Europe has been hit by a global financial crisis, and so has Germany. This crisis is associated, among European Union citizens, with the degree of support for European integration: those who are skeptical about the Euro and the debt crises in parts of the Eurozone tend also to be skeptical about European integration more generally. Our main question in this article is whether the pledges of political parties (as issued in their election manifestos) can add to our understanding of electoral choices in Germany. Relating German election results to the German data provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project MRG/CMP/MARPOR research tradition, our expectation is that political parties' European pledges have been irrelevant for the vote over half a century. Now that the European Union is rapidly moving in its postfunctional phase, the election of 2013 is expected to mark a turning point in that regard.
Steven Weldon and Hermann Schmitt
Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-wing Populist Party
“populist moments”—are usually a prerequisite for the spawning of such parties and movements. In the AfD’s case, the euro and financial crisis played that role. It opened the window of opportunity for a new euroskeptic party whose primary policy demands
Coverage of the 2017 Bundestag Election
Alexander Beyer and Steven Weldon
role of the media in the AfD’s breakthrough, this would mean that the media published or promoted a disproportionate share of stories about the AfD or stories directly related to the party’s defining issues: immigration and Euroskepticism. As we will
Brigitte Young and Willi Semmler
Only a decade ago, slow growth and high unemployment plagued Germany, but the "sick man of Europe" has now moved to outperform the Eurozone average growth since the second quarter of 2010. This confirms Germany's recovery and its status as the growth engine of the continent. This surely is a success story. While Germany (also Austria and the Netherlands) is prospering, the peripheral countries in the Eurozone are confronted with a severe sovereign debt crisis. Starting in Greece, it soon spread to countries such as Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In the course of the debate, Germany was blamed for the imbalances in Europe. In short, German export performance and the sustained pressure for moderate wage increases have provided German exporters with the competitive advantage to dominate trade and capital flows within the Eurozone. Thus, Germany is seen as the main beneficiary of the EURO. This argument, however, is vehemently disputed within Germany. Many economists and political leaders reject this argument and point to the flagrant lack of fiscal discipline in many of the peripheral countries. Some prominent economists, such as Hans-Werner Sinn, even disputes that Germany was the main beneficiary of the Eurozone. The paper analyzes the two sides of the controversy, and asks whether we are witnessing a more inwardlooking and Euroskeptic Germany. These issues will be analyzed by first focusing on the role of Germany in resolving the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, and the European Union negotiations for a permanent rescue mechanism. We conclude by discussing some possible explanations for Germany's more assertive and more Euroskeptic position during these negotiations.
Comparing German Party Responses to the Euro Crisis
ineffective in exploiting the cdu ’s response to the euro crisis, highlighting each party’s ideological stance and internal conflicts on the issue. The Social Democrats Remarkably, neither the Social Democrats nor the euroskeptics in Merkel’s coalition were
contributed towards the deepening of the eu ’s lingering legitimacy problem. This is reflected by the dwindling levels of trust in eu -level institutions and policies, as well as the growing support for euroskeptic populist parties on the far left and far
Edited by H. C.
interest groups to represent them. Charles Maier pursues another of Stanley’s lifelong scholarly concerns—Europe’s postwar project of economic and political integration—by interrogating the claim, often made by Euroskeptics, that Europe lacks a “demos” (a
Examining the Alternative for Germany in European Context
points to disruptive populist strategies, centrifugal polarization trends and parliamentary shifts which are, too, reflective of European political developments. From a Euroskeptic to a European Radical Right-Wing Populist Party? The Political and
German Reactions to Brexit
eu . This scheme was intended to placate the vocal euroskeptic wing of the Conservative Party, which had long been a disruptive force. The strengthening of the right-wing nationalist uk Independence Party ( ukip ) led by Nigel Farage—which won the
Pegida as a European Far-Right Populist Movement
Helga Druxes and Patricia Anne Simpson
, Pegida capitalizes on Euroskeptic nativist tendencies and Islamophobia. Its supporters can be found in various East and West German cities and increasingly also transnationally, in the uk , Estonia, Spain, Hungary, Russia, and the United States. 5