In this paper I examine the role of emotions in the initial development of self-awareness through intersubjective communication between mother and infant. I argue that the empirical evidence suggests that the infant's ability to communicate is initially an ability of the infant to share emotions with the mother. In section one I examine the biological foundations that allow infants from birth to interact with others of their own kind, focusing on the abilities which allow them to engage in emotional relationships with others. These include an infant's ability to express, share, and regulate emotions as well as her brain's ability to imitate the neuronal activity of another. In section two, I explore the fit between Sartre's phenomenologically-based account of intersubjectivity in Being and Nothingness and the accounts from psychology and neuroscience that I've examined in section one, focusing on his phenomenology of the Look and the emotional response he claims it elicits. In section three I examine the explanatory gap objection that Sartre among others could raise to my attempt to understand phenomenological accounts of human reality and scientific ones in light of each other. I don't have any final answer to this objection, but I offer some thoughts on why I think it's less of a problem than it might first appear to be.
Jean-Paul Sartre's account of the Look in Being and Nothingness is not straightforward and many conflicting interpretations have arisen due to apparent contradictions in Sartre's own writing. The Look, for Sartre, demonstrates how the self gains thematic awareness of the body, forming a public and self-conscious sense of how the body appears to others and, furthermore, illustrates affective and social aspects of embodied being. In this article, I will critically explore Sartre's oft-cited voyeur vignette in order to provide a coherent account of the Look and to illustrate the significance of intersubjectivity and self-consciousness in Sartre's work. Through considering Sartre's voyeur vignette and other examples of reflective self-consciousness, this article will examine epistemological, self-evaluative and ontological concerns in the constitution of reflective self-consciousness. It will be contended that Sartre's accounts of the Look and reflective self-consciousness within social relations can provide insight into the intersubjective nature of the shaping of the body and the significance of self-presentation within the social realm.
By means of a tale of food poisoning as retribution, this article describes a kind of reasoning that consciously defies commonsense logic. The lived validity of this form of reasoning emphasizes the necessity of an epistemology for anthropology that puts the analysis of relations between people at the heart of our understanding of human reasoning and its ontogeny. An ethnographic analysis of how certain island Fijians give form to kinship relations through the production, exchange, circulation, giving, and consumption of food suggests that it is the very specificity of intersubjective relations between particular persons that make them a proper focus for the anthropologist's attention. It follows that intersubjectivity is central to anthropology as an epistemological project whose fugitive object of study can only be ourselves, even while its focus is bound to be on others.
Restoring Viable Relations in Emigrant Gambia
discourses on aspirant migrants and on the influence that families and migrants have on them. Second, I show how an existential, intersubjective approach to mobility may help us not only to access these motivations, but also to unpack some of the
Comprehending Subjectivity in Vietnam and Beyond
Tine M. Gammeltoft
significant others, that is, strivings for ‘intersubjective belonging’. The notion of intersubjective belonging refers, as I use it here, to people’s sense of attachment to other individuals—to the sense of connection that can arise out of joint social
Thoughts on Sartre, Lacan, and Contemporary Psychoanalysis
understand language as practico-inert. We must also make a place for speech and other human world-making activity as praxis. If we are going to emphasize intersubjectivity, which Sartre like the postmodernists thinks we must do, it must be an
Pascal Wallisch and Jake Alden Whritner
produced movie achieves much higher synchronization between viewers than footage of unstructured scenes ( Hasson et al. 2008 ). This is also reflected in the intersubjective synchronization of brain activity ( Hasson et al. 2004 , 2009), particularly in the
The Generative Power of Political Emotions
Mette-Louise Johansen, Therese Sandrup, and Nerina Weiss
important to us” ( Goodenough 1997: 6 ). We concord with these authors that the emotion emerges in the intersubjective field, as it only occurs when infringed by others, and is most explicitly expressed and experienced when collectively shared. The
On Being In-Between in a Global Health Intervention
the storytelling format because, as she compellingly argues, ‘narrative better captures the complexity of a research praxis that unfolds in and through complicated intersubjective relationships’ (128). (In)auspicious Beginnings and Messy Middles
A Haptic Reading of Phil Solomon’s Experimental Films
identification with a diegetic character. Film viewing is thus conceived as a venue for dynamic intersubjective communication, involving the spectator, the film, and the maker. 3 In this article I highlight haptic apparatuses at work in Solomon’s films. Beyond