This article offers a corrective to the notion that German ordoliberal ideology is the key to understanding German policy behavior during the Eurocrisis and, by extension, to the contours of the electoral debate in fall 2013. First, it shows that ordoliberal thought underdetermines policy choices. That is, different actors clearly influenced by ordoliberal thinking and often stressing different aspects of the broader ordoliberal cannon are arguing for more or less diametrically opposed policy solutions. Second, the article provides evidence that this deep divide inside the ordoliberal policy community has contributed additional incentives to the tentative and inconclusive policy choices of the government throughout much of the Eurocrisis. Third, the article extends the analysis of this very cautious policymaking into the campaign phase and the subsequent coalition agreement. It explains why the two major German parties—including an SPD with a much thinner attachment than the CDU to ordoliberalism—sought to play down the Eurocrisis in their campaigns and in their subsequent coalition agreement. One implication is the low probability of German policy change despite ideological differences.
A Cautionary Tale
Beverly Crawford Ames and Armon Rezai
Kindleberger’s theory of hegemonic stability states that fixed exchange rate regimes require a leader that will provide it with disproportionate resources to ensure stability. Applying his theory to European monetary cooperation, we argue that, like the tools of Goethe’s “Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” European Monetary Union was constructed as a “self-regulating system,” and it threatens to run amok without a hegemonic leader. Germany has exercised “soft hegemony” in Europe, providing the European Union with disproportionate resources to stabilize the single market. It has the capability to be the Eurozone’s leader. But, by 2017, blinded by its ordoliberal ideology, it refused to do so, instead placing the burden of cooperation on the weak. If Germany continues to refuse to play the role of the hegemonic leader, European Monetary Union faces collapse.
German Reactions to Brexit
characterized German policy preferences towards European Monetary Union in the 1990s and throughout the Eurocrisis. 22 With the resilience of euroskeptic sentiment in virtually every member state—even represented in the Hungarian and Polish governments
Race, Gender, and Reconfigurations of “Europe”
“crisis” in Europe is nothing new: there have been numerous crises of concepts of Europe (and of its constituent nationalities) perceived by intellectuals and public figures across the political spectrum since 1945. The discourse of Euro-crisis is also not
Differentiated Integration , ed. Kenneth Dyson and Angelos Sepos (Basingstoke, 2010), 3–23. 18 Angelos Sepos, “The Centre-Periphery Divide in the Eurocrisis: A Theoretical Approach” in Core-Periphery Relations in the European Union: Power and Conflict in a
Luke B. Wood
Fabbrini, “The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in Comparative Perspective,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 32, no. 1 (2014): 64-118. 15 Erik Eriksen and John Erik Fossum “Bringing European Democracy Back In
A Model Reconsidered
. Importantly, the country’s ever-greater reliance on export-led growth is not the only mechanism through which adjustments in Germany’s labor relations fed the international economic imbalances that precipitated the Eurocrisis and now fuel conflict with the
The Economics of German Natural Gas Imports from Russia, 1982 and 2014 Compared
Stephen G. Gross
German handling of the Euro-crisis have damaged relations between Washington and Berlin and led Merkel to question the United States’ ability to be the global leader she thinks it should be. 78 Given this tense transatlantic relationship as well as the