The article draws upon the formal coalition literature to demonstrate that party system change over the last thirty years means that the Volksparteien enjoy more coalition options and greater ideological leverage within coalitions that form than was the case in the past. The Free Democrats have lost their kingmaker status and the distribution of party weights over recent elections allows no other small party to act in this manner. By contrast, the numerical and ideological resources possessed by the two Volksparteien means that they remain the only parties within the German party system that can act as formateur in the coalition game and are less vulnerable to threats of a decisive defection by small parties to alternative coalitions than they were in the past.
Frank Decker and Jared Sonnicksen
The recent Bundestag election in Germany warrants consideration for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that the results are indicative of several trends developing since unification and that will continue to play an important, if not ever increasing role in German politics. These developments include the intensifying fragmentation of the German party system and German voters' growing electoral volatility, both of which are hampering the parties' ability to form government coalitions. In the following article, we distill five fundamental aspects of the election. Building upon this analysis, we explore their meaning as well as potential impact on the German party system and partisan competition, as well as coalition patterns. At the same time, we address the overarching question of whether—and if so, to what extent—German politics is experiencing a trend toward bipolarity between a center-right and left camp and whether such an antagonistic model will be a passing phase or is indicative of a more established five-party system in Germany.
The Social Democrats at the Crossroads
Andreas M. Wüst
Coalition lost 13.8 percentage points; albeit the cdu / csu more (−8.6 points) than the spd (−5.2 points). In light of the success of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD, 12.6 percent)—now the third largest parliamentary group in the Bundestag
The German Party System Before and After the 2017 Federal Election
Frank Decker and Philipp Adorf
( pds )/Left—continues to be regarded as a rather problematic if not unacceptable coalition partner, 4 the AfD’s emergence has created a similar constellation on the right. The spd ’s dubious pleasure of facilitating the rise of new and viable parties
In 2008 the first state-level CDU-Green coalition was formed in Hamburg. Drawing on the literature on party goals (vote-, office-, policy, internal cohesion- and democracy-seeking), this article examines the GAL's decisions to join and to end the coalition. It examines the trade-offs between party goals as they evolved in different phases of “schwarz-grün,” with particular reference to the Greens' education reform agenda. While policy- and vote-seeking complemented each other during the election campaign, vote-, office- and party unity-seeking conflicted with each other in the Greens' decision to enter a coalition with the CDU. Later, policy- and democracy-seeking conflicted with each other when a referendum organized by a citizens' initiative defeated the Greens' education reform, a defeat that contributed significantly to the premature end of the CDU-Green coalition. New elections led to defeats for vote-, office-, and policy-seeking when the SPD achieved an absolute majority.
The eighteenth Bundestag elections of 22 September 2013 brought important changes to the Bundestag party system, some of which are contingent but others of which are more systemic and profound. The narrow failure of the FDP to scale the electoral threshold has had an impact on coalition negotiations and the improvement in the overall vote share for the CDU/CSU and the SPD, for the first time since the 1960s represents a significant, if probably only temporary, concentration of the German party system in the Bundestag. More systemically, the election saw a continuation of the ongoing redistribution of voting power in the Bundestag in favor of the catch-all parties as formateurs. The article also discusses how the increased importance of the potential formateuer parties has gone hand-in-hand with a greater focus on the individual leading candidates, and concludes that this is particularly good news for the CDU/CSU, given the political qualities of Angela Merkel and the failure of the SPD to find and support a leading candidate that can match her political acumen.
Elisabetta De Giorgi
As summed up by Denis Verdini, coordinator of Forza Italia (FI), in an
interview in La Repubblica after the constitutional congress of People
of Liberty (PdL) at the end of March 2009, “It is more difficult to unite
the elites than to unite the voters.” This assessment is especially apt
considering the tensions that have characterized relations between
allies in the government during the early part of the current coalition’s
tenure. This analysis can be extended to the entire government,
which, beyond the newly formed PdL—composed of FI, the National
Alliance (AN), and a small sub-group of the Christian Democrats
who support northern Italian autonomy—also includes the Northern
League (LN) of Umberto Bossi and some smaller parties, represented
by a team of junior ministers: the Liberal Populists (a faction within
the PdL), the Christian Democratic Party (DC), and the Movement for
Autonomy (MpA) of the president of Sicily, Raffaele Lombardo.
While the Federal Republic has been famously characterized as a "grand coalition state," the Merkel government, formed in the after-math of the 2005 federal election, is only the second CDU/CSU-SPD coalition at the federal level since 1949. A comparison of the present administration with the first grand coalition government (1966-1969) reveals a wealth of differences that include some of the basic parameters of governing and governance in Germany, such as the structure of the party system and the overall public climate. Also, the personnel features and patterns of informal coalition governance under Chancellors Angela Merkel and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger display major differences. Arguably the single most important difference between the two administrations, however, relates to the level of public policy, with the Merkel government seeking to reverse some of the key decisions of its historical predecessor. Such u-turn dynamics have been particularly tangible in the field of federal system reform.
A comparison of the 2005-2009 cabinet Merkel I (the “Grand“ Coalition) and the Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition cabinet Merkel II formed in 2009 presents an interesting puzzle. Political commentators and coalition theorists alike would have expected the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition to experience a relatively high, and the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition a relatively low level of overt inter-party conflict. In reality, however, relations in the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition were relatively conflictive, whereas the Grand Coalition seemed to manage conflict between reluctant partners successfully. This article seeks to explain these seemingly paradoxical differences between the two coalitions. It demonstrates that both the positioning of the coalition parties in the policy space and important institutions constraining coalition bargaining after the formation of the cabinet Merkel II (portfolio allocation, role of the CDU/CSU state minister presidents) disadvantaged the FDP in pursuing its key policy goals (especially tax reform). As a result, the Liberals resorted to “noisy“ tactics in the public sphere. The grand coalition, by contrast, was an alliance of co-equals, which facilitated a more consensual management of inter-party conflict.
In October 1998 the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens1
formed a coalition government, the first ever between these parties at
the federal level. In more ways than one, this new coalition marked a
watershed in Germany’s post-1945 development. Since 1945, Germany
had been a democracy in which political parties hold an especially
privileged position. This “party-state” has operated almost
exclusively through the three major “Bonn” parties, which for nearly
a half-century had governed through shifting coalitions. The Greens
arose as a social movement challenging this hegemony; yet, only fifteen
years after they first entered the Bundestag, they forged a federal
coalition with one of the established parties they had once attacked.
For the first time since 1957, a coalition had been formed that
involved not only a party other than the three “Bonn” parties but also
one not linked to the Federal Republic’s creation. It was, furthermore,
the first coalition ever to have resulted unambiguously from
the wishes of voters.