down chunks of grey, graffiti-spattered concrete and cheer. As I was about to graduate from high school, however, seven years later, I thought I had understood it. The ‘Evil Empire’ had collapsed; in the words of Francis Fukuyama, we had arrived at ‘the
Shakespeare and War
Honour at the Stake
A comforting notion in much recent scholarly work on political regimes is that what, broadly, has come to be termed liberal democracy reflects the normative ‘telos’ of the modern world’s developmental trajectory. Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man stands as an almost iconic, if perhaps somewhat coarsely crafted, statement of this view. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi have, in Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, presented a nuanced, empirically well grounded case for the general relative superiority of liberal democracy as a political framework for richer economies, and as a framework that societies will tend to adopt, with fewer dangers of regression, as they become wealthier. Even the economies of poorer countries—contrary to some earlier views—appear to grow and prosper no better under authoritarian regimes than they do under liberal democratic dispensations, not least with regard to the efficiency of resource allocation. Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom bears eloquent testimony to the wider social, political and ethical virtues of liberal democracy. After all, liberal democracies promise greater individual freedoms, better protection of rights, and better mechanisms for public policy formation and assessment than do authoritarian or ‘totalitarian’ forms of state. They also do not go to war against one another.
Politics, Consumption, or Nihilism
Protest and Disorder after the Global Crash
Bob Jeffery, Joseph Ibrahim, and David Waddington
The years since the onset of global recession, circa 2008, have led to an unprecedented rise in discontent in societies around the world. Whether this be the Arab Spring of 2011 when popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes cascaded across North Africa and the Middle East, or the rise of left-wing, anti-capitalist and far-right movements in the developed 'north', ranging from the Indignados in Spain, Syriza and the Golden Dawn in Greece, Le Front National in France, student movements in Quebec, or the allegedly less articulate explosion of rage characterizing the English Riots of 2011, it is clear that Fukuyama's thesis regarding the final ascendency of liberal capitalism (and its puppet regimes in the developing world) was grossly misplaced. In Badiou's (2012) terms we are witnessing 'the rebirth of history', where all bets regarding the trajectories of local and global political economies are off.
Opportunity in the Crisis of Democracy
Jean-Paul Gagnon and George Vasilev
union-state ( Fukuyama and Gagnon 2014: 52–53 ; Gagnon 2011) , any democratic regime is actually a blend of different types of governing systems and ideals, and not a product of one uniform template that is copied universally. It is the blend of
On a Concept of Black Politics
critical of and transgressive in the field of normative political discourse, where normativity is also Eurocentrism. Thus, the affirmation of normativity, universalism and inclusivity in normative political discourse is consistent with Fukuyama's (2006
Ready to discuss our future?
The Kapuscinski Development Lectures
Wanjira Mathai. And how about asking Francis Fukuyama about the end of history, challenging Joseph Stiglitz, Thomas Piketty, or Tony Blair on inequality, learning from Esther Duflo how to reduce poverty effectively, or reforming the world financial system
Myra Marx Ferree, Hanno Balz, John Bendix, Meredith Heiser-Duron, Jeffrey Luppes, Stephen Milder, and Randall Newnham
, theoretical section, Bednarz starts with an attack on neoliberal theory and its explanation of the demise of East Germany. He focuses first on Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis published originally in the spring of 1989. 5 He makes fair points, but
The (R)evolution Is Dead, Long Live the (r)evolution!
Daniel P. Ritter
2004 ), “democratic” ( Thompson 2004 ), “electoral” ( Wilson 2011 ), “color” ( Beissinger 2007 ), “self-limiting” ( Staniszkis 1984 ), and “unarmed” ( Ritter 2015 ). 3 Francis Fukuyama (1989) famously argued that with communism's end the future
Democracies and Their Crises Reconsidered
Wolfgang Merkel and Jean-Paul Gagnon
encountering disease—what, for comparison, Francis Fukuyama (2014) has recently been calling democratic decay. “Democracy losing its democratic content” can identify a form of prolonged diffuse crisis and also instances of acute crisis. As a conceptual tool
Chinese Contemplations on Utopian and Dystopian Democratic Governance
practice of grass-root democracy via village elections. During the early 1990s, it was the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Francis Fukuyama's announcement of an “end of history” and his prediction of an inevitable regime transformation of the few