This article studies the question of history during the dramatic moments recorded in Léon Werth's Déposition: Journal de guerre 1940-1944. Analyzed in reference to Nietzsche, Descartes, and Lévinas, Werth's journal approaches history in a manner timely for then and now. Probing his own knowledge of and relation to France's unsettling defeat and Occupation by Nazi Germany,Werth undertakes his own version of a Cogito that leads not to some linear chain of syllogisms, but instead to an acute sense of implication in and even responsibility for history. Werth's lucidity, engagement, and ethics constrast favorably with Nietzsche's elitist, exclusionary vitalism as well as with the rationalist solitude of the Descartes' Discours de la méthode. His probing reflexions on his relation to historical events offer significant parallels to the philosophical project of Emmanuel Lévinas.
Léon Werth's Déposition: Journal de guerre 1940-1944
Let me start with an apparent aside. In the midst of his dialectical demolition of Foucault’s Histoire de la folie, in “Cogito et histoire de la folie,” Derrida argues that although Foucault wants to do an archeology of madness’s silence, an archeo-logy is a logically ordered work (465), and that even though Foucault wants to protest against reason’s sequestration of madness, “reason in the classical age” can only be brought before the tribunal of Reason in general (466), which could then rule on the unreasonableness of classical reason.
When remembering the past, the past appears as my own. After all, I cannot properly speaking recollect any other past than the one that I have lived, even though I can remember events from the historical past and from personal histories recounted to me by others. Authentic recollection occurs necessarily in the first person, i.e. I remember myself in given situations, circumstances and places. Recollection is therefore a cogito experience par excellence, despite the fact that I may have become estranged from my past engagements, emotional attachments or culinary preferences. The difference between myself in the past and myself in the present does not put the underlying identity of one life into question. Memory affirms my personal identity, despite the temporal difference and in that difference, it appears therefore as a privileged context for inquiry into subjective life and possibly even as the ground for upholding the contested notion of “the subject.”1 No wonder then that the way philosophers theorize memory is indicative of their conception of subjectivity as a whole. In what follows, I turn to Sartre and to Husserl with the aim of unveiling how their accounts of recollection resolve the question of identity and difference within the temporality of a subjective life. Tracing Sartre’s arguments against Husserl’s, as well as Husserl’s and Sartre’s own presentations of recollection, I inquire into the reasons that incited them to bring either the aspect of sameness or otherness at the heart of subjective life into view.
A Defense of Lacanian Responsibility
critiques take aim at the inadequacy of theories that they take to oversimplify subjectivity by reinstating the illusory ego back into the fortified position of the cogito. The point of divergence between the two, as the story goes, is that where Sartre
clearly. Was the Sartrean cogito the best place to start off from if one wanted to account for South Africa’s racial/colonial antagonism? Just what was the conceptual purchase of the former on the latter? In order to split this subject from itself, so as
Sartre on Pure Reflection in Response to Husserl & Levinas
approached the cogito better than Descartes himself: Descartes does not go back to the source of the evidence of the cogito ; he does not search for its root in the being of consciousness which renders this evidence possible. 20 In other words
Charles William Johns and Marcos A. Norris
-Christianity’ and a successful illumination of divergences between himself and Heidegger. These last two sections critically highlight Sartre's complex loyalty to the Cartesian tradition of the cogito as an absolutely free capacity for ‘pure consciousness’ (92) and
Le cas de Laëtitia ou la fin des hommes
’un sujet humain. De ce fait, au lieu de situer le Cogito au centre des connaissances comme point de départ et référence de base, on considère le moi pensant ou le sujet comme une construction plutôt illusoire et trompeuse, en tout cas entièrement secondaire
Sartre lecteur de Brice Parain
pouvoir accompagner toutes mes représentations » – qui précède toute l'expérience du langage. Ensuite, le cogito , du moins dans son être irréfléchi, n'est pas un fait de grammaire, comme l'affirme une « lamentable analyse » de Nietzsche, mais il faut au
matériaux cosmogoniques que constituent les mythes et récits. Il importe de préciser que parler de rationalité, c'est de fait évoquer l'homme en tant qu'être pensant, si du moins l'on se réfère au cogito cartésien, “Je pense donc je suis”, qui fait aussi