Europe, but also over the institutions of the European Union. After providing a critical assessment of the literature on hegemony in Europe, this article outlines three main trends in the scholarship on German power in European affairs. First, scholars tend to exaggerate Berlin’s power capabilities relative to other major European states such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Research shows that Europe is best understood as a multipolar regional order, not a hegemonic system dominated by one powerful state. Second, German leadership in Europe is contested and often delegitimized. Since 1949, German political elites have not been able to exercise influence in Europe without the support of other European states. This remains true even after the collapse of the Franco-German “tandem” in the wake of the European debt crisis. Third, scholars fail to adequately address how American power in the North Atlantic impacts regional polarity. Since reunification, the role of the United States in Europe has only increased and American influence over Eastern Europe, in particular, surpasses that of other European powers, including Germany.
This article examines how colonial reckoning is belatedly becoming part of the German memory landscape thirty years after reunification. It argues that colonial-era questions are acquiring the status of a new phase of coming-to-terms with the past in Germany alongside—and sometimes in tension with—the memory of the National Socialist and East German pasts. This raises new and difficult questions about what it means for the state and citizens to act responsibly in the face of historical wrongs and their lasting consequences. Given deep disagreements over what responsibility for the past means in practice, these questions also raise the stakes for the future of Germany’s global reputation as a normative model for democratic confrontations with difficult pasts. It provides an overview of the circumstances after reunification in which colonial memory issues came to the fore, and analyzes a 2019 Bundestag debate on colonial heritage as an example of how the main contours of colonial memory are being configured within the context of contemporary politics.
Stephen J. Silvia
Since German unification, assessments of the German economy have swung from “sick man of the euro” in the early years to dominant hegemon of late. I argue that the German economy appears strong because of its recent positive performance in two politically salient areas: unemployment and the current account. A deeper assessment reveals, however, that German economic performance cannot be considered a second economic miracle, but is at best a mini miracle. The reduction in unemployment is an important achievement. That said, it was not the product of faster growth, but of sharing the same volume of work among more individuals. Germany’s current account surpluses are as much the result of weak domestic demand as of export prowess. Germany has also logged middling performances in recent years regarding growth, investment, productivity, and compensation. The article also reviews seven challenges Germany has faced since unification: financial transfers from west to east, the global financial crisis, the euro crisis, internal and external migration, demographics, climate change, and upheavals in the automobile industry. German policy-makers managed the first four challenges largely successfully. The latter three will be more difficult to tackle in the future.