The present study examined the extent to which youth who endorse emo subculture reject the traditional masculine norm of restrictive emotionality. It also examined the relationships between endorsement and rejection of emo subculture and traditional masculine and feminine norms and masculine gender role conflict. In Study 1 (N = 13) three focus groups were conducted to create the mixed methods Emo Culture Questionnaire (ECQ). In Study 2 (N = 164) exploratory factor analysis of the quantitative part of the ECQ resulted in a 15-item, 4-factor scale; however, due to low reliabilities, only two scales were used in the analyses. Three hypotheses were mostly supported. The endorsement of emo subculture by men was negatively associated with their Restrictive Emotionality subscale scores of both the Male Role Norms Inventory-Revised (MRNI-R) and Gender Role Conflict Scale (GRCS). The endorsement of emo subculture by women was negatively associated with their MRNI-R Restrictive Emotionality scores but was not positively associated their Femininity Ideology Scale (FIS) Emotionality scores. Negative views of the emo subculture by both men and women were positively correlated with their MRNI-R Restrictive Emotionality scores. An exploratory question found that the endorsement of emo subculture had significant negative correlations with three additional MRNI-R subscales and the total scale for men and with five MRNI-R subscales and the total scale for women. In addition, the endorsement of emo subculture had significant negative correlations with two FIS subscales, and with two additional GRCS subscales and the total scale for men. Qualitative results from the ECQ indicated that while the label “emo” may not function as a personal identifier, the music, fashion, and behavior thus identified remain popular.
Noah N. Allooh, Christina M. Rummell, and Ronald F. Levant
Ronald F. Levant, Stephen T. Graef, K. Bryant Smalley, Christine Williams, and Neil McMillan
Data were collected on samples of American (N = 172) and Scottish (N = 264) adolescents to evaluate the scale reliability and construct validity of an adolescent version of Levant et al.’s (1992) Male Role Norms Inventory. Results indicate that the MRNI-A showed good overall internal consistency for the scale as a whole in both samples; results for the subscales were less robust. Convergent and discriminant validity were assessed with the U.S. sample. Results indicated adequate convergent validity for the MRNI-A for both boys and girls, and adequate discriminant validity for girls. Results for the discriminant validity of the MRNI-A for boys were not as conclusive. Consistent with research on adults, females in both samples endorsed less traditional views of masculinity than did males. Scottish adolescents endorsed less traditional views of masculinity than did Americans.
The Ebbing Wave in Southern Africa
Huntington's third wave of democracy was no such thing. It neither ushered in a democratic era nor was it a wave in any acceptable historical sense. What it did do was to highlight a contrast and competition among norms and values, so that what we automatically regard as undemocratic practice that is norm-free is no such thing. They might perhaps, and with a freight of contingencies, be bad norms—but they are still norms.
Democracy in ASEAN
, and members cannot be suspended or expelled due to domestic political events (such as an unconstitutional change of government). Further, the norm of non-interference means that member states—which are politically diverse—have traditionally refrained
Narratives of Girlhood
In this article I focus on the narratives of girls who describe the events that shape their lives and get them into trouble. The narratives are explored against Darrell Steffensmeier and Emilie Allan’s (1996) proffered Gender Theory, to consider whether it offers an adequate explanatory framework. The article adds to the body of knowledge about girlhood, gender norms, and transgression and provides fresh insight into the relevance of physical strength to girls’ violence. I conclude that girls are defining girlhood as they live it and it is the disjuncture with normative concepts that leads them into conflict with institutions of social control.
EU networks in Vietnam
suffice for it to be a normative actor as non-action can undermine the EU's normative credibility and legitimacy, and any failure to act can impact the EU's credibility and reputation vis-à-vis third parties ( Gebhard, 2017 ). Rather, norm implementation
low democratic progress (or incipient democratic regress) appears to be already packed in the premises of the picture. One last dynamic that needs to be addressed is the distinction between facts and norms, the use of such terms as normative and
Ernst B. Haas, Sally Roever, and Anna Schmidt
Contemporary interstate relations in Europe are proclaimed by
Europeans to be little short of ideal. Every nation and every state is
told to behave toward others as do the states of the European Union.
Inter-European relations, we are told, illustrate the norms to which
everyone should aspire. Moreover, the same civilized rules of political
behavior apply within each country.
In this paper I will explore the relationship between social norms – in the sense of regularities in action which embody moral attitudes – and corruption, in contexts of transcultural interaction. There is a great deal of theoretical unclarity in relation to all the key notions involved, namely, social norms, corruption and transcultural interaction, and yet theoretical clarity is a necessary precursor to resolving the empirical and policy issues in this area, including empirical and policy issues of great importance for the future of many countries involved in the process of globalisation. Accordingly, in the first section of this paper I will spend some time on theoretical clarification.1 In the last section of the paper I will make some tentative suggestions concerning the connections between social norms and corruption in transcultural interactions, and illustrate these suggestions by use of two well-known transcultural corruption scandals, namely, Bhopal in India, and Lockheed in Japan. The informing idea here is that examination of such major scandals is likely to reveal underlying institutional conditions and processes which are conducive to corruption, but which go largely unnoticed in the normal course of events; it takes a major corruption scandal to bring these underlying conditions and processes to the surface.2
Much previous scholarly work has noted the gendered nature of humor and the notion that women use comedy in a different way than do their male peers. Drawing on prior work on gender and humor, and my ethnographic work on teen girl cultures, I explore in this article how young women utilize popular cultural texts as well as everyday and staged comedy as part of a gendered resource that provides potential sites for sex-gender transgression and conformity. Through a series of vignettes, I explore how girls do funny and provide a backdrop to perform youthful gendered identities, as well as establish, maintain, and transgress cultural and social boundaries. Moving on to explore young women and stand-up I question the potential in mobilizing humor as an educational resource and a site in which to explore sex-gender norms with young people.