Mark Huberty, Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University The development of the high-technology startup sector in Germany is critical for the adjustment of the German economy to growing international competition in traditional industrial sectors. The article explores whether changes to the German venture capital financing sector in the period 1995-2005 indicate an improved development path for high-technology startup firms. Based on the volumes and structure of venture capital investments during this period, I conclude that the venture capital sector has undergone substantial change in favor of financing and supporting high-technology startup firms. However, small firm behavior suggests that even with a changed venture capital sector, the overall regulatory structure of the German economy will result in lower rates of firm success than otherwise would be expected from a resurgent venture capital market. The policy implication is that, without additional regulatory reform favoring small, high-technology enterprises, the transformation of German industry will continue to be constrained.
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In German Politics and Society
- Published (Print):
- 01 Sep 2006
- Article Type:
- Research Article
- Pages:
- 20–40
Stephen Kalberg
The disagreement between Germany and the United States over the
war in Iraq was massive. During the winter of 2002, many observers
spoke of a long-term rift between these longstanding allies and a
total loss of credibility on both sides. No one can doubt, regardless
of recent healing overtures,1 that the German-American partnership
has been altered and significantly weakened. It has suffered a blow
far more damaging than those that accompanied past conflicts over,
for example, Ostpolitik, the neutron bomb, the Soviet gas pipeline,
the flow of high technology products to the Soviet Union, the imposition
of trade sanctions in 1980 against the military government in
Poland, the stationing in the late 1970s of middle-range missiles on
German soil, and the modernization of short-range missiles in 1989.
Jutta A. Helm
For more than a century, Germany has had a well-balanced system
of cities showcasing considerable variety in their social and physical
make-up. It has lacked spectacular global cities like New York,
Tokyo, or London. Instead, western cities include industrial cities
like those in the Rhine-Ruhr Valley and cities shaped by universities
and research (Göttingen or Freiburg), media and publishing (Hamburg),
culture and high-technology sectors (Munich), banking and
finance (Frankfurt/Main), wholesale trade and insurance (Cologne
and Düsseldorf), as well as government and administration (Berlin,
Bonn, and most state capitals). Dramatic social or economic crises
that generate debates about urban decline have not happened.
Thanks in part to effective urban governments, no German city has
come close to the near-collapse of American rustbelt cities during
the early 1980s, or the fiscal meltdown of New York City in the
1970s. Crime has been consistently lower and less violent, and the
American racial divide has no equivalent in German cities. East German
cities, while more unevenly developed, have been no less stable.
East Berlin was the dominant center, linked to the industrial
cities in the North (Rostock) and South (Leipzig, Halle, Dresden) by
a rather creaky infrastructure.
Ocean, Motion, Emotion
Mobilities and Mobilizations in the Pacific
Matt Matsuda
Pacific across centuries has been trade—the movement of goods from sago and fish, to silk and spices, to sugar and copra, to petroleum and high technology. Not all of the trade was commodities, however; sometimes it involved bodies and lives resettled in
Fern Thompsett
theorists, including Autonomous Marxists, contend that the present era is characterised by a form of high-technology capitalism that cultivates and exploits the ‘general intellect’ as ‘human capital’ ( Dyer-Witheford 1999 ). In other words, pedagogies that
Is there a link?
Japan’s internal cohesion and external conflict with neighbors
Robert W. Compton Jr.
developmental state att ributes. As an example, he shows how new well-being centers (WBCs) to service the elderly rely on the Finnish model of WBCs of service and high-technology conglomerates working together to create clusters of cooperation. This type of
Water scarcity and sustainability in the arid area of North America
Insights gained from a cross-border perspective
Alejandro Yáñez-Arancibia and John W. Day
States overall ( Parry et al., 2004 ), or perhaps for crops in the coast of México ( Azuz-Adeath, 2015 ). However, this is not the case for more arid regions of the US agricultural system where irrigation, fertilization, and high technology support large
Klaus Berghahn, Russell Dalton, Jason Verber, Robert Tobin, Beverly Crawford, and Jeffrey Luppes
to subsidize development in Europe’s poorer regions and thereby strengthen “cohesion” in the eu . Although Germany is the world’s third largest conventional arms exporter, the German government put restrictions on its own high technology exporters
Place of Birth and Concepts of Wellbeing
An Analysis from Two Ethnographic Studies of Midwifery Units in England
Christine McCourt, Juliet Rayment, Susanna Rance, and Jane Sandall
experience in childbirth was distinct from, rather than related to safety. They also challenged the view that hospitals, with provision of potentially life-saving high-technology equipment and a concentration of professional expertise, would automatically
The Euro, The Gold Standard, and German Power
A Cautionary Tale
Beverly Crawford Ames and Armon Rezai
Germany contributes disproportionately to the eu ’s nonproliferation export control efforts, imposing more stringent restrictions on its own high technology exporters than other members. 33 Being by far the largest of the environmentally progressive
In German Politics and Society
- Published (Print):
- 01 Dec 2017
- Article Type:
- Research Article
- Pages:
- 77–104