This article addresses the question of why Israel initiated the Second Lebanon War so quickly, despite the civilian agenda to which the government had been committed, other mitigating factors, and the fact that the kidnapping of two soldiers did not warrant such a massive operation. Arguably, the war reflected the syndrome of a gap of legitimacies, that is, the gap that has emerged since the 1980s between high levels of political legitimacy for using force and low levels of social legitimacy for making the attendant sacrifices. Both values led to belligerency. Strong support for the use of force pushed Israel into taking offensive action that a civilian government could not contain, while the low level of social legitimation for sacrifice led to speedy decision-making and the desire for a swift conclusion by using massive force. Such a response would obviate any restraints on military action that might result from discussions about how to avoid sacrifices.
The 2006 Lebanon War
Amnon Cavari and Itay Gabay
Local television news is the most-watched news source in America, yet we know very little about how local channels cover foreign events. In this article, we examine and compare the news coverage of the 2006 Lebanon War on local and network news channels in the United States. Applying Entman's framing functions, we find that the local news coverage of this war was significantly more supportive of the Israeli position compared to the coverage of the same event on network news. We suggest that this difference is due to features of the local newsroom, including economic and institutional constraints, as well as newsroom routines that result in the tendency of the local media to comply with the positions of the US authorities.
In the early morning of 12 July 2006, Lebanese Hezbollah guerrillas
kidnapped two Israeli soldiers on border patrol and killed a further
eight. A similar episode had occurred on 25 June at the Kerem Shalom
kibbutz. Members of the radical wing of Hamas seized Corporal Gilad
Shalit, leading to the death of two fellow soldiers. The government of
Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert, had responded by initiating a
vast military offensive in the Gaza Strip, leading to the arrest of, among
others, 9 members of the Palestinian government and 20 parliamentarians.
The two events were closely related: the Hezbollah leader, Hassan
Nasrallah, stated that the movement, with this gesture, had intended to
support the struggle of Hamas, as well as solicit an exchange of prisoners.
The reaction of Israel was once again expeditious: the “asymmetric”
war lasted 34 days, with over 1,500 dead. The risk of the conflict
spreading—with the indirect involvement of Syria and Iran, traditional
supporters and financiers of Hezbollah—and the diffusion in the Middle
East of a belief in terrorism as an indisputable instrument for the
defense of national causes were evident. In the background was Iraq,
by now subject to increasingly severe convulsions.
This article deals with the disappearance of Menachem Begin, the leader and the chairman of the Herut movement and the sixth Prime Minister of Israel (1977-1983). He disappeared from the political arena for about half a year: from the defeat of his party in the elections of the Second Knesset (26 July 1951) until the debate in the Knesset about the reparations from West Germany. Four central topics will be discussed: (1) the reasons for his disappearance; (2) his whereabouts and activities during that period; (3) the reason for his return to the political arena and the connection between his return and the debate about the reparations; and (4) the significance of this story for Begin's biography.
From 'Forging' to 'Deciphering'
Zeev Lerer and Sarit Amram-Katz
This article discusses the links between military knowledge production and the cultural representations of war based on the Israeli experience during the past two decades. It argues that the locus of military knowledge production has moved from what can be described as 'forging knowledge' to 'deciphering knowledge'. This transition is linked to a crisis in the classic representation of war, which is based on the congruence between three binary signifiers: enemy, arena, and violence. The article asserts that the blurring of these three signifiers has created a Bourdieuian field of military knowledge production in which symbolic capital is obtained from the production of knowledge that deciphers the new uncertainty. The article follows the relations between the binaries and the types of knowledge that have been imported and translated in the IDF with regard to four major operational settings: the Oslo redeployment, the Second Intifada, the disengagement from Gaza, and the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War.
Battle Missives in the Israel Defense Forces
sense of solidarity and to justify sacrifice. However, the First Lebanon War in 1982 marked a turning point. Israeli commanders turned to rational justifications for risking life in battle, using less emotive and more realistic language that emphasized
Lebanon War, which took place in 2006 along the border between northern Israel and southern Lebanon, was characterized by what Hoffman saw as the convergence of challengers and methods into “multi-modal or Hybrid Wars” (ibid.: 28). Hezbollah, in this view
On Colin Shindler’s Respublica Hebraeorum
Arie M. Dubnov
mind, taken from the 1973 Battle of the Chinese Farm in Sinai or the ruthless battles of Emek HaBacha (Valley of Tears) on the Golan Heights in the same war, or from the relentless battles in Lebanon during and after the First Lebanon War. Their heroism
soldiers. These are the songs that they scribble on the walls of the latrines and sing during training runs or at parties on the base. These songs are largely unknown to civilians on the home front, who became aware of them only during the First Lebanon War
Translation and Reception, 1918–2018
Yael Halevi-Wise and Madeleine Gottesman
1967, the First Lebanon War in 1982, the Oslo Accords in 1993, and the Second Intifada from 2000. Still, it is important to keep in mind that historical events may affect translation trends less than economic factors, as well as a delicate network of