analysis of counter-violence, is not simply the responsibility of the West. In other words, terrorism, while there is certainly a reactionary component to it, is more than simply counter-violence. Žižek argues (from a Hegelian perspective) that too often
Is Liberation without Freedom Possible?
investigate the possibility of interpreting fundamentalist Islamic terrorism as a form of counter-violence, as presented in the unfinished, posthumously published Notebooks for an Ethics . I want to use Islamic terrorism as a sort of case study to test the
A New Idea of Democracy in Sartre's <i>Hope Now</i>
In the Critique of Dialectical Reason and in many interviews, Sartre upheld the proletariat’s attempts at emancipation in Western societies and their revolts in the developing world. In these texts, counter-violence is considered the only way to exercise concrete engagement, and a classless society is presented as the only possibility of reducing social inequalities. However, this radical point of view was not the only perspective he tried to develop. He also sought to elaborate an existentialist ethics, which does not correspond to the Marxist theory. This article aims to show that Sartre evoked Notebooks’ ideas in his last interview, Hope Now, in which he envisaged a different typology of democracy and society. This article will examine this new and last direction of Sartre’s political thought.
Ronald E. Santoni
In this article, I maintain that (1) Sartre's views on violence are ambivalent and (2) Sartre sometimes justifies violence. More specifically, I attempt to establish the misreadings by Michael Fleming and Marguerite LaCaze (on whom Fleming relies) of both my writing and Sartre's in these regards. Each, by arguing that, for Sartre, violence is “sometimes acceptable” or “functionally necessary” or “understandable,” but not morally justifiable, is ignoring Sartre's tendency at times to skirt the issue of justifiability by employing “weasel words” that amount to justification. Both critics seem to forget that Sartre says that, on occasion, violence “could be called just” (qu'on pourrait appeler juste), especially in conditions of last resort defense against oppression, in which case violence, according to Sartre, can restore and regenerate the oppressed. Further, although I acknowledge Fleming's noteworthy emphasis on “structural violence,” I offer considerable counterevidence against his (and LaCaze's) claim that I ignore or slight Sartre's concern for it. I argue, on Sartrean grounds, against his (and Zizek's) claim that structural violence can be purely objective. Finally, I contend that in arguing that Sartre's views are not strictly ambivalent, Fleming, following LaCaze, makes the error of equating “consistency” with not being ambivalent.
Bioculturalist approach can be fruitfully employed to explain why fictional violence is such an integral part of both our art and entertainment. In any cultural context aggression related biological traits are controlled and shaped in order to ensure both the internal order and the security of a community. William Flesch has argued that his process is guided by the tendency to admire altruistic punishers, who without self-interest assume the task of punishing evildoers. Spectators of such actions tend to react to it emotionally, both spontaneously and via reflection, thus giving the experience both an emotional and a meta-emotional aspect. This plays an important role in relating to the ways in which resorting to violence is justified in mainstream films. This scenario has a strong emotional appeal, even if the spectator would deplore such means in real life contexts. This discrepancy emerges even more strongly in the revenge scenario, which in a fictional context can appear satisfying and empowering despite the moral qualms the spectator might have concerning the ethics of revenge. Because of the deeply ingrained cult of individuality and doubts about the efficacy of government in maintaining law and order, these narrative patterns have developed especially strongly within American popular culture. However, judging by the worldwide success of such films, their appeal is nonetheless quite universal.
Matthew C. Eshleman and Ronald E. Santoni
Can violence ever be justified or is violence necessarily oppressive? Is self-defensive counter-violence or “revolutionary violence” aimed at human liberation, which Sartre defended, necessarily in bad faith? These questions form the crux of the debate between Matt Eshleman and Ronald Santoni. Is violence by nature Manichean, making the Other into an “object” and evil antagonist, and thus dehumanizing and oppressing the Other? Or can violence be liberatory when it is directed at oppressors? Both authors—but especially Eshleman, and Santoni reluctantly—agree that some forms of violence (such as self-defense) do not involve bad faith, but disagree about whether or when revolutionary violence can be justified.
John Gillespie and Sarah Richmond
throughout Europe and beyond, and have brought into cruel focus the aims and objectives of ISIS and its jihadist ideals. Maria Russo’s discussion of the legitimacy of such an activity using the criterion of Sartre’s doctrine of counter-violence in the cause
Mark McKinney, Jennifer Howell, Ross William Smith, and David Miranda Barreiro
demands for liberation and that the responsibility for counterviolence cannot be placed on the enslaved’ (119–120). 3 In chapter 7, Christina M. Knopf studies the representation of gender roles during periods of Irish rebellion in Gerry Hunt's graphic
that the act is wrong: “for A to be ‘less immoral’ does not rid it of the bad faith characterized by objectification and by choosing not to see all the evidence regarding the brutality of counter-violence and terror.” Ibid., 80. 28 Ibid., 65. 29 NE
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viewing part of these rebellions as forms of resistance towards an imposed, as well as ineffective, power. Resistance, for this analysis, is not only confined within the classic boundaries of counter-violence (as in the case of West Point’s riots) but