our perceptual relations with the world, which, for her, are necessarily mediated by an imaginary. This last position is one she shares with Maurice Merleau-Ponty. But in accepting it, Merleau-Ponty offers a very different account of the relation
Ethical Experience, Trauma, and History
section, I will use Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of institution to synthesize these accounts to articulate a model of distributed affectivity in cinematic experience. I will close by looking at the ways that this model can help to articulate the
Loving and Grieving with Heart of a Dog and Merleau-Ponty's Depth
. In this article, I look to the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty's later writing on depth in order to approach but not try to measure Anderson's film and its poetic evocations of loss. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's “Eye and Mind” and other relevant texts
Ideology and Representation in the Zen Garden
Allen S. Weiss
It is impossible to separate the semiological from the mytho- logical, the poetic from the historical, the aesthetic from the ideo- logical. Since, as the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty insisted, any entity can be taken as an emblem of Being, one must be attentive to the symbolic power and semiotic valences of every word, object, and image. This article is an attempt to sketch out the role of the rock in Zen-inspired Japanese gardens and, consequently, to offer a new inter- pretation of one of the most famous gardens in the world, Ryōan-ji.
Despite their common roots in the phenomenological tradition, Jean- Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty differed markedly in the way they formulated the problem of being-in-the-world. As is well-known, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943) emphasized the dualistic, oppositional, and even antagonistic relationship between human consciousness and the world inhabited by consciousness, while Merleau-Ponty, in texts such as Phenomenology of Perception (1945) and The Visible and the Invisible (1964, posthumous), conceptualised a kind of originary communion between consciousness and world that stressed their imbrication rather than their separateness.
The work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty has enjoyed a marginal presence within Anglo-American sociology and social theory for many years, particularly within the phenomenological and interactionist camps. In more recent years, however, his profile has grown. This is due largely to the growth of sociological interest in embodiment, a theme which Merleau-Ponty’s work addresses at length, and perhaps also to the rise to prominence within sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, whose work is influenced by that of Merleau-Ponty, particularly in relation to themes of embodiment and habit. Loic Wacquant1 has described Bourdieu as the ‘sociological heir’ of Merleau-Ponty and many other writers2 have identified the connection between the two thinkers as pivotal in their attempts to elucidate the nature and contribution of Bourdieu’s thought. It is perhaps only natural, therefore, that Bourdieu’s recently elevated standing in Anglo-American sociology should entail some reflected glory for Merleau-Ponty too.
Democracy, Identification, and Embodiment
The significance of embodiment has long been overlooked in theories of deliberative democracy. Deliberation is characterized by inclusive and rational discussion that functions in an allegedly neutral and abstract space. This article draws attention to the bodies between which political interaction always occurs. Bodies have important yet unpredictable effects for political interaction and can extend or disorder the careful conscious conversation invoked by deliberative democrats. Identities are reproduced by bodies, and bodies may conform to or transform their identifications. Using Merleau-Ponty's notion of habitual knowledge, the article argues that bodies provide limitations, capacities, and opportunities for democratic politics. At the same time, bodies and their identifications are themselves transformed through deliberation and other types of political experience.
John Gillespie and Sarah Richmond
postmodernist social framework. Lennon’s proposal that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s thought overcomes the criticisms applied to those accounts by making ‘imaginary form a way of expressively manifesting the possibilities of the real’ is a helpful addition to this
Marissa C. de Baca
theoretical link. Drawing from the urban theorist Henri Lefebvre and the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the author connects the differential body and urban space. This link blurs the boundary between the human form and the external world. In Chapter 4
Ghosting a History without Shadows
Duane H. Davis
actions carried out in the name of revolution, how do we reconcile the apparent contradiction between political ideals and historical forces in revolutionary praxis? 2 This article concerns entirely the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty on a topic for which